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VSU M M A R Y
In  the past few  decades many sectors of the marine transport 
in d u s t r y  have been sub jec t to ra p id  te ch n o lo g ica l and 
organ isational change. The reason fo r  tha t is tha t sh ipp ing is 
today a h ig h ly  com pe tit ive  and, thus, a constan tly  changing 
indus try . Innovations in modern shipping practice challenge the 
Law to respond to these changing circumstances.
A second im p o rtan t fea ture  of the shipping in d u s try  is tha t 
contracts of carriage by sea are perform ed in special and often 
hazardous conditions. This factor was c learly  ins trum en ta l in the 
deve lopm ent of the sea carrier's  du ty  to prov ide  a seaw orthy 
ship.1
A th ird  noticeable feature is tha t shipping is essentia lly  an 
in te rna tiona l business; this means tha t there is a great desire fo r 
in te rna t iona l u n ifo rm ity  in M arit im e  Law. This desire has been 
satisfied in  an in te r-gove rnm en ta l agreement w h ich  resu lted in 
the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules.2
Under these Rules, the fundam enta l duties of the ca rr ie r are 
duties of due diligence, diligence in  caring fo r cargo and diligence 
in  preparing his ship fo r sea. I t  is the la tte r  du ty  tha t has been 
selected fo r  detailed study, and w h ich  the w r i te r  is concerned 
w i th  in this thesis.
Also as i t  is intended tha t the Hamburg Rules w i l l  even tua lly
1 See Dockray, M., Cases and materials on the carriage of goods bv sea. 
Abingdon, Professional Books limited, 1987, p. 1.
2 Ibid, at p. 1.
replace the Hague Rules, we are bound to look a t the changes 
b rought by the new Convention in  respect of the shipowner's 
du ty  to provide a seaworthy ship.
Thus, in th is  w o rk , the carr ie r 's  undertak ing  to p rov ide  a 
seaw orthy ship, is studied com para tive ly  under the d i f fe re n t 
regimes of Common and conventional Laws.
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1INTRODUCTION
D uring the las t n in e ty  years  leg is la tu res , courts  and 
in te rn a t io n a l conferences have t r ie d  to m a in ta in  a balance 
between the param ount du ty  to protect cargo-owners and the 
desire to render justice to shipowners. The p ro tec tion  of the 
ca rg o -o w n e r dem ands id ea l s tanda rds  and an abso lu te  
guarantee of safety, w h ile  justice to the shipowner is based on 
the realisation of a num ber of technical and commercial realities 
that call fo r re la t iv ity .
A ship is a complex in s tru m e n t w i th  p o te n t ia l ly  h idden 
defects, some of w h ich  are undiscoverable by reasonable care. 
The maintenance, repair and inspection of the ship are delegated 
to experts and registered surveyors and are la rge ly  carried out 
w h ile  the ship is in port or drydock. Yet in the modern w orld  the 
shipowner is blamed i f  his ship is found to be unseaworthy. Since 
bills of lading, charterparties or marine insurance policies re fer 
to seaw orth iness and do no t p a r t ic u la r is e  fu r th e r ,  th is  
perpetua lly  creates a tug -o f-w ar between the shipowner and the 
cargo-owner.
A l l  th is  leads us to the question  of w h a t  cons t itu tes  
seaworthiness at the present day and how both the cargo-owner 
and the shipowner can be protected in a complex commercia l 
world?
To answer th is question, the h is to ry  and deve lopm en t of 
seaworthiness w i l l  have to be traced from  ancient times to the
2present day.
However, i t  is im p o rta n t here to have a b r ie f  look at the 
background tha t has shaped the carrier's l ia b i l i ty  and to recall 
its evo lution. This w i l l  help us in  our e f fo r t  to  de term ine the 
degree of his l ia b i l i ty  to prov ide a seaworthy ship under the 
d iffe ren t regimes of Common and conventional Laws.
Under the general M aritim e law, a common carrier of goods by 
sea was liable to the cargo-owner on an absolute basis fo r any 
loss or damage occasioned in the transport of the goods, w i th  the 
exceptions of loss or damage caused by an act of God or the 
public enemy, or by the inherent vice of the goods or the default 
of the shipper. Thus, the common carrier's rule was strict, i t  may 
be characterised as an example of l ia b i l i ty  w ith o u t fau lt, fo r  the 
carr ie r may be held liable even though he took all reasonable 
steps to protect against loss. Once the cargo-owner could show 
tha t goods le f t  to the carr ie r had been lost or damaged, the 
ca rr ie r had the burden of prov ing specifica lly tha t one of the 
fou r excepted perils caused the loss or damage. Failure to do so 
would inev itab ly  make him liable.
The severity  of this rule of the Common Law is said to have 
had its orig in in the danger of the ft  by the carrier's servants, or 
collusion between dishonest carriers and thieves to the prejudice 
of the shipper, since geographic remoteness of the shipper from  
the p rope rty  w h ile  i t  was in trans it would  make proof of such a 
co llus ion  d i f f ic u l t  i f  no t im poss ib le . To p re v e n t th is , the 
respons ib il i ty  of an insurer fo r  the safe d e live ry  of the goods, 
was imposed on the carrier in addition to his l ia b i l i ty  as a bailee 
fo r reward.
3Further, the carrie r was perm itted to exonerate h im self from  
l ia b i l i ty  fo r loss caused by the negligence of his employees or 
agents, including the master and crew of the vessel.
But at the same time M arit im e Law added another Common 
Law doctrine w h ich  served as an additional hu rd le  before the 
carrier could claim exoneration on account of one of the excepted 
perils. This was the im p lied  w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness, w h ich  
ob liged the ca rr ie r  to p rov ide  a seaw orthy  vessel at the 
beginning of the voyage.
Despite the apparen tly  s tr ic t rules of Common Law, carriers 
w ere  h a rd ly  at the m ercy of cargo-owners. In  fac t tak ing  
advantages of the realities of the commercia l w o r ld  la rge ly  in 
th e ir  fa v o u r  and of th e ir  t ra d it io n a l freedom  of contract, 
shipowners began to insert clauses in  the b i l l  of lading w h ich  
purported  to exonerate them from  l ia b i l i ty  fo r  loss or damage 
due to num erous causes. Thus the im p lie d  cond it ion  in  the 
contract of a ffre igh tm en t tha t the ship is seaworthy has been 
subjected to any contrary in tention appearing in  the contract and 
sh ipow ners  have f re q u e n t ly  t r ie d  to cover them se lves so 
tho rough ly  as to be v i r tu a l ly  impregnable against any fo rm  o f 
l iab il i ty .
I f  the courts in B rita in  have allowed the carrie r to avoid the 
im p lied  w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness by an exp lic it  s tatem ent to 
tha t effect in  the b i l l  of lading, Am erican courts, t ra d it io n a l ly  
more pro tective  of shipper's rights, refused to recognise any 
abrogation of the im p lied  w a rran ty .  As a resu lt sh ipowning in 
the United States was at a low point w h ile  n ine teen th  cen tu ry  
B rita in  boasted the world 's largest merchant fleet.
4Because of tha t s ituation American traders, facing a v ir tu a l  
B rit ish  monopoly over in te rna tiona l transport, even tua lly  found 
su ff ic ie n t congressional support to pass the f i r s t  leg is la t ive  
attem pt to define the m in im um  l ia b i l i ty  of ocean carriers in the 
Harter Act of 1893. The Harter Act was an im portan t mile stone 
in  the challenge to a system in which ocean carriers could easily 
sh ift  the r isk  of loss on to cargo-owners, and thus effecting an 
im portan t change in the l ia b i l i ty  of the carrier under the general 
M aritim e Law.
W ith  regards to loss or damage caused by unseaworthiness, 
the Act, in section I I I ,  perm itted the inclusion in the b i l l  of lading 
of provisions e lim inating the absolute w a rra n ty  and substitu ting 
in  its place the du ty  to use due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy.
In toto the Harter Act may be v iewed as the f i r s t  fo rm u la tion  
of na tiona l Law designed to prov ide  a certa in u n i fo rm ity  by 
re s tr ic t in g  the power of carriers  con trac tua lly  to l im i t  th e ir  
l ia b i l i ty .  Yet un like  the United States in w h ich  cargo in terests 
were re la t ive ly  powerfu l, shipowning nations such as B rita in  and 
France continued to allow carriers fu l l  freedom to set the ir  own 
l ia b i l i ty  terms. As a resu lt, a negligence clause inserted in an 
in te rna tion a l b i l l  of lading could be va lid  in  one coun try  and 
in va lid  in  another, the l ia b i l i ty  of the carr ie r then depending 
upon the chosen forum.
These were b r ie f ly  the events wh ich  il lus tra ted  the need fo r 
an in te rn a t io n a l  so lu tion , and in  1924, the com prom ise  
represented by the Harter Act was in  essence codified on an
5in te rna tiona l level in the Hague Rules. This Convention has since 
been g iven w ide  effect. Great B r ita in  was the f i r s t  nation to 
introduce legislative measures to bring the Rules in to legal effect.
The Hague rules re ta ined the carr ie r 's  d u ty  to p rov ide  a 
seaworthy vessel at the beginning of a voyage, and imposed an 
add it iona l du ty  upon the carr ie r to care fo r  the goods in  his 
possession.
Unfortunate ly, w ith  but few  exceptions all the countries which 
have introduced legislation, w i th  the object of g iv ing effect to the 
Hague Rules, have in troduced  m odif ica tions and va r ia t io ns , 
additions and deletions, some of a v e ry  w ide nature, and some of 
lesser importance, bu t all to some extent, departing from  the 
desire of the Convention fo r complete u n ifo rm ity  and rendering 
necessary a reference to each ind iv idua l enactment itse lf in  order 
to determ ine its fu l l  e ffect upon any pa rt icu la r b i l l  of lading 
contract.
Furthermore, critics of the Convention argue tha t the l ia b i l i ty  
regime achieved by the Hague Rules is too favourable to carriers 
and does not re f le c t present day rea li t ies  of in te rn a t io n a l 
tran spo rt ,  and be lieve th a t though o ften  re fe rre d  to as a 
compromise between carriers and cargo in terests, the Hague 
Rules in  fact preserve the essential and somewhat paradoxical 
character of Common Law, in wh ich  a presum ption of l ia b i l i ty  
against the carrier can be defeated by the exercise of numerous 
exceptions of liab il i ty .
Indeed, i t  was general be lie f among some elements of the 
in te rna t ion a l m arit im e com m unity , such as p a r t ic u la r ly  cargo 
in te rest and the m a jo r ity  of developing countries, tha t existing
6legal rules governing l ia b i l i ty  fo r loss of cargo carried under a b il l 
of lading are inequitable and therefore should be changed.
As a result, a new Convention was adopted in 1978, know n as 
the Hamburg Rules, w h ich  is s t i l l  aw aiting fo r  in te rn a t io n a l 
enforcement. The adoption of this Convention, as i t  w i l l  be seen at 
the end of this study, was directed as a rev is ion of the Hague 
Rules to restore the carr ie r to the position he held under the 
general M arit im e Law, by shifting back to him  greater l ia b i l i ty  
fo r the loss of cargo.
Thus, i t  is the aim of this study to examine the manner in 
w h ich  the courts have dealt w i th  the carrier's unde rtak ing  to 
provide a seaworthy ship. A ll the details of this problem are, in 
fac t, re f le c te d  in  a n u m b e r  of decis ions dea ling  w i th  
unseaworthiness. In  the ligh t of these decisions, we shall a ttem pt 
to d iffe ren tia te  between the du ty  to provide a seaworthy ship as 
i t  arises at Common Law, under the Hague Rules and the 
Hamburg Rules.
In  th is study, the w r i te r  endeavours to con tr ibu te  to the 
knowledge of the law of seaworthiness by a ttem pting  a logical 
and more systematic approach, by selecting for discussion from  
the m u lt i tu de  of cases w i th  w h ich  the textbooks inundate  us, 
those wh ich  are typ ica l and suffic ient fo r the comparison of the 
prov is ions of the present Hague Rules, w i th  respect to the 
ca rr ie r ’s du ty  of seaworthiness, w i th  those of the new Hamburg 
Rules, in  order to f in d  out to w h a t extent th is d u ty  has been 
modified under the new Rules, and therefore w ha t consequences 
we shall expect from  the application of the Hamburg Rules i f  and 
when they come into force.
7Thus this study is d ivided into three main chapters.
The f i rs t  chapter, wh ich is d ivided in to  two sections, examines 
the double fea tu re  of the w a r ra n ty  of seaworthiness, i.e. a 
w a r ra n ty  being re la t ive  and absolute. Section one introduces a 
detailed study of the meaning of seaworthiness as understood in 
Law. Having thus established w hat seaworthiness means, section 
tw o deals w i th  the absolute w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness imposed 
upon the carr ie r under the Common Law, and shows how does 
seaworthiness w o rk  in its clash w ith  the excepted perils.
The second cha p te r discusses the c a r r ie r 's  d u ty  of 
seaworthiness on a com para tive  basis under both the Hague 
Rules and Ham burg Rules. Our com para tive  discussion w i l l  
involve the main features of the seaworthiness du ty  namely, the 
basis upon w h ich  this du ty  is based, the tim e during w h ich  this 
du ty  must be exercised, and f in a l ly  the standard of care w h ich  
the carrier must use in order to make his ship seaworthy.
The th ird  and last chapter deals w ith  the carrier's l ia b i l i ty  fo r  
any loss or damage aris ing from  unseaworth iness. In  o ther 
words, having fa iled to exercise his du ty  to m ainta in the ship in 
a seaworthy condition, as explained in the previous chapter, the 
ca rr ie r  w i l l  incu r l ia b i l i ty  fo r  any loss or damage resu lt ing  
therefrom. The w r i te r  is concerned here w ith  two main questions. 
F irst, on w hom  lies the bu rden  of p ro v in g  or d isp ro v in g  
unseaworthiness. Second, w ha t im m un it ies  are available to the 
carr ie r to exempt h im self from  l ia b i l i ty  fo r any loss or damage 
caused by unseaworthiness of his ship. The discussion is also 
here made on a comparative basis.
8CHAPTER ONE
The Relative and Absolute Nature of the 
W a rra n ty  of Seaworth iness.
A t f i r s t  sight of th is t it le , one must w onder how can the 
w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness be re la tive and absolute at the same 
time?
The answer is tha t the "absolute" feature of the w a rra n ty  of 
seaworthiness im p lied by the Common Law refers to the degree 
of the shipowner's l ia b i l i ty .  The re la t ive  nature, on the other 
hand, refers to the standard of fitness or seaworthiness of his 
ship.
I t  is essential that this point be appreciated and not confused. 
In  Rio Tinto Co.. L td . V. The Seed Shipping Co.. L td ..1 the Law was 
clarified by Roche.J as thus:
"The w a r ra n ty  of seaworthiness is an absolute 
contract, bu t at the same time, although i t  is an 
absolute contract tha t the ship in  question is 
reasonably f i t  fo r the voyage...it is not a contract 
that the ship is absolutely f i t  fo r the voyage..."
In  accordance w i th  th is  p r in c ip le ,  the s ta n d a rd  of 
seaworthiness is not absolute, bu t the l ia b i l i ty  of the ow ner fo r  
unseaworthiness is under the Common Law.
1 ( 1926) 24 Ll.L.Rep 316 at p. 320.
9Therefore, this chapter w i l l  be div ided in two main sections:
I) The re la t iv i ty  of the term seaworthiness.
I I )  The absolute w a r ra n ty  of seaworth iness under the 
Common Law.
Section one: The R e lativ ity  of the Term Seaworthiness.
To the seeker after precision in the Law, seaworthiness is a 
disconcerting doctrine because, by its v e ry  na ture , i t  is not 
reducible to exactitude. I t  is a "re lative" term; i t  is a question of 
fact and like  many concepts premised on a question of fact, i t  
does not lend itself to easy application or absolute defin ition.
Accordingly, the standard of seaworthiness must always be 
uncertain, fo r the Law cannot f ix  in  advance those precautions in 
h u l l  and gear w h ich  w i l l  be necessary to meet the m anifo ld  
dangers of the sea.
Therefore, i t  is clear enough that, there can be no f ixed and 
positive standard of seaworthiness but tha t i t  must v a ry  w i th  
the va ry ing  exigencies of Mercantile en terprise .2 The ship, said 
Lord Cairns:
"should be in a condition to encounter w ha teve r 
perils of the sea, a ship of that k ind  and laden in 
tha t way, may be fa ir ly  expected to encounter on
the voyage.
I t  must be borne in  m ind tha t the req u ired  s tandard of
2 See Arnould, J„ L a y .o f  Marine insurance and average. 16th ed. by 
M.J. Mustill &. J.C. Gilman, London, Stevens & Sons, 1981, Vol. 2, p. 569.
3 Steel V. State Line S.S.Co. f 18771 3 A.C 72 at p. 77.
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seaworthiness is not absolute. I t  is re la tive  among other things, 
to the nature of the ship, to the particu lar voyage contracted fo r 
and the pa rt icu la r  stages of tha t voyage being d i f fe re n t  fo r  
summer or fo r  w in te r  voyages, fo r  r iv e r  or fo r sea navigation, 
w h i ls t  loading in  ha rbour and w hen sailing, to the state of 
knowledge and scientific progress at the time of contract,4 and 
varies w i th  the pa rt icu la r cargo contracted to be carried. For 
instance th a t  state of re p a ir  and eq u ip m e n t w h ic h  w o u ld  
constitute seaworthiness for one description of voyage m ight be 
w h o l ly  inadequate  fo r  another. A ship sea w o rth y  fo r  the 
coasting m ight be unseaworthy for a voyage to the Greenland 
seas.
M oreover, a ship may be seaw orthy  a lthough sc ie n t if ic  
research subsequently  shows tha t her re fr ig e ra t in g  chambers 
were un f it  to receive the cargo i f  that fact was not know n at the 
tim e.5
I t  is obvious, then, tha t seaworthiness is a re la t ive  concept 
w h ich  depends upon circumstances. A ship may be seaworthy in 
one ins tance  b u t u n s e a w o r th y  in  a n o th e r .6 H o w e ve r ,  
seaworthiness does not requ ire  tha t a vessel be of the la test 
design. Even though a sh ipowner has not ins ta lled the la test 
appliances, the ship may stil l be held to be seaworthy.
4 See Bradley & Sons V. Federal S.N. Co. (1927) 27 Li.L.Rep 395 at p. 396 
per Viscount Sumner, "relative among other things, to the state of 
knowledge and the standards prevailing at the material time."
5 See Carver, T.G., Carriage bv sea. 13th ed. by Raoul Colinvaux, 
London, Stevens & Sons, 1982, Vol. 1, p. 116.
6 See Briguglio, A.J, "Unseaworthiness and evidence of subsequent 
repairs", (1983) 19 Calif.Western L.Rev. 450 at p. 453.
11
Thus, i t  is the aim of this section to investigate the meaning of 
seaworthiness and probe in to  its many ram ifications: in respect 
of the ship; in  respect of the captain, officers and crew; in respect 
of the cargo, and all other re levant factors.
I -  Definition of Seaworthiness:
For over a ce n tu ry  at least the question of w h a t  is a 
"seaworthy" ship has been a matter tha t has troub led the courts 
of the common law w o r ld .7 Yet th roughou t tha t period i t  has 
been d i f f ic u l t  to f in d  any more apposite meaning fo r  the 
"Seaworthiness" of a ship than the description, as long ago as 
1877, by Lord B lackburn in Steel V.State Line Steamship Co.8 
"...the ship should rea lly  be fit."
The term  seaworthiness and the determ ination of w ha t makes 
a vessel unseaworthy, as i t  has been noted above, is a f lex ib le  
one w h ich can never be settled by positive rules of law, fo r the 
reason that im provem ents and changes in the means and modes 
of navigation frequen tly  require new implements or new form s of 
old ones.
Although, the f le x ib i l i ty  of this term, the commonly accepted 
de fin it ion  of seaworthiness appears to be as follows.
"Seaworthiness" may be defined as:9
7 See Starke, J.G, "Meaning of Seaworthiness", (1982) 56 A.L.T. 88 at p.
8 8 .
8 [1877] 3 A.C72 at p. 86.
9 See Tetley, W., Marine cargo claims. 2nd ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 
1978, p 157.
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"The state of a vessel in such a condition, w i th  
such equ ipm ent, and manned by  such a master 
and crew, tha t no rm a lly  the cargo w i l l  be loaded, 
carried, cared fo r  and discharged p ro p e r ly  and
safely on the contemplated voyage."
Another in teresting de fin it ion  of seaworthiness is to be found 
in  Bouv ie r’s Law dictionary, wh ich defines "Seaworthiness" to be 
in  M arit im e law:
"The su f f ic ie n cy  of the vessel in  m ate ria ls , 
construction, equipment, officers, men and o u t f i t  
fo r the trade or service in which it  is em ployed."10
From these definitions, i t  is clear that, the term  seaworthiness 
is applicable to the cond it ion  of the vessel, its  s truc tu re , 
equ ipm ent, f i t t ing s , to the stowage of the goods, and to the 
manning of the ship. Seaworthiness also concerns such matters 
as the type of the vessel, character of the voyage, foreseeable 
weather and navigational conditions.
Therefore, in order to keep a ship in a seaworthy condition fo r 
the purpose of the voyage, she must, at the time of sailing, be in 
a f i t  state as to repairs, equ ipm ent and crew, and in  all other 
respects, to encounter the perils of the voyage at the particu la r 
season in  question. She must, therefore, be t igh t, staunch and 
strong, and furn ished w ith  all tackle and apparel necessary fo r 
the in tended voyage, and she must have on board a pilot, w hen 
by the law of the country one is required.
10 Definition approved in The Southwark (1903) 191 U.S. 1 at 8.
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I I -  General Princip les:
To be seaworthy a vessel "must have tha t degree of fitness 
wh ich an ord inary, careful and prudent owner w ou ld  require his 
vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage, having 
regard  to a l l the probab le  c ircum stances of i t " . 11 As an 
ins trum en t of transport a ship is e ffic ient i f  her hull, tackle and 
m achinery are in  a state of good repair, i f  she is su ff ic ie n t ly  
provided w i th  fuel, and is manned by an e ffic ient crew. In  other 
words; the ship must be f i t  in  design, structure, condition and 
equ ipm ent to encounter the o rd ina ry  perils of the voyage, and 
the cargo taken must be a safe cargo fo r  such a voyage as may 
be reasonably expected, and i t  must be stowed in a w ay so as not 
to be a source of danger.
Also, the ship must take in a safe supply of bunkers, including 
w a te r fo r boilers. She w i l l  be unseaworthy i f  she bunkers w i th  
low grade coal wh ich is liable to spontaneous combustion during 
the voyage.
Thus, in Fiumana Societa di Navigazione V. B unge .12 i t  was 
held tha t an unexplained occurrence of f ire  in the coal-bunkers 
afforded a reasonable presumption that this was due to a defect 
or unfitness of the bunker coal at the time of loading of the cargo 
wh ich  amounted to a breach of the w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness.
Therefore, i t  is clear that, seaworthiness encompasses many 
things, a t ig h t hu ll  and hatches, a proper system of pumps, 
va lves and boilers, and engines, generators and re fr ig e ra t io n  
equ ipm ent in  good order. A seaworthy vessel must be equipped
11 Me Fadden V. Blue star line [19051 1 K.B. 697 at p 706.
12 [1930] 2 K.B. 47.
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w i th  up -to -d a te  charts, notices to m ariners  and nav iga ting  
equipment, the crew must be p roperly  tra ined and instructed in 
the s h ip ’s opera tion and id iosyncrasies. Equ ipm ent must be 
p roperly  labelled.
However, i t  is n o tew o rthy  that, seaworthiness depends not 
on ly  upon the vessel being staunch and f i t  to meet the perils of 
the sea, bu t upon its character in  reference to the pa rt icu la r 
cargo tran spo rte d ,13 i.e: f i t  to carry  the particu lar cargo i t  takes 
on board.
I t  is convenient to mention here that, fa ilu re  to comply w ith  
one or more of these re q u ire m e n ts  constitu tes  a case of 
unseaworth iness. For instance, inadequate design, de fective  
condition, or crew in su ff ic ie n t in  e ither skills  or num ber can 
render a vessel unseaworthy.14
I l l -  The H u l l :
The hu ll is the fram ew ork  of a vessel, together w i th  all decks,, 
deck houses, the inside and outside p la ting or p lank ing, bu t 
exclusive of masts, yards, riggings and all ou tf i t  or equ ipm ent.13
Seaworthiness o r ig ina lly  meant the good order of the hu ll  of 
the vessel and in  pa rt icu la r the cond ition  of the bu lkheads, 
plating and rivets.
To constitute seaworthiness of the hu ll  of a vessel, the hu ll
13 See Sorkin. S.. Goods in transit. Vol. 1. Chaot. 5 at p. 89.
14 See Langhauser, D.P., "Implied w arranties of seaworthiness: 
applying the knowing neglect standard in time hull insurance policies", 
(1987) 39 Maine L.Rev. 443 at p. 446.
13 See Webster, F.B., Shipping Cyclopedia. New York London, Simmons- 
Boardman publishing company, 1920, p. 70.
15
m ust be so tight, staunch, and strong as to be competent to resist 
ail o rd ina ry  action of the sea and to prosecute and complete the 
voyage w ith o u t  damage to the cargo under deck.16 In  other 
words; seaworthiness as fa r as relates to the condition of the 
ship, requires tha t when the ship sails on her voyage she should 
be w e ll furn ished, t igh t, sound, staunch and strong, competent, 
tha t is, in her h u ll  to resist the o rd in a ry  attacks of w ind  and 
weather on the voyage.
The in te g r i ty  of the hu ll is a v e ry  im p o r ta n t  condition fo r 
seaworthiness. The wasting of shell plates through the passage 
of t im e  has o ften  produced leakage and consequent cargo 
damage.17 While seaworthiness, w i th  respects to r ive ts  does not 
requ ire  before the start of every voyage, tha t a test be given to 
each of the thousands of r ive ts  in a large steel vessel, i t  does 
require that the rivets be tested from  time to time by hammering 
or otherwise drydocking.
I f  a vesse l encoun te rs  e x t re m e ly  h e a v y  w e a th e r ,  
seaworthiness requires tha t she be ca re fu lly  examined before 
she embarks on another voyage to ascertain i f  the stresses to 
w h ich  she has been subjected have caused damage w h ich  
should be made good.
Also i f  a vessel has been subjected to contact w i th  ice, or in 
collision, careful examination and test of her r ive ts  and seams is 
req u ired , a sup erf ic ia l exam ina tion  f ro m  a distance is not
16 See Benedict on Admiralty. Vol. 2.A "Carriage of goods by sea", Chapt. 
7 at p. 1.
17 See Dewey.R.Villareal, J.R., "The concept of due diligence in 
Maritime Law", (1970 /71 ) 2 I.M.L.C. 763 at p. 770.
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enough.18
In  The Cvoria.19 the vessel was held to be unseaworthy as no 
ham m er or d r i l l  test of the r ive ts  was done and on ly  a long- 
range v isual examination by surveyors during the vessel’s e ight- 
years classification.
I t  is im p o r ta n t  to note that, openings in the h u l l  are as 
im portan t as the general in te g r i ty  of the shell plating and fa ilu re  
to check the w a te r tightness of ports, by those tests, constitutes 
unseaworthiness.20
Seaworthiness w i th  respects to hu ll, invo lves tha t hatches 
should be tight, as hatches are a constant source of damage to 
cargo and as such a constant source of litigation.
Thus, in  Sears Roebuck & Co. V. Am erican P res ident Lines 
L td ..21 a vessel was badly constructed, there being a hole in  the 
coamings of the hatches. Held, the vessel was unseaworthy.
I t  must be borne in mind that, i f  in  a short period after sailing 
on the voyage the ship becomes leaky and founders, or is obliged 
to put back, w i th o u t  encountering any ex tra o rd in a ry  peril, or 
other v is ib le  cause to produce such effect, there is a presumption 
of fact tha t she was not seaworthy when she sailed. Accordingly, 
i f  after her re tu rn  to port, i t  is found that the leak arose from  the 
loosening of the timbers of her hull, owing to the decayed state of 
her bolts and fastenings, or s im ila r ly  w i th  the rive ts  in  her plates 
or other like deficiency, th is is, generally speaking, a clear case of
18 See Benedict, op.cit.. Vol. 2.A, Chapt. 8 at p. 8.
19 [1943] A.M.C. 947.
20 See Dewey.R. Villareal, J.R., op.cit.. at p. 771.
21 [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 385.
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unseaworthiness.22
I V -  M ac h in ery :
Besides being competent in  hu ll  to resist the o rd in a ry  attacks 
of the w ind  and weather on the voyage, the ship should have f i t  
propuls ion machinery w i th  suffic ient fuel, and re fr ige ra tion  and 
ve n t i la t io n  machinery in good order. Also the vessel's engines, 
boilers and generators must be in good w ork ing  order in order to 
constitute seaworthiness.
Thus in Seville Sulphur &. Copper Co. V. Colvils Lowden & Co..23 
the vessel was lost in consequence of the breakdown of her boiler 
th rough the presence of m uddy wate r in it, wh ich  rendered her 
unseaworhty.
I t  is no tew orthy , tha t few  cases discuss seaworth iness in 
connection w i th  the main p ropu ls ion  m ach inery , p ro b a b ly  
because breakdowns of tha t machinery do not no rm a lly  produce 
cargo damage. But re f r ig e ra t io n  and v e n t i la t in g  m ach ine ry  
predictab ly, have f igured in cargo damage cases.24 Therefore i f  
a vesse l's  re f r ig e ra t in g  m a ch in e ry  is de fe c t ive , she is 
unseaworthy.
An interesting case concerning this point is that o f The Maori 
k in g  V. H u g h e s .23 A cargo of frozen meat was carried from  
A u s tra l ia  to Europe. A t the beg inn ing  of the voyage the 
re fr ige ra ting  machinery was defective, and owing to tha t defect 
broke down during the voyage. Held, the ship was unseaworthy.
22 See Arnould. op.cit. at p. *>72.
23 (1888) 15 R. (Ctof Sess) 616.
24 See Dewey.R.Villareal, J.R., op.cit.. at p. 772.
25 [18951 2 Q.B. 550.
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I t  must be said that, fa ilu re  to supp ly  the ship w i th  these 
things constitutes a case of unseaworthiness. For example, fa ilu re  
to supply the propulsion machinery w ith  suffic ient fue l to make 
the projected voyage w i th  a margin of about 25 percent, may 
amount to unseaworthiness.
An il lu s tra t ing  case tha t can be cited in connection w i th  the 
question of machinery, is tha t of, The Quebec Marine Insurance 
Co. V. Commercial Bank of Canada.26 In this case, a vessel sailed 
w i th  a defective boiler, but the defect did not appear u n t i l  she 
had passed in to  salt water, and then i t  became necessary to put 
back and repa ir the boiler. A fte r  sailing again she was lost by 
perils of the sea. I t  was held that she was not seaworthy.
I t  is convenient to mention here that, i f  a vessel's machinery 
breaks down sho rt ly  a fte r a voyage commences, i t  is to be 
presumed prim a facie tha t the machinery was defective at the 
start of the voyage and therefore the ship was unseaworthy.
Thus in The S ou thw ark .27 the vessel was to carry  a cargo of 
dressed beef. S h o rt ly  a fte r  leav ing  port, the re f r ig e ra t in g  
m ach inery broke down, and a fter being repa ired broke down 
again, and during the voyage did not reduce the tem pera tu re  
s u f f ic ie n t ly  to preserve the meat. The vessel was the re fo re  
presumed to be unseaworthy at the start of the voyage.
V -  C om plem en t (M aste r and C re w ):
Seaworthiness invo lves adequacy of the ship's o fficers and 
men. Most of the m arit im e nations have regulations govern ing
26 (1870) L.R. 3 P.C. 234.
27 (1903) 191 U.S. 1.
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the manning of ships of the ir  flags, and the vessel's certif icate 
sets out the number of officers and men required by Law to man 
her. So, i f  a vessel sails w i th  a crew less in num ber than her 
certificate or accepted practice requires, she is unseaworthy.28
A vessel is also unseaworthy, i f  the crew are inexperienced 
and untra ined in  the operation of the ship. Accordingly, eve ry  
ship at the tim e of sailing must be p ro p e r ly  manned, w i th  a 
master of com petent nau tica l skills , a crew s u f f ic ie n t  and 
competent to navigate her on the voyage, and a p ilo t on board 
whenever there is an establishment of pilots at the port and the 
nature of the navigation requires one.29
First, of the master, he must be a person su f f ic ie n t ly  w e ll 
acquainted w i th  the usual course of navigation on the voyage, to 
be able to conduct the vessel in  safety th rough  its o rd in a ry  
perils, and i f  he is ignorant of that, the ship is not seaworthy. 
The master must also, even i f  generally competent, be su ff ic ien tly  
instructed in  any peculiarities of the vessel w h ich  may requ ire  
special a tten tion  during  the voyage. His incompetence may 
consist in  a d isab ling w a n t of s k i l l  or d isab ling  w a n t  of 
knowledge, in  other words, ignorance of the master concerning 
the condition or characteristics of his vessel, her f i t t in g s  and 
the ir  use, may make a vessel unseaworthy.
In  th is connection reference can be made to the case of 
Standard Oil  Co. V Clan l i n e .3° in  w h ich  the vessel was of the 
unusual construction but was quite stable and seaworthy i f  two
28 See Benedict, op.cit.. Vol. 2.A, Chapt. 7 at p. 11.
^9 See Carver, op.cit.. Vol. 1. p. 114.
30 [1924] A.C. 100.
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of her ba llast tanks rem ained fu l l .  Because of the master's 
ignorance of the necessity fo r ballast, he ordered that the ballast 
tanks be pumped out sho rt ly  a fter the vessel sailed on her 
voyage, and w hen this had been done the vessel capsized, and 
therefore, she was considered unseaworthy.
In  another case,31 where the master was of broad experience 
and had held fo r  many years a master's license issued by the 
B r it ish  Board of Trade, the vessel was found  unsea w o rth y  
because i t  was established tha t the master was f re q u e n t ly  
in toxicated, and tha t his weakness in  this regard was w id e ly  
known.
Seaworthiness also requires that the master must be in a f i t  
state of health to command the ship when the voyage starts.32
Secondly, as to the crew. The crew must be adequate to 
discharge the usual duties and to meet the usual dangers to 
w h ich  the ship is exposed.33 I f  the crew be suff ic ient w hen the 
ship sailed on her voyage, she is then, seaworthy. In  o ther 
words, the ship is unseaworthy i f  she sails w ith o u t a crew tha t is 
competent and suffic ient fo r the voyage, regard being had to its 
length and the circumstances in wh ich it  is undertaken.34
I t  is conven ient to m ention here that, seaworthiness w i th  
respect to the crew, involves tha t the sh ipowner must satis fy
31 The Mountoswald (192S) IS 1,1.1..Ren. 1 SS
32 See Rio Tinto Co.. l.td. V. Seed Shipping Co.. Ltd. (1926) 24 Ll.L.Rep. 
316 at p. 320.
33 See Arnould. op.cit.. at p. ^77.
34 See Halsbury, haws of England. 4th ed. by Lord Hailsham of St. 
Marylebone, London, Butterworths, 1983, Vol. 43 ’’Shipping", p. 408.
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him self by inspection of the seaman's documents, in te rv iew s and 
inqu ir ies  from  previous employers that he is reasonably f i t  to 
occupy the post to which he is appointed.35
An in te res t ing  case concerning th is  po in t is th a t of The 
M a k e d o n i a .^6 I t  was held in this case tha t the chief engineer 
and the second engineer were ineffic ient, and the shipowner had 
not taken the necessary steps and make the necessary inqu ir ies  
to ascerta in  the record and competence of these o ff ice rs . 
Consequently the ship was unseaworthy.
I t  is no tew orthy  that, unseaworthiness may also be caused by 
a crew tha t held all the necessary competence certif icates bu t 
was neverthe less incom peten t, in  o ther words, i t  w i l l  no t 
necessarily be enough to re ly  on certificates of competence held 
by the seaman.
This was the case in Adamastos Shipping Co.. L td . V. A ng lo - 
Saxon Petroleum Co.. L td ..37 where the engine-room crew though 
q u a l i f ie d ,  was in c o m p e te n t  so th a t  the  sh ip  became 
unseaworthy.
I t  must be borne in mind that, the question of the competence 
of the crew may depend upon the nature of the voyage on wh ich  
they  are employed, fo r  instance, i f  there is no mate on board 
capable of perform ing the captain's duties, should the captain be 
disabled by accident or illness, the ship may be unseaworthy.
Thus in C liffo rd  V. H u n t e r .38 the voyage was from  M aurit ius
35 See Scrutton, T.E., Charterparties and bills of lading. 19th ed. by A.A. 
Mocotta, M.J. Mustill & S.C. Boyd, London, Sweet &. Maxwell, 1984, p. 435.
36 [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 316 at pp. 334-338.
37 [1959] A.C. 133.
38 (1827) Mood. & M. 103.
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to London. The captain on sailing from  M aurit ius was v e ry  ill, and 
next day feeling himself, from  increased illness, incom petent to 
take charge of the ship, he inqu ired  of his two mates w he the r 
they  could manage the voyage to England, bu t f in d in g  no one 
competent to undertake it, he put back towards the M aurit ius, 
and in his w ay the ship was lost by perils of the sea.
In  ad d it ion  to these cases cited in  connection w i th  the 
incompetence of the crew, some other v i ta l  matters has been 
found to establish unseaworthiness. For example, ignorance of a 
ship's engineer of the amount of bunker oil on board and his 
u n fa m il ia r i ty  w i th  the o i l-p ip in g  system was held to have 
rendered a vessel unseaworthy.
In  the case of The M a ke d o n ia .39 the ch ie f engineer and 
second engineer were not p roperly  instructed or experienced in 
the use of the oil and ballast lines in a t im be r- la den  ship. Held 
that the ship was unseaworthy.
Also vessels have been found unseaw orthy  because th e ir  
helmsmen were ignorant of English in  w h ich  the watch officers 
gave the ir orders. This led to the helmsmen tu rn ing  the wheel in 
a d irection  opposite to tha t ordered by the watch o ff ice r and 
thus the vessel became invo lved in disaster.40 Furtherm ore, an 
unwillingness on the part of a member of the crew to perform  his 
proper tasks and in  ca rry ing  out his duties may constitu te  
incompetence and render the ship unseaworthy.41
39 [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316.
40 See Benedict, op.cit.. Vol. 2.A, Chapt. 7 at p. 15.
4 * See Scrutton, op.cit.. at p. 86, see also The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 316.
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Th ird ly , as to the pilot. I f  the nature of the navigation or the 
law or usage of the place requires tha t the ship should take a 
p ilo t on board, e ither before leaving or before en tering a port, 
she is, i t  would seem, not seaworthy w ith ou t a pilot.
Accordingly, i f  a ship sails w ith o u t a p ilo t from  a port where 
pilotage is compulsory or customary, she is insu ff ic ien tly  manned, 
and the re fo re  unseaw orthy , unless the master h im se lf  has 
adequate local knowledge.42 I t  was fu r th e r  stated tha t:” a vessel 
coming out of a harbour must have a pilot, because the captain 
has i t  in  his power always to procure one".4^
I t  is no tew orthy  that, the question which arises in connection 
w i th  the incompetence of the crew is: w hether negligence of the 
master or the crew may amount to unseaworthiness?
For answering such question, a d is tinc tion should be made 
between unseaworthiness and neglect or default in  management.
Unseaworthiness is to be distinguished from  neglect or defau lt 
in management, in that even i f  on sailing, the ship is not in  safe 
condition to complete the voyage, she is not unseaworthy, i f  in 
the course of the voyage, the defect w i l l  be remedied.
For instance, on sailing, a port-hole m ight be le ft  open w h ich  
m ight no rm a lly  be closed in the course of the voyage. Such a 
defect of a tem pora ry  nature or t r iv ia l  character w h ich  in  the 
o rd ina ry  course of the voyage could and would be remedied by 
the crew, cannot reasonably be said to render the ship u n f i t  to 
encounter the perils of the voyage. She is therefore seaworthy in
42 See Carver, op.cit.. at p. 114.
4 3 Citing Lord Tenterden in Phillips V. Headlam (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 380 at
p. 382.
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spite of the defect, and i t  is im m ate r ia l tha t the defect is not in 
fact put r igh t, there is then negligence on the part of the crew 
bu t not unseaworthiness of the ship.44
Thus in  The S i lv ia 4  ^ case, the vessel sailed w i th  an iron  
porthole cover know ing ly  le ft open by the ship's officers to afford 
l ig h t  in  the com partm en t by w a y  of the porthole. Conditions 
pe rm itted  ready access to the porthole to make fast the cover. 
A f te r  the vessel sailed, the open porthole was fo rgotten , and 
when a storm threatened, the cover porthole was not made fast 
and w a te r entered the vessel and damaged cargo. I t  was held 
that, The Silv ia was seaworthy when she sailed on her voyage 
under the circumstances mentioned, and tha t the damage to 
cargo resulted from  negligence in the ship's management.
On the other hand, although the defect is tem porary  or tr iv ia l,  
i f  i t  is inv is ib le  and inaccessible, the ship cannot be considered 
seaworthy.
An in te res t ing  case concerning th is  po in t is th a t of The 
S chw an .46 In  th is case, the damage arose because of a th ree - 
w ay  cock wh ich  was intended to be used e ither to open in to  the 
bilges or in to the sea, was allowed to be in  such a position as to 
leave both openings free at the same time. In consequence of 
this, wa te r entered the hold and damaged the cargo.
The court of Appeal held tha t the engineer ought to have 
understood the construction of the cock, and if  he had, could at 
any time have turned i t  in to  the proper position. The loss was
44 See Halsbury, op.cit.. at p. 407.
45 171 U.S. 462, 19 S. ct. 7, 43 L. ed. 241.
46 [1909] A.C. 450.
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therefore due to negligence and not to unseaworthiness.
But th is decision was reversed by  the House of Lords on the 
ground tha t the construction of the cock was adm itted ly  unusual 
and dangerous, and as the engineer had no notice of the unusual 
and dangerous character or the need of special care, the ship 
could not be considered seaworthy although the engineer was in 
fact negligent.
V I -  C a rg o w o r th in e s s :
Seaworthiness includes "cargoworthiness". In  re la tion  to cargo 
the com m only accepted de fin it ion  of seaworthiness, is w he the r 
the vessel is reasonably f i t  to ca rry  the cargo w h ich  i t  has 
undertaken to transport.
Seaworth iness depends not on ly  upon the vessel being 
staunch and f i t  to meet the perils  of the sea, b u t upon its 
character in  reference to the p a rt icu la r  cargo tran spo rte d . 
Seaworthiness is tha t qua lity  of the ship wh ich  makes i t  f i t  to 
c a rry  the p a r t ic u la r  merchandise i t  takes on board. I t  is 
seaworthy or unseaworthy in  re lation to the particu lar artic le or 
goods ca rr ie d .47 Thus i t  may be seaworthy as to one k in d  of 
goods and unseaworthy as to another.
This was the case in Stanton V. R ichardson.48 where the ship 
was perfectly  capable of carry ing a cargo of w e t sugar, bu t the 
ship's pumps were not able to deal w i th  the moisture, though 
good fo r  any other purpose. Held the ship was not cargo_ or 
seaworthy.
47 See Saul Sorkin, op.cit.. Chapt. 5 at p. 89.
48 (1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 390 (Ex ch).
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Cargoworthiness means tha t he ship must be equipped not 
o n ly  to c a r ry  the con trac t cargo b u t also to p re v e n t its 
de te r io ra tion  during the voyage. Accord ing ly  i f  goods carried 
requ ire  re fr ige ra tion  or freezing and the re fr igera ting  apparatus 
is defective, then the ship is unseaw orthy as to those goods 
requ ir ing re fr igera tion  although it  may be perfectly  seaworthy in 
re lation to other types of goods.
This was w e ll i l lus tra ted  by the case of The M aori King V. 
Hughes.49 where a ship w i th  defective re fr igera ting  machinery 
was held unseaworthy in the sense of being uncargoworthy fo r a 
cargo of frozen meat.
I t  is convenient to note here that, the cargo taken must be 
stowed in  a w a y  so as not to be a source of danger,5° as 
unseaworthiness may be caused not on ly by the unfitness of the 
vessel to carry  the cargo but also by the manner in w h ich  such 
cargo is stowed.
Therefore, i f  a ship is so heav ily  or im p ro p e r ly  loaded w hen 
she sails on her voyage as to be incapable of encountering the 
o rd in a ry  perils o f  the sea, tha t is unseaworthiness. In  certa in  
cases of th is  na ture , i.e: bad stowage, i t  is necessary to 
d is t ingu ish  be tween unseaworth iness and bad stowage not 
amounting to unseaworthiness.
Bad stowage w h ich  endangers the safety of the ship and 
makes her u n f i t  to encounter the perils  of the voyage may 
amount to unseaworthiness.
An interesting case that can be cited in this connection is tha t
49 [18951 2 Q.B. 550.
50 See Carver, op.cit.. at p. 11 S.
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of K o o ito f f  V. W i l s o n . 5 1 w h ich  concerned iron  arm our plates 
stowed in  the ship broke loose during bad w eather and w e n t 
through her side so tha t she sank, the court found tha t the ship 
was unseaworthy as regards the manner of stowing because she 
was not f i t  to encounter the o rd in a ry  perils  th a t  m igh t be 
expected on the voyage.
On the other hand, i f  the bad stowage is such as on ly to affect 
the cargo and not the ship as a ship, she w i l l  not be unseaworthy 
a lthough the effect of the bad stowage may be to make i t  
impossible for the cargo to arrive undamaged.
In  this connection reference can be made to the case of Elder 
Demoster and Co. V. Paterson Zochonics and C o . 5 2  In  th is case 
some casks of palm oil were stowed on board a vessel w h ich  had 
no "tween decks". A fte r  they had been stowed, a q u a n t i ty  of 
palm kerne ls  was stowed on top of them, the casks w ere  
damaged and much of the oil was lost.
Held, by the House of Lords, tha t the vessel was s truc tu ra lly  
f i t  to receive the oil and ca rry  it, and tha t she was the re fo re  
seaworthy. The damage to the o il cargo was no t due to the 
unseaworthiness of the ship by reason of the absence of "tween 
decks" bu t was due to bad stowage. The observations of Lord 
Sumner in this case are of particular interest. He s a i d ; 5 3
Bad stowage w h ich  endangers the safety of the 
ship may amount to unseaworthiness, of course, 
bu t bad stowage w h ich  affects no th ing bu t the
51 [1876] 1 Q.B. 377.
32 [1924] A.C. 522.
53 [1924] A.C. 522 at p. 561.
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cargo damaged by it, is bad stowage and noth ing 
more, and s t i l l  leaves the ship seaworthy fo r  the 
adven tu re  even though the adven tu re  be the 
carry ing of tha t cargo."
One last po in t w h ich  deserves notice is tha t the vessel is 
sometimes loaded so heav ily  tha t she cannot safely sail on the 
voyage contracted for, she is unseaworthy. A measure of the 
w e igh t of cargo wh ich a vessel may safely carry  is p rov ided by 
her Plimsoll marks, a line or a series of lines on a ship's sides.54 
The Law requires tha t eve ry  vessel bear marks painted on her 
side delineating to w ha t depths she may p roperly  and safely be 
loaded.
These lines or marks are painted under the superv is ion of 
L loyd 's Register of Shipping, Am erican Bureau of Shipping, or 
o ther l ike  organizations, based on th e ir  com puta tions o f  the 
lim its  of safe loading for the particu lar ship, and w i l l  include load 
marks fo r  seawater and for freshwater, fo r summer, fo r  w in te r,  
fo r w in te r  North A tlantic  and for trop ical waters. Accord ingly i f  a 
vessel is so loaded that her load line is submerged in a v io la tion  
of a binding regulation, she is unseaworthy.
V I I -  O ther R e levan t Fac to rs :
Besides the  d i f f e r e n t  fa c to rs ,  a lre a d y  m e n t io n e d ,  
seaworthiness includes other re levan t th ings such as bunkers, 
n a v ig a t io n a l e q u ip m e n t and docum ents necessary fo r  the 
performance of the voyage. In  other words; to be seaworthy, a 
vessel must be supplied w ith  a suffic iency of fue l and equipped
54 See Benedict, s im i. ,  Vol. 2.A, Chapt. 7 at p. 11.
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w ith  adequate charts and fire f igh ting  equipments, etc.
1- B u n k e rs :
To be seaworthy, a vessel must be adequately supplied w i th  
bunkers fo r the voyage undertaken. I t  has been held tha t to be 
adequate, the bunkers should be 20 to 25 percent greater than 
the tonnage of bunkers which is estimated to be consumed on the 
contemplated voyage under normal conditions.
Thus, in  T h in  V. Richards and Co..55 the voyage was from  
Oran to Garston, w ith  l ib e r ty  to call at Huelva. The ship le ft  Oran 
w i th  a supply of coal insu ff ic ien t fo r the voyage to Garston, but 
su ff ic ien t to take her to Huelva. And through a mistake of the 
engineer, w ho overestim ated the q u a n t i ty  s t i l l  on board at 
Huelva, sailed thence w ith o u t taking a fresh supply. As a result, 
the ship w en t ashore when the engines failed, and the cargo was 
lost.
Held by Day. J. tha t the voyage was an en tire  voyage from  
Oran to Garston, and tha t the ship was unseaworthy w hen  she 
sailed from  Oran. The Court of Appeal did not decide w hether the 
voyage was entire  or was d iv ided in to  stages, bu t held tha t in 
e ither v ie w  of the case the ship was unseaworthy. I f  the voyage 
was en tire , they  said, the ship should on s ta rt ing  have had 
enough coal to take her to Garston, i f  i t  was a voyage in stages, 
the ship ought to have been p roperly  equipped at Huelva fo r  the 
la ter stage.
The quan tity  of fue l required on board depends on season of
55 [189212 Q.B. 141 (C.A).
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voyage. Thus, a greater supp ly  of bunkers is req u ired  fo r  a 
w in te r  North A tlan t ic  voyage than one in  the summer. I f  i t  is 
known tha t ice may be encountered, the supply of bunkers must 
relate to the possib ility of delay resulting from  ice conditions.56
Seaworthiness in  respect of bunkers, requires tha t the vessel 
be supplied w i th  bunkers of q u a lity  w h ich  w i l l  p e rm it  her to 
prosecute her voyage at a reasonable speed.
An in te res ting  case concerning th is po in t is tha t of, A /B .  
Karlshams Obiefabriker V. Monarch Steamship Co.. L td .57 In  this 
case, the ship was supplied w ith  coal which, by reason of its poor 
q u a l i ty ,  p reven ted  her f ro m  prosecuting her voyage w i th  
reasonable despatch. Held, tha t the ship was unseaw orthy  in  
this regard.
I t  must be borne in mind that, i t  is sometimes, impossible for a 
vessel to take on board, at the start of a long voyage, a suffic ient 
supply of fue l fo r  the whole voyage contracted for. That is the 
basis fo r  the princip le of seaworthiness by stages. This princ ip le 
means, tha t w hen a ship starts on a long voyage w i th  on ly  
enough coal or other fue l fo r part of the voyage, the in te n t io n  
being to take on board a fre sh  sup p ly  at one or more 
in te rm ed ia te  ports. The voyage is considered as d iv ided  in to  
stages for the purpose of coaling or bunkering.58
I t  is convenient to mention here that, the shipowner has the 
r ig h t  to decide w h a t the bunkering  stages are to be, p rov ided
tha t they  are usual and reasonable. But once the stages have
56 See Benedict, op.cit.. Vol. 2.A, Chapt. 7 at p. 16.
57 (1946) 79 LI.L.Rep. 385 (Court of Session).
58 See Arnould, op.cit.. Vol. 2 at p. 566.
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been fixed, i t  is not open to the shipowner to say tha t the vessel 
was seaw orthy  because of the presence of an in te rm e d ia te  
bunkering port at wh ich  she could, but was not in tended to call.
Therefore, to be seaworthy, the ship must at s tarting, have 
enough supply of fue l fo r the f irs t  stage to the in te rm ed ia te  port 
at w h ich  i t  is in tended to take fu r th e r  supplies, and she must 
have enough fo r  her second stage w hen  she sails f ro m  tha t 
in term edia te port.
Thus in The V o rt ig e rn .^9 a vessel sailed on her voyage from  
the Philippines to Liverpool. The voyage was d iv ided in to  stages. 
She called at Colombo, but did not take on suffic ient coal fo r the 
next stage to Suez. When she was near a coaling station, the 
master did not take on any more fue l owing to the negligence of 
the engineer in  not in fo rm in g  him  tha t the coal was runn ing  
short. In  consequence, some of the cargo had to be burned as fue l 
to enable her to get to Suez.
Held, by the Court of Appeal, that the ship was unseaworthy 
w hen  she le f t  Colombo by reason of the insu ff ic iency  of coal 
taken there.
2-  Navigational Equipment:
Seaworthiness involves elements independent of the vessel's 
structure, she must be supplied w ith  means w hereby  she may be 
safe ly navigated. Thus she must have on board a re l ia b le  
compass or compasses and sextants.
Also, i t  is clear that a vessel is unseaworthy w hen she sails on 
her voyage i f  she is not equipped w i th  adequate charts, l igh t
59 [1899] P. 140.
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books, p ilot books, lists of radio beacons and notices to mariners.
But this does not mean tha t every  chart and pub lica tion  on 
board must be corrected up-to-date prior to breaking ground on 
the voyage provided the means of correcting them before they 
need to be used are at hand, nor must the ship must have the 
latest edition of a given chart or publication provided the edition 
on board contain substantia lly  the same in fo rm ation  as the la ter 
ones.60
I t  is im p o rta n t to note, tha t fa ilu re  to provide plans of the 
vessel's machinery may amount to unseaworthiness.
Thus in Robin Hood Flour M ills L td . V. N.M. Paterson and Sons 
L td ..6 1 the absence of a plan of the engine-room pip ing system 
made the ship unseaworthy.
Furtherm ore , to be seaworthy, the ship must be equipped 
w i th  suitable loading and discharging tackle fo r  the o rd in a ry  
purposes of loading and discharging.62
The ship must also have on board all papers and documents 
necessary fo r  the protection of the ship and cargo and fo r  due 
performance of the voyage such as her b i l l  of health.
Thus in C iam pa V. B r it ish  Ind ia  Co.6  ^ A ship sailed fro m  
Monbassa w h ich was a plague contaminated port, w i th  a fou l b i l l  
of health. A t Naples lemons were shipped under a b i l l  of lading 
fo r London. Marseilles was the next port of call and under French
60 See Dewey.R.Villareal, J.R., .Qp,eit., at p. 775, see also The Irish Spruce 
[1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 63.
6 * [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 276.
62 See Payne, W., and Ivamy, E.R.H., Carriage of goods bv sea. 12th ed. 
by E.R. Hardy Ivamy, London, Butterworths, 1985, p. 15.
63 [1915] 2 K.B. 774.
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Law, the ship coming from  an Eastern port w ith o u t a clean b i l l  of 
health, had to be fum igated. The lemons were damaged by 
fum igation.
Held tha t the ship was not reasonably f i t  at Naples fo r  the 
carriage of lemons and she was, therefore, unseaworthy.
3 -  Seaworthiness and Importance of Classification or 
C ert i f ica tes:
M any seagoing vessels are b u i l t  under the superv is ion  of 
classification societies and most are classified in  one or another 
of the standard classification societies of the w o r ld  such as 
Lloyd 's Register of Shipping, American Bureau o f  Shipping and 
Bureau V e ritas . These c la ss if ica tion  societies have ru les  
concerning the design, construction and f it t ings  of vessels wh ich  
they  respective ly  classify.64 These rules are c learly  a measure 
of the vessel's seaworthiness. Accordingly, i f  a vessel conforms to 
the requirem ents of her class, she is prima facie seaworthy.
But the question w h ich  arises in  this connection is w h e the r 
the issuance of seaworth iness certif ica tes, by  c lass if ica tion  
societies, is suffic ient to establish a vessel's seaworthiness?
As seaworthiness relates to a vessel's actual condition, ne ither 
the g ranting  of c lassification nor the issuance of certif ica tes 
establish seaworthiness.
This was made clear in the case of Charles Goodfellow Lum ber 
Sales L td . V. V e rre a u lt  H o v in g to n .6  ^ w h ich  came before the 
Canadian courts. I t  was held that, the production of a certif icate
64 See Benedict, op.cit.. Vol. 2.A, Chapt. 8 at p. 10.
65 [19711 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 185.
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of seaworthiness signed by a steamship inspector appointed by 
the Department of T ransport was not suff ic ient to establish the 
vessel's seaworthiness.
On the other hand, if  on sailing, a vessel's structure, f i t t ings  or 
stowage do no t com p ly  w i th  measure of p roper cond itions 
p ro v id e d  by  the ru les  of c la ss if ica tion  societies, she is 
unseaworthy.
Section tw o : The Absolute W a rra n ty  of Seaworthiness  
Under the Common L aw .
I -  History of the Absolute W arran ty  of Seaworthiness:
In  The Caledonia66 case, M r Justice Gray d e live r in g  the 
opinion of the Circuit court, said:
"In  every contract fo r the carriage of goods by sea, 
unless otherw ise expressly stipu lated, there is a 
w a r ra n ty  on the pa rt of the shipowner tha t the 
ship is seaworthy at the t im e of beginn ing her 
voyage..."
I t  has been said tha t the w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness, in  the 
relations between vessel and shipper, is one of the most severe 
know n to the Law. I t  is that, at the commencement of the voyage, 
the vessel shall be tho rough ly  f i t te d  fo r  the same, both as 
regards structure and equipment. I t  is not merely tha t the vessel 
owner w i l l  exercise reasonable care to have her in  this condition 
or tha t he w i l l  repair such things as are discoverable, bu t i t  is an
66 (1895) 157 U.S. 124 at p. 130.
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absolute w a r ra n ty  of fitness fo r  the voyage against even such 
defects as are la tent.67 That means tha t the most controvers ia l 
feature of the w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness is the e lement of s tr ic t 
l iab il i ty .
Thus i t  is th is absolute qu a lity  of the w a r ra n ty  w h ich  we 
shall focus upon in  th is  section, spec if ica lly  its orig ins and 
development.
The concept of seaworthiness f i rs t  appears in the customs and 
regulations dealing w i th  the sh ipm ent of cargo by sea and the 
chartering of vessels to carry  cargo (contracts of a ffre igh tm en t) 
and concurrently  in the Law of Marine insurance.68
The orig ins of much of Ang lo -A m erican  M a r it im e  Law are 
found in  the Law M erchant consisting of the customs and 
practices of merchants common to most European countries.69
The Law Merchant was adm in istered in most seaport towns 
p r io r  to the seventeenth cen tu ry  by special courts of w h ich  a 
nu m be r of "grave and discreet merchants" w ere  necessary 
m e m b e rs .70 And as the Law M erchan t was considered as 
custom, cases were ra re ly  reported as laying down any particu lar 
rule. As a resu lt l i t t le  was done towards bu ild ing up any system 
of Mercantile Law in England, and it  was not un t i l  Lord Mansfield
67 See Dewey.R.Villareal, J.R., op.cit.. p. 763.
68 See Chamlee, G.H., "The absolute w arran ty  of seaworthiness: a 
history and comparative study", (1973) 24 Mercer Law Review 519 at p. 520.
69 See Scrutton, T.E, "General survey of the history of the Law  
Merchant" In 3 select essavs in Anglo-American legal history, edited by a 
committee of the Association of American Law Schools, Boston, 1909, Vol. 3, 
p. 7 at p. 12.
70 Ibid, at p. 12.
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became chief justice of the King's Bench in  1756 tha t any real 
system of Mercantile Law came into being in England.71
An im p o rta n t source of the M arit im e  Law adm in is te red in 
these ea rly  merchants' courts, and la te r in  the Common Law 
courts, was a series of codes of sea laws wh ich  became iden tif ied  
w i th  pa rt icu la r  seaports.72 In  these famous codes are found 
some of the most enduring  princ ip les of M a r it im e  Law. The 
absence of references to these codes in early texts w h ich discuss 
seaworthiness support th is conclusion; however, i t  is probable 
tha t an express w a r ra n ty  of a vessel's fitness was com m only 
incorporated into early charterparties.
Scrutton cites a cha rte rpa rty  dated July 3rd, 1531, containing 
the fo llow ing passage;
"And the sayd owner shall w a rra n t the said shypp 
strong stanche w e ll and su ff ic ie n t ly  v ita l le d  and
apparellyd.etc."73
Variations of this same language are found in charte rparties  
today.74
In  1681 a comprehensive body of M arine ordinances was
71 Ibid, at p. 13.
7  ^ Ibid, see also Gilmore, G. & Black, C., The Law of Adm iralty . 2nd ed., 
New York, The Foundation Press, Inc., 1975, pp. 5-7.
7 3 See Scrutton, T.E., The contract of affreightment as expressed in 
charterparties and bills of lading. 15th ed. by W.L. Me Nair & A.A. Mocatta, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1948, p. 97.
74  "Vessel on her delivery to be...tight, staunch, and in every w ay  
fitted for the service..." (excerpt from New York Produce Exchange Time 
charter form) in Gilmore & Black, op.cit.. Appendix B, p. 1003.
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published by Louis X IV 7  ^ under the d irection of his celebrated 
m in is te r of f inance Colbert. A lthough  of French o r ig in , the 
ordinances were based upon the prevailing M arit im e  princip les 
of Europe. In  tim e the ordinances became qu ite  popu lar w i th  
Eng lish  Ju r is ts  w h o  had no com parab le  n a t io n a l  code 
a va ila b le .76 The ordinances included a prov is ion  w h ich  v e ry  
l ike ly  form ed the foundation of the w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness:
"However, i f  the merchant prove tha t w hen  the 
ship pu t to sea she was u n f i t  fo r  sailing, the 
master shall lose his f re ig h t  and pay the o ther
damages and losses."77
The significant feature of this ordinance was tha t i t  afforded 
the merchant a r ig h t  to in d e m n ity  solely upon p roo f of the 
vessel's unfitness independent of any fa u lt  or negligence on the 
part of owner or master.
R.J. Va lin , in  his com m e n ta ry  on th is  a rt ic le , cites an 
observation of Weitson:
"That the pun ishm ent of the master in this case 
ought not to be thought too severe, because the 
m aster, by  the n a tu re  of the co n tra c t  of 
affre igh tm ent, is necessarily held to w a rra n t tha t
7 5 The Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV. [1879] 30 Fed. Cas., pp. 1203-  
1216. see also Chamlee. op.cit-. at n. S2 1 .
7  ^ See Scrutton, "General survey of the history of the Law Merchant", 
op.cit.. at p. 14.
77 The Marine ordinances of Louis XIV. Title third, article 12, (1879) 30 
Fed. Cas, 1203 at p. 1208, see also Abbott, C.. A treatise of the Law relative to 
merchant ships and seamen. 4th ed., London, Butterworth, 1812, p. 229.
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the ship is good, and perfec tly  in  a cond ition  to 
perform  the voyage in question, under the penalty
of all expenses, damages, and interest."78
And he h im se lf  adds tha t th is is so, a lthough before its 
depa rtu re  the ship may have been v is ited  according to the 
practice of France, and reported suffic ient; because on the v is i t  
the exterior parts on ly  of the vessel are surveyed, so tha t secret 
faults cannot be discovered, for which by consequence, says he:
"The owner or master remains always responsible; 
and th is  the more ju s t ly  because he cannot be 
ignorant of the bad state of the ship, but even i f  he 
be ignorant, he must s till answer, being necessarily 
bound to fu rn ish  a ship good and capable of the
voyage."79
The author of the most popular English ad m ira lty  text of the 
early  n ineteenth century, Charles Abbott, w r i t in g  in 1812, seems 
to c red it the Marine ordinances and Valin 's in te rp re ta t io n  w i th  
being the source of the absolute w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness.80
Adding his own stamp of approval to the absolute w a rran ty ,  
Abbott states:
" In  a ch a rte rp a rty  the person w ho lets the ship 
covenants that i t  is tight, staunch, and suffic ient; i f  
i t  is not so, the term s of the covenant are not 
complied w ith ,  and the ignorance of a covenator
78 See Abbott, (iiL fiil., PP. 229-230.
79 Ibid, at p 230, quoting Valin.
80 Abbott, (ULCiL pp. 229-230.
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can never excuse h im .”81
W ith  regards to a general ship, a sh ipowner w ho offers to 
carry  the goods of all comers or who runs a line of ships from  
port to po rt ha b itu a l ly  carry ing  all goods b rought to h im  is a 
common ca rr ie r .82 In the absence of express stipulations in the 
con trac t of a f f re ig h tm e n t,  and subject to ce rta in  s ta tu to ry  
exem ptions  f ro m  l ia b i l i t y ,  the common c a r r ie r  im p l ie d ly  
undertakes to ca rry  the goods at his own absolute r isk, except 
where the loss or damage to them is caused by:
(i) The act of God. In  Nugent V. S m ith .8 3 James. L.J gave the 
fo llow ing observation:
"The act of God is a mere short w ay of expressing 
this proposition: a common carrier is not liable for
any accident as to w h ich  he can show th a t i t  is
due to na tu ra l causes, d ire c t ly  and exc lus ive ly , 
w ith o u t human in te rvention , and that it  could not 
have been prevented by any amount of fo res igh t 
and pains and care reasonably to be expected from  
him .”
(ii) The queen's enemies, ( i i i)  the inheren t vice of the goods, 
( iv )  de fa u lt  of the sh ipper, or by (v) a genera l average 
sacrifice.84
The severity  of this rule of the Common Law is said to have
8 1 Abbott, op.cit.. at p 231.
82 V. Smith [18751 3 Asp.M.L.C 87 at p. 89, per Brett. J.
8 3 (1876) 1 C.P.D. 423 at p. 444.
For further discussion on the exceptions, see'Carver, op.cit.. pp. 11-
19.
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had its orig in in the danger of the ft  by the carrier's servants, or 
collusion between dishonest carriers and thieves to the prejudice 
of the shipper, since geographic remoteness of the shipper from  
the property  w h ile  i t  was in trans it would make proof of such a 
co llus ion d i f f ic u l t  i f  no t im poss ib le .85 To p re ve n t th is, the 
respons ib il i ty  of an insure r fo r the safe d e live ry  of the goods, 
was imposed on the carrier in addition to his l ia b i l i ty  as a bailee 
fo r rew ard .86
In  the case of R i le v  V. H o rn e .87 Best C.J. d e live r in g  the 
judgment of the Common Pleas, said:
"When goods are delivered to a carrier, they are no 
longer under the eye of the owner, he seldom 
fo llow s or sends any servant w i th  them to the 
place of the ir  destination. I f  they should be lost or 
in ju red by the grossest negligence of the carr ie r or . 
his servants, or stolen by them, or by th ieves in 
collusion w ith  them, the owner would be unable to 
prove e ither of these causes of loss; his witnesses 
must be the ca rr ie r ’s servants, and they, know ing 
tha t they could not be contradicted, w ou ld  excuse 
the ir masters and themselves.
To give due security  to p rope rty , the Law has 
added to tha t re sp o n s ib il i ty  of a carr ie r, w h ich  
im m edia te ly  rises out of his contract to carry  for a 
reward, namely tha t of taking all reasonable care 
of it, the responsib ility  of an insurer."
85 Chicago & ILL R.R. Co. V. Collins Produce Co. (19 19) 249 U.S. 186 at 
192-93.
86 Per Lord Holt in Coggs V. Bernard (1703) 2 Ld. Ravin. 909 at 9 18.
87 (1828) 5 Bing 217 at 220.
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The same reason was given by Lord Mansfield in Forw ard  V. 
P it ta rd .88 where he stated that:
"...by the nature of his contract, he is liable fo r  all 
due care and diligence, and for any negligence he 
is suable on his contract. But there is a fu r th e r  
degree of re sp o n s ib i l i ty  by  the custom of the 
realm, tha t is, by the Common Law; a carrier is in  
the nature of an insurer. I t  is laid down tha t he is 
liable fo r every  accident, except by the act of God, 
or the k in g ’s enemies."
In  addition to these famous cases imposing on the carr ie r the 
l ia b i l i ty  of an insurer, Abbott comments that a common carrier is 
in  any event liable as an insurer of the cargo against all events 
bu t "act of God and the king's enemies".89 Accordingly, there is 
no doubt that an absolute w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness im p lied  by 
Law prevailed in England at the tu rn  of the n ineteenth cen tury  
as to contracts of affre ightment.
The case of Lvo n  V. M e l ls .90 arising in  the year 1804, is an 
early  and much cited authority . A leaky ligh ter had wetted bales 
of yarn . The owner of the ligh te r re lied on a notice w h e re by  he 
reduced his l ia b i l i ty  in ambiguous language. In de live r ing  the 
judgm ent of the court on this occasion, the learned chief justice 
Lord Ellenborough said:
" In  e ve ry  con tract fo r  the carriage of goods 
between a person ho ld ing h im se lf  fo r th  as the
88 (1785) 1 T.R. 27 at 33.
8  ^ Abbott, op.cit.. at p. 23 1.
90 (1804) 5 East 428.
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owner of a ligh te r or vessel ready to carry  goods 
for hire, and the person putting goods on board or 
employing his vessel or ligh ter fo r  that purpose, it  
is a term  of the contract on the part of the carrie r 
or ligh term an, im p lied  by Law, tha t his vessel is 
t ig h t and f i t  fo r  the purpose or em p loym en t fo r  
wh ich  he offers and holds i t  fo r th  to the public: i t  
is the v e ry  foundation and immediate substratum  
of the contract tha t i t  is so: the Law presumes a 
promise to tha t effect on the pa rt of the ca rr ie r 
w i th o u t  any actual proof; and eve ry  reason of 
sound policy and public  convenience requ ires i t
should be so."91
From this judgm ent arose the doctrine of an absolute and 
im p lied w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness as a fundam enta l condition of 
every contract of affre ightment.
Lord Ellenborough's judgm ent has been fo llow ed ever since. 
Thus, in  Steel V. State Line Steamship Co..92 Lord B lackbu rn93 
emphasizes tha t the "w a rra n ty "  is "not m ere ly  tha t they  (the 
owners) should do the ir  best to make the ship f i t ,  bu t tha t the 
ship should rea lly  be fit."
In  United States, the f i rs t  American case of note in  w h ich  an 
absolute w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness was applied was Putm an V. 
W ood94 decided in 1807 by the Supreme court of Massachusetts. 
In  a transaction w h ich  seems ex trao rd ina ry  today bu t possibly 
was not uncommon in  the era of sailing ships, the p la in t i f f
91 Ibid, at 437.
92 [187713 A.C. 72.
93 Ibid, at p. 86.
94 (1807)3 Mass 481.
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en trus ted  $ 3.000 to a sh ipow ner to be used to purchase 
merchandise at Calcutta fo r de live ry  to him at N e w bury-po rt.  In  
lieu of fre ig h t and a broker's commission the sh ipowner agreed 
to accept one ha lf  of the net p ro f its  f rom  the sale of the 
merchandise. Upon a rr iva l at Calcutta, a fter encountering tw o 
severe gales, the ship was found to be leaking s lightly . Repairs 
were effected and loading commenced. A fte r receiving two th irds 
of its cargo, four feet of water were discovered in the cargo hold. 
Sale of the damaged cargo resulted in a $ 300 loss to the p la in t i f f  
who sued to recover.
The evidence at t r ia l  disclosed "no w an t of care and diligence 
in  the officers and crew of the vessel in f ind ing  out the leak, and 
securing the cargo". Rejecting the argum ent tha t the vesse l’s 
seaworthiness at the commencement of the voyage was suffic ient 
to exonerate the shipowner, the court (citing A b bo tt as its sole 
a u th o r i ty )  art icu la ted  an absolute w a r ra n ty  in  the broadest 
possible terms:
" I t  is the du ty  of the owner of a ship, w hen  he 
charters her, or puts her up for fre ight, to see that 
she is in a suitable condition to transport her cargo 
in safety; and he is to keep her in tha t condition, 
unless p re v e n te d  by  p e r i ls  of the sea or 
unavo idab le accident. I f  the goods are lost by  
reason of any defect in  the vessel, w he ther la ten t 
or v is ib le , kno w n  or unknow n , the ow ne r is 
answerable to the fre ig h te r,  upon the p r inc ip le  
tha t he tac it ly  contracts tha t his vessel shall be f i t  
fo r the use, for w h ich  he thus employs her. This 
principle governs, not on ly in charterparties and in 
policies of insurance, but i t  is equally applicable in
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contracts of a ffre ightm ent."9^
W ith  Putman case, the absolute w a rra n ty  established a f i rm  
foothold in the New world . I t  on ly remained for the United States 
Supreme court to place its im p rem atu r upon the doctrine. This i t  
did 71 years later in W ork  V. Leathers .96 a cha rte rpa rty  case in 
w h ich  Putman was cited as prim e a u th o r ity  fo r  the absolute 
w a rran ty .
I I -  The W a r ra n ty  of S eaw orth iness  in  C h a r te ro a r t ie s :
Charterparties in v a r ia b ly  conta in a large num ber of te rm s 
express ly  agreed to by  the parties, conta ined bo th  in  the 
standard fo rm s used in the m arke t and in  the special r iders  
agreed to between pa rt icu la r owners and charte rers . These 
express terms w i l l  deal w i th  such matters as the period of the 
charter, the rate of fre igh t or hire, etc.97
As a general rule of Law, the courts w i l l  not im p ly  a particu lar 
te rm  in  a contract merely because i t  would have been reasonable 
fo r  the parties to have inserted such a term , fo r i t  is not the 
function of the court to make a contract fo r the parties.98
However, i f  certa in  terms are necessary to give business 
efficacy to the contract as both parties must have in tended ,99 
the court w i l l  then im p ly  them in to  the contract. In  th is  way,
9 5 Ibid, at p. 484 per Parker.J.
96 (1878) 97 U.S. 379.
97 See Chorley, R.S., & Giles, O.C., Shinning Law , 8th ed. by N.J.J. Gaskell 
et Al, London, Pitman Publishing, 1987, p. 181.
9  ^ See Scrutton. 1984. on.cit.. at p. 81.
99 Ibid, at p. 81.
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certa in terms have, th rough jud ic ia l policy, become perm anent 
f ix tures in  charte rpa rty  Law. One of the most im p o rtan t of these 
im plied terms is the w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness.
1- Express and Im p l i e d  U n d e r ta k in g s  as to 
Seaworthiness in Charterpart ies:
By entering in to  a contract to carry  goods in his ship, w hether 
under a ch a r te rp a r ty  or as a common carr ie r, a sh ipow ner 
undertakes tha t his ship is seaworthy.100
This im p l ie d  u n d e r ta k in g  of seaw orth iness, was w e l l  
i l lus tra ted  in  Steel V. State L in e 101 case, where Lord B lackburn 
said:102
"...where there is a contract to ca rry  goods in a 
ship, whether that contract is in the shape of a b i l l  
of lading, or any other form , there is a du ty  on the 
part of the person who furn ishes or supplies tha t 
ship, or tha t ship's room, unless something be 
stipu la ted wh ich  should p reven t it, that the ship 
shall be f i t  fo r  its purpose. That is ge ne ra lly  
expressed by saying that i t  shall be seaworthy..."
Yet charterparties also contain the express term  tha t the ship 
is "t ight, staunch, and strong and in  eve ry  w ay  f i t te d  fo r  the 
voyage". This express provis ion seems to be equ iva len t to the 
w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness and fitness w h ich  is im p lied  by Law 
on the part of the shipowner.
100 See Chorlev &. Giles, on.cit.. at p. 182.
101 [187713 A.C. 72.
10  ^ Ibid, at p. 86.
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Therefore, i t  may w e ll  be asked w hy, in  v iew  of these clear 
words, the courts should have found i t  necessary to im p ly  a 
w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness?
The answer is that, in charterparties, tw o  d if fe re n t positions 
of shipowner may be distinguishable:
(i) The usual clause that the ship is "tight, staunch, and strong 
and in  every  w ay f i t te d  fo r  the voyage" apparently  refers e ither 
to the tim e at w h ich  the contract is made, or to the t im e of 
sailing fo r the loading p o r t . 1 0  ^ In other words; the "voyage" for 
w h ich the ship is to be "in every w ay f i t te d "  can, therefore, only 
be the p re lim ina ry  voyage from  where the ship happens to be to 
the port where the cargo is taken on board. The charter is silent 
on the condition of the ship when i t  sails w i th  cargo from  the 
loading po rt.104
(ii) Seaworthiness implied by Common Law, on the other hand, 
re fe rs  to the cargo-carry ing  voyage, actua lly  to the t im e  of 
sailing from  the loading port.
Generally speaking, the w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness on sailing 
from  the port of loading is, however, im p lied by Law, although 
there be an express w a rra n ty  in the charter w h ich  relates on ly 
to the time of sailing for that port.
Thus in Seville Sulphur Co. V . C o l v i l s . , 1 0 5 w here the charter 
prov ided tha t the ship "being tight, staunch, and strong and in 
eve ry  w ay f i t te d  fo r  the voyage" shall proceed to Seville, and 
there load, i t  was held tha t she was bound to be seaworthy on
103 See Carver, op.cit.. at p. 4 4 8 .
104 See Chorlev &. Giles, op.cit.. at p. 1 82.
1Q5 (18 88 )  25 S.L.R. 437.
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sailing from  Seville: And the charterer recovered on the ground 
tha t this w a r ra n ty  was broken, though the defect was not an 
orig inal one, but lay in the muddy state of the w a te r w h ich had 
been taken into the boilers just before leaving Seville.
From th is  case, i t  is clear enough, th a t the con trac tua l 
w a rra n ty  need not coincide w ith  the Common Law one, so that an 
exemption from  the fo rm er in the cha rte rpa rty  does not re lieve 
the owner i f  the pa rticu la r unseaworthiness remains u n t i l  the 
ship sails from  the port of loading.106
2 -  Time of Seaworthiness in Voyage C harterparties:
We must now consider at w h a t  t im e  the ship must be 
seaworthy.
First, the ship is warranted to be f i t  to receive the cargo, and 
lie in harbour un til ready to sail. A defect arising after the cargo 
has been shipped is no breach of this undertaking.
Thus in Me Fadden V. Blue Star L in e .107 a sluice door was 
im p e rfec t ly  closed after the p la in t i f f ’s goods were shipped, bu t 
before the ship sailed. In  consequence the goods were damaged.
I t  was held by Channei.J.108 that, the state of the sluice door, 
had i t  existed before the goods were put on board, w ould  have 
constitu ted a breach of the w a r ra n ty  of fitness in respect of 
cargo, bu t as i t  did not exist t i l l  a fter the loading commenced, 
there was no breach of the w a rra n ty  in tha t respect.
106 See Lorentz, H.A., Hie_L.aw a-S lo.seaworthiness under the contract of 
affreightment. L.L.M. Dissertation, University of London (19 54), 7.
107 [19051 1 K.B. 697.
108 Ibid, at p. 705.
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Secondly, the ship is w a rra n te d  to be f i t  "to encounter 
w hatever perils of the sea a ship of that k ind, and laden in tha t 
way, may be fa ir ly  expected to encounter".109 This last and most 
im p o rta n t w a r ra n ty  is restr ic ted to the commencement of the 
voyage. " I t  does not take effect before the ship is ready to sail, 
nor does i t  continue to take effect after she has sailed: i t  takes 
effect at the time of sailing, and at the time of sailing alone".110
An interesting case that can be cited in this connection, is that 
of Cohn V. D av idson .111 A ship was chartered to proceed to a 
w h a r f  in the port of Sunderland, there take on board a cargo and 
proceed to Dundee. She was seaworthy when she began to load, 
bu t unseaworthy when she put to sea.
Held, th a t the ow ner undertakes th a t the ship shall be 
seaworthy for the intended voyage at the time of her sailing on 
it; tha t w h a t is seaworthiness fo r  loading in  ha rbour may be 
unsea w o rth in ess  fo r  the voyage; th a t  the w a r r a n ty  of 
seaw orth iness  im p l ie d  by  Law  upon e n te r in g  in to  the 
c h a r te rp a r ty  had been broken, and th a t the p la in t i f f  was 
en tit led  to recover the value of the cargo shipped by h im  on 
board the vessel.
One last po in t w h ich  deserves notice is that, i f  the ship is 
reasonably f i t  to complete the voyage at the moment of sailing, 
the fact tha t she becomes unseaworthy during the course of the 
voyage is no breach of the w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness as " it  is 
not a continuing w a rran ty , in the sense of a w a r ra n ty  th a t she
109 Si££i V. State Line S.S. Co. [1877] 3 A.C. 72, per Lord Cairns L.C at p. 77.
110 Me Fadden V. Blue Star Line [19051 1 K.B. 697, per Channei.J at p. 704.
111 (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 455.
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shall continue f i t  during the voyage".112 I f  unseaworth iness 
arises in  the course of the voyage, the shipowner is bound to 
rem edy i t  i f  possible. This special obligation, however, does not 
arise from  the w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness, bu t from  the du ty  to 
take care.113
Where the voyage is d iv ided in to  "stages", the w a r ra n ty  of 
seaworthiness is in te rp re ted  as a w a rra n ty  that, w hen the ship 
sails on each stage of the voyage, she is f i t  fo r  the dura tion  of 
tha t particu lar stage. There is, then, no breach of the w a rra n ty  if  
the ship is not f i t  fo r the whole voyage w hen she sails on one 
part icu la r stage, prov ided tha t she is f i t  fo r  the whole of this 
stage.114
An extrem e ly  im portan t and invo lved point of seaworthiness 
is suff ic ient fuel. For cargo vessels on long voyage i t  is, f rom  a 
commercial point of v iew , impossible to take on board a suffic ient 
supply of fue l fo r the whole voyage.1 *5 In  such cases, the voyage 
is deemed to be div ided in to bunkering stages for the purpose of 
re-fue ll ing . And, accordingly, the voyage from  one coaling port to 
another is a "stage", and by commencing this "stage" w i th  an 
insuff ic iency of fue l on board, the shipowner is in breach of the 
undertaking.
Thus in The V o rt ig e rn .116 a vessel sailed on her voyage from  
the Philippines to Liverpool. The cha rte rpa rty  excluded l ia b i l i ty
112 Me Fadden V. Blue Star Line [19051 1 K.B. 697, per Channei.J at p. 703.
1 ^  See Scrutton, 1984, on.cit.. at p. 86.
114 See Ridley, J., The Law of the carriage of goods bv land, sea, and air. 
6th ed. by Geoffrey Whitehead, London, Shaw & Sons Ltd., 1982, p. 89.
1 See Arnould. op.cit.. at p. S66.
116 [1899] P. 140.
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fo r  the negligence of the master and engineers. The voyage was 
d iv ided in to stages. She called at Colombo, bu t did not take on 
suff ic ient coal fo r  the next stage to Suez. When she was near a 
coaling station, the master did not take on any more fue l fo r  he 
was not warned by the engineer tha t the supplies were runn ing 
short. The consequence was tha t some of the cargo had to be 
used as fue l to enable the ship to reach Suez.
Held, by the Court of Appeal, tha t the shipowners could not 
plead the exception clause; tha t the ship was not seaworthy for 
the stage from  Colombo to Suez, and tha t the cha rte re r could 
recover from  the shipowner the value of the cargo burned in 
consequence of the breach of the w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness.
3- The Effect of Unseaworthiness in Voyage C harter-  
p a r t ie s :
I f  the charterer discovers tha t the ship is unseaworthy before 
the voyage begins, and the defect cannot be remedied w i th in  a 
reasonable time, he may th row  up the charter.
Thus, in S tan ton V. R icha rdson .117 a ship was chartered to 
take a cargo inc lud ing w e t sugar. When the b u lk  of sugar had 
been loaded, i t  was found that the pumps were not of su ff ic ien t 
capacity  to rem ove the drainage fro m  the sugar. Adequate  
pum ping m achinery could not be obtained fo r  a considerable 
time.
Held, the ship was unseaworthy fo r the cargo agreed on, and 
as she could not be made f i t  w i th in  a reasonable tim e, the
117 (1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 390.
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charterer was justif ied in throw ing up the charter.
Further, a lthough the ship is unseaworthy, the sh ipow ner 
may s t i l l  re ly  on a contractual clause w h ich  exempts h im  from  
l ia b i l i ty  fo r certain perils if  the respective loss or damage has not 
been caused by the unseaworthiness of the ship.118
The issue was settled in The Eurooa119 case, the facts of wh ich 
neatly  il lus tra te  the point.
The German steamship "Europa” was chartered by  B r it ish  
merchants to ca rry  a cargo of sugar in  bags f ro m  S te tt in  to 
L ive rpoo l,  and there de live r it. One of the excepted perils  
mentioned in the cha rte rpa rty  being "collision". When entering 
the dock at L iverpoo l the ship struck the dock wa ll. A w a te r-  
closet pipe was broken and wate r got through it  in to  the tween 
decks and some bags of sugar w h ich  were stowed there were 
damaged by the water. In  the tween decks near to the w a te r -  
closet pipe w ere  tw o scupper holes. The pipes w h ich  had 
orig ina lly  been affixed to these two scupper holes fo r the purpose 
of ca rry ing  o ff w a te r from  the tween decks to the bilges, had 
been rem oved, and the scupper holes had been im p e r fe c t ly  
plugged. W ith  the resu lt tha t the w a te r from  the broken closet 
pipe not on ly  got to the tween decks, bu t also th rough  these 
scupper holes, in to the lower hold, damaging other bags of sugar 
stowed there.
There was thus, two d iffe ren t aspects of seawater damage to 
the sugar: one in  the tween decks, and one in the lower hold. I t  
was not disputed tha t the im perfec t plugging of the scupper
1 See Payne &. Ivamy, op.cit.. at p. 16.
119 [1908] P. 84.
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holes existed before the cargo was loaded, and before the vessel 
sailed f ro m  Stettin ; and tha t the reb y  the vessel was, to tha t 
extent, unseaworthy.
W hile  the defendant shipowners adm itted  l ia b i l i t y  fo r  the 
damage to the sugar in  the lower hold, as being due to a breach 
of the seaworthiness duty, they denied l ia b i l i ty  fo r  the damage 
in the tween decks, alleging tha t th is damage was not caused at 
all by unseaworthiness, bu t was the direct result of the collision 
w i th  the dock w a ll,  and tha t l ia b i l i ty  fo r  co llis ion had been 
excepted.
Held, tha t they were not liable fo r this damage; and tha t the 
breach of the undertaking of seaworthiness did not displace the 
terms of the contract. The damage to the sugar in  the tween 
decks was caused not by unseaworthiness, but by the collision, 
and so the shipowners were en tit led  to re ly  on the exception 
clause.
On the other hand, “i f  the unfitness of the ship becomes a real 
cause of loss or damage to the cargo, the sh ip o w n e r is 
responsib le, a lthough other causes f ro m  whose e ffec t he is 
excused e ithe r at Common Law or by express contract have 
contributed to cause the loss".120
Accordingly, where there is an exception of negligence, but no 
exception of unseaworthiness, the sh ipowner is liab le fo r  the 
whole of the damage.
Thus, in  The Chris te l V in n e n .121 damage to cargo due to
120 Smith Hogg & Co. V. Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance Co. f 19401 
A.C. 997, per Lord Wright, at p. 1005.
121 [19241P.208.
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leakage through a leaky r iv e t  was increased by the negligence of 
the master in  not detecting the water in the hold and pumping it 
out.
I t  was held by the Court of Appeal that, no tw iths tand ing  an 
exception of negligence, the shipowners were responsible fo r the 
whole of the damage, not m ere ly  for such p ropo rt ion  as must 
have been incurred  before the in f low  of the w a te r could have 
been checked. No distinction was drawn between damage due to 
perils of the sea alone and tha t due to perils of the sea and to 
negligence combined.
In  this case, Scrutton L.J said:122
"The w a te r w h ich  entered and did the damage 
entered through unseaworthiness; its effects w hen 
in the ship m ight have been pa rt ia l ly  remedied by 
due diligence, w h ich  the shipowner's servants did 
not take. But in my v iew  the cause of the resulting 
damage is s till unseaworthiness..."
The test is not was unseaworthiness the dom inant c a u s e , 12  ^
bu t was i t  a cause, or a real e ffec tive  or actual cause of the 
loss?124 I t  is im m ateria l that other causes contributed to occasion 
i t .125
122 Ibid. at p. 214. see also Scrutton. 1984. op.cit.. at p. 24^.
123 Scrutton L.J's test in The Christel Vinnen [1924] P. 208 at p. 214, 
whether unseaworthiness was the direct or dominant cause of the loss, now 
appears to be wrong, see per Lord Wright in the Smith Hogg case [1940] A.C. 
997 at p. 1006.
124 Smith Hqrr V. Black Sea & General Insurance [1940] A.C. 997, per 
Lord Wright at p. 1007.
125 Ibid, at p. 1007.
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I t  must be borne in  m ind, tha t the choice g iven  to the 
charte re r e ithe r to rescind the contract or to claim damages 
depends upon w h e th e r  the breach of the seaw orth iness 
undertak ing  defeats the commercia l purpose of the voyage or 
not.
A breach of th is undertak ing  w h ich  defeats the commercia l 
purpose of the voyage w i l l  ju s t i fy  the charterer of the ship in 
repud ia ting the contract and claiming damages i f  he suffers any 
by reason thereof. Another breach w h ich  does not defeat the 
commercial purpose of the voyage w i l l  give rise on ly to an action 
fo r damages.126
I t  is no tew orthy  that, the r ig h t to rescind the contract fo llows 
from  perceiv ing tha t the w a r ra n ty  of seaworthiness, is as we 
saw earlier, a condition ly ing at the v e ry  root of the contract: 
"The v e ry  foundation and immediate substratum of the contract" 
as Lord Ellenborough C.J put i t . 127
Carver reverses this proposition by stating:128
"...the obligation of seaworthiness is not, generally  
speaking, a condition breach of w h ich  entit les the 
pa rty  aggrieved, on discovering it, to rescind the 
contract. On principle, therefore, i t  would seem that 
i t  should never so operate, bu t operate on ly  as a 
w arran ty , breach of wh ich would  entit le  the pa rty  
aggrieved m ere ly to damages. But there is high 
a u th o r i t y  fo r  the p ro p o s it io n  th a t  i t  may 
sometimes operate as a condition."
126 See Scrutton. 1984. op.cit.. pp. 81-82
127 In Lyon V .J M ls  (1804) 5 East 428 at 437.
1 2 & Carver, op.cit.. at n. 1 0 6 .
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The r ig h t of the charterer to trea t the contract as discharged 
in  consequence of a breach of the unde rtak ing  depends on 
w hether the breach goes to the root of the contract.129
4 -  Excluding L ia b il ity  for Unseaworthiness:
In  Lyon V. Mells.130 Lord Ellenborough C.J. sa id131 tha t the Law 
'’presumes” a promise of seaworthiness on the part of the carrier 
w ith o u t any actual proof.
W hat is presumed may be rebutted . In  all cases w here  the 
carriage of goods by sea Act does not apply, the Common Law 
w a rra n ty  of absolute seaworthiness asserts itself. The shipowner 
is, under English Law, pe rfec t ly  free  e ithe r to m od ify  i t  by 
contract or to contract h imself out of i t  altogether. He may, in the 
drastic words of Lord B lackburn,132 say:
"We w i l l  take the goods on board, bu t we shall not 
be responsible at all, though our ship is ever so 
unseaworthy; look out fo r  yourselves; i f  we pu t 
them on board a rotten ship, that is your look-out.”
I f  the shipowner wishes to exempt h im self from  l ia b i l i ty  fo r 
unseaworthiness, he must use clear and unambiguous language. 
The respective  clause in  the c h a r te rp a r ty  must be " in  the
*29 See Scrutton, 1984, op.cit.. at p. 82, see also Hong Kong Fir Shipping 
Co.. Ltd. V. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. [1962] 2 Q.B. 26, per Upjohn L.J., at p. 
63.
130 (1804) 5 East 428.
131 Ibid, at 437.
132 Steel V. State Line S.S. Co.. Ltd. f 18771 3 A.C. 72 at p. 89.
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plainest possible language".*33
In  M arine  C ra ft Constructors L td . V. Earland B lo m a v is t
(Engineers) L td ..1^ 4 M r Justice L y n s k e y * 3 5  said that:
" I t  requ ires v e ry  clear w ords to get r id  of tha t 
p a r t ic u la r  w a r ra n ty  im p lie d  by  Law  in  any 
contract of carriage or charterparty."
In  The P e tro fina136 case, Lord W righ t laid down the Law:
"We are dealing w ith  a contract of a ffre igh tm ent, 
and i t  is necessary to bear in  m ind the w e l l -  
established v ie w  w h ich  has been so often stated, 
tha t i f  i t  is sought to effect a reduction  of the 
overr id ing  obligation to provide a seaworthy ship, 
w hether that is express or im plied for this purpose 
does not matter, by other express term s of the 
ch a r te rp a r ty  or contract of a f f re igh tm e n t,  th a t 
resu lt  can on ly  be achieved i f  p e r fe c t ly  clear, 
effective , and precise words are used expressly 
stating that lim itation."
According to f i rs t  principles, any exceptional term  in a contract 
is to be s tr ic t ly  construed and any ambiguous expression w i l l  be 
construed against the sh ipow ner. A te rm  in  the con trac t 
excluding the l ia b i l i ty  of the sh ipowner in  general term s, or 
excluding his l ia b i l i ty  fo r negligence, w i l l  be in te rp re te d  as not
133 Waikato V. New Zealand Shipping Co.. Ltd. f 18981 1 Q.B. 645 at p. 647 
per Bigham.J.
134 [19531 1 Lloyd's Rep. 514.
*35 ibid, at p. 519.
1 3 6 Rgtrofina_S,A. of Brussels V. Compaenia Ita liana Trasoorto Olii 
Minerali (1937) 53 T.L.R. 650 (C.A) at p. 653.
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affecting his l ia b i l i ty  fo r unseaworthiness.137
A good example of am b ig u ity  is the case of Nelson L ine  
(Liverpool) L td . V. lames Nelson & Sons L td ..138 where frozen meat 
had been shipped under an agreement w h ich  stated tha t the 
shipowner would not be liable fo r any damage "which is capable 
of being covered by insurance". The meat arr ived  in  a damaged 
condition on account of the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Held, 
by  the House of Lords, that the clause was not su ff ic ien t ly  clear 
to exempt the shipowner from  being liable to supply a seaworthy 
ship.
In  some cases, the shipowner exempts h im self from  l ia b i l i ty  
fo r unseaworthiness on ly where the loss or damage is caused by 
personal w a n t  of due diligence on his pa rt or th a t of his 
employees to make the vessel in all respects seaworthy.139
Thus, clause (2) of the "Gencon" ch a rte rp a rty140 provides:
"Owners are to be responsible for loss or damage to 
goods...only in  case the loss, damage has been 
caused...by personal w an t of due diligence on the 
part of the owners or the ir  manager to make the 
vessel in all respects seaworthy..."
In Itoh & Co. L td . V. A tlantska Plovidba (The Gundulic).141 The
137 See Ridley, op.cit.. p. 90, see also the case of Lvon V. Mells (1804) 5 
East 428.
138 [1908] A.C. 16.
139 See Payne k  Ivamy, op.cit.. at p. 18.
149 Ibid, Appendix B at p. 276.
141 [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 418, Q.B.D (Commercial court), for other 
examples, see Elderslie S.S Co. V. Borthwick [19051 A.C. 93.
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vesse l "G undu lic " was cha rte red  fo r  a voyage unde r a 
c h a r te rp a r ty  con ta in ing  the above clause. The cargo was 
damaged by  the e n try  of seawater through the hatch covers. 
The charterers claimed damages from  the shipowners.
Held, by  the Queen's Bench Division (Commercial Court) tha t 
there would be judgm ent fo r the charterers. The condition of the 
hatch covers was such tha t any prudent surveyor ought to have 
seen a real r isk  tha t seawater w ou ld  enter the holds th rough 
them and w ou ld  have called fo r  repairs. The shipowners had 
fa iled  to discharge the burden of showing tha t the damage had 
occurred w ith o u t any personal w ant of due diligence on the part 
of a jun io r engineer superintendent employed by them.
One last point which deserves notice here is, tha t a mere r igh t 
g iven to the charte re r and his inspector to inspect the ship 
before loading and to satisfy h im self as to her being f i t  fo r the 
cargo in question does not free the shipowner from  his obligation 
to provide a cargoworthy ship.142
This, was w e ll i l lu s tra te d  in P e tro fina  S.A of Brussels V. 
Compagnia I ta l ia n a  T raspo rto  Olii M in e ra l i . 143 w here  the 
ch a r te rp a r ty  of a steamer w h ich  was to ca rry  a cargo of oil 
p rov ided in  clause (1) that the ship was to be "in eve ry  w ay 
f i t te d  fo r  the voyage and to be mainta ined in  such condition  
during the voyage". By clause (16) the master was bound to keep 
tanks, pipes and pumps clean. F inally a clause (27) was inserted 
according to w h ich  the steamer should be clean fo r the cargo in 
question to the satisfaction of the c h a r te re r ’s inspector. On
14  ^ See Chorley &. Giles, op.cit.. at p. 191.
143 (1937) 53 T.L.R. 650 (C.A).
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discharge the benzene was discoloured, and on the evidence this 
was found to be the fa u l t  of the steamer. The sh ipowner, 
however, pleaded clause (27), and contended tha t he was on ly  
bound to keep the tanks clean to the sa tis fac tion  of the 
charterer's  inspector, and the la tte r  had in  fact expressed his 
satisfaction.
Held, tha t clauses (1) and (16) contained an express w a rra n ty  
of seaworthiness tha t the ship was f i t  fo r the part icu la r cargo, 
and th a t  clause (27) fa r  f ro m  exc lud ing the w a r ra n ty  of 
seaworthiness, on ly gave an additional r igh t of inspection to the 
charterers. W ithou t express words to this effect, the satisfaction 
of the inspector could not be re lied on as a discharge of the 
shipowner's obligation to provide a seaworthy ship; and tha t the 
shipowners were accordingly liable to the charterers.
Carver, a fte r c it ing a num ber of e ffec tive  and in e ffec t ive  
clauses, comes to the conclusion that:
"No general ru les can be la id  down as to the 
language w h ic h  is s u f f ic ie n t  to exclude the 
w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness. Each contract must be 
construed as a whole."144
I l l -  The I n t e r a c t io n  B e tw e e n  th e  W a r r a n t y  o f  
S eaw orth iness  and the Excepted P e r i ls :
Under the Common Law, the shipowner was exempted from  
l ia b i l i ty  fo r  losses or damages resu lting from  a few  perils only: 
acts of God, the K ing’s enemies, the inhe ren t vice of the goods, 
default of the shipper,and general average sacrifice.
* 44 See Carver, op.cit.. at p. 127.
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The Merchant Shipping Act 1894, section 502 (i) added fire . 
F inally the cha rte rpa rty  or the b i l l  of lading, as the case may be, 
w i l l  almost always name ye t fu r th e r  exceptions. We thus have 
exceptions under Common Law, exceptions under s ta tute, 
exception under contract, all of w h ich  sail under the flag of the 
"excepted perils".
The question is: how does unseaworthiness fare w i th  these 
excepted perils? Must i t  recoil before them, or does i t  overr ide 
them? W hat does prevail? The l ia b i l i ty  fo r unseaworthiness, or 
the exception from  lia b i l i ty  fo r fire, negligence, etc?
To answer th is  question we have to d is tingu ish . Those 
exceptions wh ich  preva il even i f  the ship is unseaworthy, from  
those w h ic h  are s w e p t aw ay  by  the  l i a b i l i t y  fo r  
unseaworthiness.
We come f i r s t  to consider how fa r  the resp o n s ib i l i ty  of a 
carrie r by sea fo r the goods wh ich he carries has been affected 
by the Merchant Shipping Act wh ich  affords carriers a special 
protection in the case of fire.
The Merchant Shipping Act 1894, section 502 p r o v i d e s : 14^
"The ow ner of a B r it ish  sea-going ship, or any 
share therein, shall not be liable to make good to 
any e x te n t  w h a te v e r  any loss or damage 
happening w ith o u t  his actual fa u lt  or p r iv i t y  in 
the fo llow ing cases, namely:
(i) Where any goods, merchandise, or other things 
whatsoever taken in or put on board his ship are 
lost or damaged by reason of f ire  on board the
145 Section 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 has been replaced by 
section 18 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1979 on December 1, 1986.
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ship;..."
Accord ingly the shipowner is not deprived of the exemption 
from  l ia b i l i ty  fo r  f ire  given by this section m ere ly because the 
f ire  was due to unseaworthiness. 146
The point arose in Louis Drevfus & Co.. L td . V. Temous Shipping 
Co.. L td . . l47 where a steamship was chartered to carry  a cargo of 
grain from  the River Plate to the United Kingdom. The vessel was 
sent to sea w i th  bad bunker coal aboard. In  th is respect the 
vessel was unseaworthy. The coal caught f ire , and pa rt of the 
cargo was damaged. The captain put in to  a port of refuge and 
incurred expense fo r  the benefit of ship and cargo.
In  an action by the shipowners against cargo-owners fo r  
c o n tr ib u t io n  tow a rds  a genera l average e x p e n d itu re ,  the 
defendants counterclaimed fo r damages fo r in ju ry  to the ir  cargo 
owing to the fire.
Held, by the House of Lords, tha t the shipowners were not 
dep r ived  of the p ro tec tion  a ffo rded  by  section 502 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 by  reason of the fact tha t the f ire  
was due to the unseaworthy condition of the ship; and tha t in 
the absence of proof of an actionable w rong on the ir  part, the 
shipowners, in  v ie w  of the prov is ions of section 502, were  
e n t it le d  to recover from  the cargo-owners the c o n tr ib u t io n  
claimed.
I t  must be borne in mind tha t the benefit of section 502 (i) is. 
subject to the proviso of the Act: "Any loss or damage happening
* 4  ^ See Payne & Ivamy, op.cit.. at p. 180.
147 [1931] A.C. 726.
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w ith o u t his actual fau lt  or p r iv ity " .  This deprives the shipowner 
of the pro tection of section 502 in cases of negligence. Where 
absence of actual fa u lt  or p r iv i ty  of the owner can be proved, he 
may re ly  on section 502 though  his ship was eve r so 
unseaworthy.
I t  is convenient to mention here that, the bene fit  of section 
502 (i) may be wa ived by contract. W hether the shipowner has, 
by his contract waived the benefit of section 502, is a question of 
construction of that contract. The statute can be excluded on ly by 
express contract. Thus, the im p lied  w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness 
has not been construed to cut down the benefit of section 502 (i) 
w here  f i re  is caused by  unseaworthiness; bu t the sh ipowner 
would not appear to be able to re ly  on the section where the f ire  
has been caused by breach of an express p rov is ion  of the 
c o n tra c t  im p os ing  upon h im  an o b l ig a t io n  re la t in g  to 
seaworthiness.!48
Thus, in  V irg in ia  Carolina Chemical Co. V. N orfo lk  & North 
Am erican Steam Shipping Co.149 Goods on board a B rit ish  ship 
were destroyed by f ire  on board.
The b i l l  of lad ing contained a clause p ro v id in g  tha t the 
sh ipowner was not responsible fo r any loss or damage to the 
goods occasioned by  ( in te r -a l ia )  f i r e  or unseaw orth iness, 
p rov ided  all reasonable means had been taken to p rov ide  
against unseaworthiness.
Held, by Bray.J and by the Court of Appeal, tha t a shipowner 
is not deprived of the protection of section 502 merely by reason
* 48 See Carver, op.cit.. at p. 286.
149 [1912] 1 K.B 229.
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of the fact tha t the f ire  is caused by the unseaworthiness of the 
ship in  breach of the w a r ra n ty  im p lied  by Law, bu t th a t the 
effect of a b i l l  of lading containing the above clause is to preclude 
the sh ipowner from  setting up the section as an answer to a 
claim fo r  the loss of goods by reason of f i re  on board the ship 
caused by the unseaworthiness of the ship.
From these c a s e s 150 concerning unseaworthiness and f ire , i t  is, 
therefore, clear enough tha t unseaworthiness i f  not due to the 
actual fa u lt  or p r iv i ty  of the owner, does not deprive him  of the 
s ta tu to ry  exception of section 502 Merchant Shipping Act from  
l ia b i l i t y  fo r  f ire ; bu t th a t a con trac tua l exception f ro m  th is  
l ia b i l i ty  fo r  f ire  is, in  principle, s ti l l  subject to the condition tha t 
he has not on ly done his best to make the ship seaworthy bu t 
that she is actually seaworthy.
The same rule _ that the exception does not come in to  play 
unless the p r im a ry  ob ligation to provide a seaworthy ship has 
been com plied w i th  _ applies to all o ther excepted perils , 
w h e the r excepted by contract, or by Common Law. Thus, no 
shipowner may re ly  on any of his exceptions i f  his vessel was not 
in a seaworthy condition when she commenced her voyage, and 
i f  tha t contributed to the loss or damage.151 As Lord Sumner put 
it:
"U nderly ing the whole contract of a f f re ig h tm e n t 
there is an im plied condition upon the operation of 
the usual exceptions from  l ia b i l i ty  _ nam ely tha t
130 See Louis Drevfus k  Co.. Ltd. V. Temous Shipping Co.. Ltd. [19311 A.C. 
726, yjpunia .Carolina Chemical Co- V. Norfolk & North American Steam. 
Shipping Co. U9121 1 K.B. 229.
*51 See Carver, op.cit.. at p. 20.
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the shipowners shall have provided a seaworthy 
ship. I f  the y  have, the exceptions ap p ly  and 
relieve them; i f  they have not, and damage results 
in  consequence of the unseaw orth iness , the 
exceptions are construed as not being applicable
fo r the shipowners' protection in such a  c a s e . " 152
To un de rs tand  th is  re la t io n  be tw een  the w a r ra n ty  of 
seaworthiness and the excepted perils, i t  is im portan t to cite here 
the case of Steel V. State Line Steamship Co.-^S in w h ich  Lord 
Blackburn laid down the Law:
" I t  is settled tha t in  any contract...to ca rry  the 
goods except the perils  of the sea, and except 
breakage, and except leakage,...there s t i l l  remains 
a du ty  upon the shipowner, not m ere ly  to ca rry  
the goods i f  not prevented by the excepted perils, 
bu t also tha t he and his servants shall use due 
care and sk il l about carry ing the goods and shall 
not be negligent...Now, i f  even th a t is excepted, 
there s ti l l  remains a du ty  to provide a seaworthy 
ship."
In  tackling any case w ith  "excepted perils" i t  is all im p o rta n t 
to keep in  m ind th is d is t inc t ive  rank  of the exceptions; to 
perceive that, logically, they are not on the same level. There is 
an order of preference amongst them:
(i) seaworthiness, ( ii) negligence, ( i i i)  f i re  under section 502 
Merchant Shipping Act, ( iv) all other exceptions.
Atlantic Shipping & Trading Co.. Ltd. V. Louis Drevfus &. Co. [1922] 2 
A.C 250, at p. 260.
153 [187713 A.C. 72, at p. 87.
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If, the re fore , unseaworth iness cannot be proved, the next 
strongest weapon w i th  w h ich  to f ig h t  the case against the 
sh ipo w n e r is tha t,  ap a rt  f ro m , his im p lie d  w a r ra n ty  of 
seaworthiness there is fu r th e r  an im p lied  engagement on his 
p a r t  to use due care and sk i l l  in  nav igating the vessel and 
carry ing the g o o d s . 1 54 j n other words; that he and his servants 
shall not be negligent in navigation or carriage. The on ly possible 
defence against the proof of negligence is tha t negligence was 
excluded.
From the above duties im p lied ly  cast upon every shipowner, i t  
fo llows as a necessary consequence, as Lord Macnaghten put i t  in 
The Xantho c a s e : 155 "that even in cases w ith in  the v e ry  terms of 
the exception in  the b i l l  of lad ing, the sh ipow ner is not 
protected", i f  (i) the vessel is not seaworthy, or (ii) i f  any default 
or negligence on his part has con tr ibu ted  to the loss. The on ly  
possible defence of the owner is his p lain and precise exception 
f ro m  (i) seaworth iness and ( i i )  de fa u lt  or negligence. His 
exception f ro m  negligence alone does not exem pt h im  fro m  
l ia b i l i t y  fo r  negligence at the commencement of the voyage 
amounting to unseaworthiness.
I f  the open port-hole, on w h ich  Steel V .  State Line c a s e 1 5 6  
turned, had been fastened at starting; then, the exception from  
negligence would have protected the owner; but being unfastened 
at the commencement of the voyage, it  came squarely w ith in  the 
fou r corners of the de fin it ion  of unseaworthiness and excepted
154 See The Xantho (1887) 12 A.C. 503, per Lord Macnaghten, at p. 515.
155 (1887) 12 A.C. 503 at p. 515.
J56 [1877] 3' A.C. 72.
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negligence was no answer to that.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Carrier's Duty of Seaworthiness Under 
the Hague Rules and Hamburg Rules.
Historical In tro d u c tio n :
I t  is not possible to in te rp re t  the Hamburg Rules or to 
understand the ir  objectives w ith o u t  citing the main h is to rica l 
factors wh ich led to the new Rules being conceived.
A t the same time, i t  may be appropriate to rem ind ourselves 
b r ie f ly  of the development of carriers ' l ia b i l i ty  towards cargo up 
to the present day.
U n ti l  the ea rly  pa rt of the n ine teen th  cen tu ry  sh ipowners 
fre q u e n t ly  had some direct in terest in the cargo itself, w h ich  the 
merchants and the shipowners sharing in a jo in t ven tu re  w h ich  
included the shipowner and the ship's captain (sometimes the 
same person) in  the sale and disposal of the cargo at the 
destination. There was, therefore, an in -b u i l t  se lf- in terest fo r the 
sh ipow ner to take the utm ost care of the cargo on the sea 
voyage.
However, w i th  the in tro d u c t io n  of steamships and the 
subsequent increasing size of the vessels, shipowners tended to 
become sole ly the carr ie rs  of cargo, and hav ing  no d ire c t 
f inanc ia l in te rest in the goods themselves. The term s on w h ich  
cargo was carried become large ly dictated by shipowners w i th
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l i t t le  or no leg is la t ive  res tr ic t io ns  or gu ide lines, and i t  is, 
the re fo re , not su rp r is in g  th a t  ca rr ie rs  tended to p ro tec t 
themselves by absolving themselves from  v i r tu a l ly  all l ia b i l i ty  
towards the cargo in the ir  care, under the terms of the contract 
of carriage.
This was genera lly  the position up to about s ix ty  years ago 
and was considered unsa tis fac to ry  because i t  rem oved any 
incentive to take care of the goods and om itted any pena lty  as a 
result of not doing so.
The lengthy struggle between ship owning and cargo interests 
w h ich  resulted, even tua lly  cu lm inated in the adoption of the 
Hague Rules in  1924 w ith  the aim of achieving a fa ire r  allocation 
of the risks of loss or damage to goods in  tran s it  between the 
parties.1
The s itua tion  was then changed by the Hague Rules w h ich
introduced certa in requirem ents fo r the care requ ired from  the
shipowner in  p rov id ing  a seaworthy ship and in  caring fo r  the 
cargo w h ils t  in  his contro l;2 bu t at the same tim e i t  gave the 
sh ipowner some va luable exem ptions3 from  l ia b i l i ty  in  certa in 
circumstances prov ided he had fu lf i l le d  the basic requ irem ents  
laid on him under the Rules.
I t  was hoped that, by  es tab lish ing jus t so lutions in  the 
in te res ts  of the sh ippers  and ca rr ie rs , the Rules w o u ld  
standardise the l iab il i t ie s  of the carr ie rs  at an in te rn a t io n a l
1 See Wilson, J.F., "Basic carrier liability and the right of limitation", 
published in the Hamburg Rules on the carriage of the goods bv sea, edited 
by S. Mankabady, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1978, p. 137.
2 See Article I I I ,  rule 1 & 2 of the Hague Rules.
3 See Article IV, rule 1 & 2 of the Hague Rules.
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level. U n fo rtunate ly , the optim ism  w h ich  prevailed at the time 
the Rules were signed proved la rge ly  i l lu so ry  and conflic t ing  
in terpre ta tions of some parts of the Rules are not in frequen t.4
In  a legal ana lys is  of the H am burg  Rules, D iam ond^ 
mentioned two main historica l factors leading to the fo rm u la t ion  
of the Hamburg Rules.
The f i r s t  one is tha t the years w h ich  had in te rvened  since 
1924 had th ro w n  up both technical defects in the Hague Rules 
and also a num ber of new commercial problems to w h ich  those 
Rules p ro v id ed  e ith e r no answer at a ll or no sa t is fac to ry  
a n s w e r . 6 In  these c ircum stances  the Comite M a r i t im e  
In te rn a tio na l (C.M.I) took the lead in  rev is ing the Rules, as it  
found itse lf compelled to recommend an amendment designed to 
bring the Hague Rules up to date, and to cure w hat may be called 
the con flic t of law  problem s in h e re n t in  most Hague Rules' 
legislation.
As a result, a d ip lomatic conference held in two stages in 1967 
and 1968, fo rm u la te d  a p ro to c o l7 con ta in ing  the V isb y  
amendments to the Hague Visby Rules.
Thus, the f i r s t  h istorica l factor w h ich  led to a demand fo r  a 
to ta l ly  new convention was the d isappo in tm ent experienced by
4 See Mankabady, S., "Comments on the Hamburg Rules", Published in 
the. Hamburg Rules on the carriage of the goods bv sea, edited by S. 
Mankabady, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1978, 27 at p. 30.
5 gee Diamond, A., "A legal analysis of the Hamburg Rules” (part I), 
published in the Hamburg Rules. A one-day seminar organised by Lloyd’s 
of London Press Ltd., September 28, 1978, p. 1.
6 Ibid, at p. 1.
7 The protocol was signed on 23rd February, 1968.
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many people at the outcome of the conferences held fo r  the 
purpose of b r ing ing  the Hague Rules up to date, since the 
modifications effected by the protocol of the amendment in  1968 
did not gain un iversa l approval. They were regarded by many 
cargo-ow n ing countries as cons t itu t ing  m ere ly  a te m p o ra ry  
exped ien t and there was a grow ing demand fo r  a tho rough 
re a p p ra is a l of c a r r ie r  l i a b i l i t y  designed to p roduce  a 
com prehens ive code covering all aspect of the con trac t of 
carriage.8
As to the second factor leading to the fo rm u la t io n  of the 
Hamburg Rules is that, both the Rules and the 1968 protocol 
came under severe c r it ic ism  fro m  most of the deve lop ing  
countries as they fe l t  tha t the ir  in terests were not taken  in to  
account.
A lready  by 1968 i t  had become clear tha t the Hague Rules 
were unpopular among the developing countries p a r t ly  because 
they were thought to have been dra fted in  the in terests of the 
so-called co lon ia lis t or sh ipowning notions, and, even more, 
because they had been imposed on the ir  colonies before those 
colonies had gained the ir independence.9
The developing countries argued tha t as shippers they  were 
being exploited by an in te rna tiona l carte l of carriers s im ila r to 
the B r it ish  shipp ing monopoly w h ich  had d ic ta ted te rm s to 
Am erican merchants at the end of the n ine teenth  century, and 
tha t they had not partic ipated in  the fo rm u la t io n  of the Hague 
Rules govern ing the allocation of r isks between carr ie rs  and
8 See Wilson, op.cit.. at p. 1 38.
9 See Diamond, op.cit.. at p. 2.
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sh ippers ,10 and that they were, therefore, en tit led to a share in 
the fo rm u la t io n  of those Laws w h ich  should govern  th e ir  
m arit im e affairs.
Therefore, and fo r the main reasons already cited, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and D eve lopm ent (UNCTAD) 
pub lished in  1970 a detailed s tudy conta in ing a n u m be r of 
proposals fo r the revision of the Rules.
In  this UNCTAD s tu d y 11 the main grounds of concern were 
iden tif ied  as follows:
a) Uncertainties arising from  vague and ambiguous w ord ing  in 
c e r ta in  areas o f the Rules, w h ic h  lead to c o n f l ic t in g  
in te rp re ta t io n s  (and w h ich  complicate such m atte rs  as the 
allocation of respons ib ili ty  fo r loss or damage to cargo; and the 
bu rden  of proof, th is being a subject of com pla in ts  by  both 
carrier and cargo interests);
b) Exemptions in the Hague Rules w h ich  are peculiar to ocean 
carriage, in cases where the l ia b i l i ty  should be logically be born 
by  the ocean carrie r, such as those w h ich  excuse h im  fro m  
l ia b i l i ty  in  respect of the negligence o f his servants and agents in 
the navigation and management o f the vessel, and in  respect of 
perils of the sea, etc;
c) The uncerta inties caused by the in te rp re ta t io n  of term s 
used in  the Hague Rules, such as "reasonable devia tion", "due
10 U.N. Conference on the carriage of goods by sea, comments and 
proposal by Governments and International Organizations on the Draft 
Convention on the carriage of goods by sea, at 36 (General Observation of 
the Government of Qatar, para 7) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 8 9 /7  (1977).
11 See UNCTAD report dated 14 December, 1970, TD/B/C. 4 / IS L /6 .
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diligence” , "p rop e r ly  and ca re fu l ly ” , "in any e ve n t” , "load on", 
"discharge";
d) The ambiguities surrounding the seaworthiness of vessels 
fo r the carriage of goods;
e) The in su ff ic ie n t legal protection fo r  cargoes w i th  special 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  th a t  re q u ire  spec ia l s towage, adequa te  
ventila tion, etc, and cargoes requir ing deck shipment.
A fte r  the adoption of this study, UNCTAD inv ited  the United 
Nations Commission On In te rna tiona l Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to 
examine the defects and the amendments to the Rules.
Therefore, the UNCITRAL Rules were prepared according to the 
reso lu tion  adopted by  the w o rk in g  group on In te rn a t io n a l 
Shipping Legislation at its second session,12 w i th  the fo llow ing  
purposes in mind:
"...the rem oval of such uncerta inties and ambiguities as exist 
and at establishing a balanced allocation of risks between the 
cargo ow ner and the ca rr ie r ,  w i th  a p p ro p r ia te  p rov is ions  
concerning the burden of proof; in particu lar the fo llow ing areas, 
among o th e rs  shou ld  be cons ide red  fo r  re v is io n  and 
amplification:
a) Responsib ility  fo r  cargo fo r the entire  period i t  is in  the 
charge or control of the carrier or his agents;
b) The scheme of responsibilities and liabilities, and r ights and 
immunities, incorporated in Articles I I I  and IV  of The Convention 
as amended by the protocol and the ir  in te raction and inc lud ing 
the e lim ination or modification of certa in exceptions to carrier's 
l iab il i ty ;
12 TD/B/C.4/86; TD/B/C. 5 / IS L /8 . Annex 1, See also Mankabady, op.cit.. at 
p. 31.
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c) Burden of proof;
d) Jurisdiction;
e) Responsib ility  fo r  deck cargoes, l ive  animals, and tra n s ­
shipments;
f)  Extension of the period of lim itation;
g) Definition under Artic le  I of the Convention;
h) E lim ination of inva lid  clauses in bills of lading;
i) Deviation, seaworthiness and un it l im ita t ion  of, l iab il i ty ."
In  the years between 1971 and 1975 negotiations took place 
under the auspices of UNCITRAL for the purpose of producing a 
text w h ich  could be subm itted to the Diplomatic Conference. I t  
was not un t i l  1976 that UNCITRAL published a f in a l d ra ft  of the 
proposed new cargo Convention.13
The next and last stage in  the process was of course the 
Diplomatic Conference wh ich  was held at Hamburg from  6 to 31 
March, 1978. Some 200 amendments were discussed and on 30 
March, 1978, the Convention on the carriage of goods by sea 
(known as the Hamburg Rules) was adopted.14
I t  is convenient to note that, the compromise reached by the 
UNCITRAL w o rk in g  group, rem oves the more n o to r io u s  
"exceptions" from  l ia b i l i ty ,  in  exchange fo r  a ru le  of general 
l ia b i l i t y  subject to a standard of reasonable care, and the 
excision of the statement of the positive duties placed on the 
carriers by the Hague Rules:
a) To "p roperly  and care fu lly  load, handle, stow, carry, keep,
13 See Diamond, op.cit.. at p. 3.
14 The Hamburg Conference also adopted a "Common Understanding".
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care fo r and discharge the goods...";
b) To exercise due d iligence to make the ship seaw orthy 
before and the beginning of the voyage.
As th is chapter is m ain ly based on the study of the la tte r du ty  
(i.e: du ty  of seaworthiness) i t  is im p o rta n t here to m ention the 
arguments w h ich  were raised in UNICITRAL in this respect.
A t the fo u rth  session15 of the w o rk ing  group on In te rn a tiona l 
Sh ipp ing Leg is la tion , the argum ents ra ised th a t the ca rrie r 's  
positive duties should be restated, and tha t his du ty  to provide a 
seaw orthy ship, should continue th roughou t the voyage, were 
opposed by counter argum ents tha t these tw o separate sets of 
duties w ould  be subsumed under the general l ia b il i ty  ru le  and 
w ou ld  not, fo r th is reason, requ ire  restatem ent, since the ca rrie r 
under the general ru le  of l ia b i l i ty  "based on p resum p tion  of 
fa u lt" , w ou ld  have to pe rfo rm  a ll his ob liga tions under the 
contract of carriage w ith  care.
This chapter w i l l  the re fo re , compare the prov is ions of the 
existing Hague Rules (found in A rtic le  I I I )  imposing on the carrie r 
certa in  duties w ith  respect to seaworthiness, w ith  those of the 
new Hamburg Rules re la ting to the basis of the ca rrie r s l ia b il i ty  
(found in  A rtic le  5).
Decisions of the courts concerning cases of seaw orth iness 
unde r the p resen t Hague Rules w i l l  be cons idered  as a 
background fo r the com parative discussion, w h ich  has to cover a 
w id e  range o f p rob lem s in  th is  re sp e c t (i.e: d u ty  o f
seaworthiness) in  order to fin d  out to w ha t extent th is im p o rta n t
15 See report of the working group on In ternationa l Shipping 
Legislation on its fourth (special) session, A/CN.9/74, para. 30.
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du ty  w i l l  be m odified under the new Hamburg Rules.
Section one: Basis of L iab i l i ty .
I -  Under the Hague Rules:
The Hague Rules placed upon the ca rrie r's  shoulders some 
im p o rtan t obligations, of w h ich breach of any w il l  give rise to the 
lia b ili ty  of the carrie r unless he brings h im se lf w ith in  one of the 
exem ption clauses.16
The fo rm u la tio n  of the basic l ia b ility  is to be found in A rtic le  
I I I  ru le  1 and 2 of the Hague Rules. On the one hand, the 
re s p o n s ib ility  of the ca rr ie r to p ro v id e  a seaw orthy  ship is 
lim ite d  by A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 to a du ty  to exercise due diligence 
before and beginning of the voyage to make the ship seaworthy. 
The cargo ow ner must f ir s t  establish th a t the cargo loss has 
resu lted from  the unseaworthiness of the ship before the ca rrie r 
assumes the burden of proving the exercise of such due diligence.
On the other hand A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  2 requ ires the ca rrie r to 
deal "p rope rly  and care fu lly" w ith  the cargo w h ich  i t  is under his 
con tro l from  the tim e of loading to the tim e of discharge. This 
la tte r  ob liga tion  is made expressly subject to the catalogue of 
exceptions contained in  A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 w h ich  can be claimed 
by the carrier.
16 See AL. Jazairy, Hashira.R., "The maritime carrier's liability under 
the Hague Rules, Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules", thesis submitted for PhD 
degree, University of Glasgow, 1983, p. 58.
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1- Origin of the Phrase "Due Diligence to Make the 
Ship Seaworthy":
I t  can be seen tha t the f ir s t  of the carrie r's  major ob liga tion 
under the Hague Rules, is to "exercise due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy". However, th is famous phrase did not spring in to  
existence in  1924 bu t i t  was borrow ed from  the language w h ich  
had been conven tiona lly  used by the carrie rs  in  th e ir  b ills  of 
lading, and from  earlie r leg is la tion.17
In  Riverstone Meat Company. Ptv. L td . V. Lancashire Shipping 
Company L td . (The Muncaster Castle).18 it  was held that:
"The fra m e rs  of the Rules had among o th e r 
precedents the A m erican H arte r Act, 1893, the 
A u s tra lia n  sea carriage of goods Act, 1904, the 
Canadian w a te r carriage of goods Act, 1910, and 
though they had no B ritish  Act as a model, they  
had decisions of the English courts in  w h ich  the 
language of the H a rte r A ct had fa lle n  to be 
construed  by  v ir tu e  o f its  p ro v is io n s  be ing 
em bodied in  b ills  of lading. In  a ll these Acts the 
re levan t words "exercise due diligence to make the 
ship seaw orthy" are to be found. I t  was in  these 
circumstances tha t these w ords were adopted in  
the Hague Rules."
The H arte r Act made use of the notion "Due d iligence" as an 
o v e rr id in g  cond ition : A c a rr ie r had to p rove th a t he had 
exercised due d iligence to make the ship sea w o rth y  "in  a ll
17 See Diamond, A., "The division of liability as between ship and cargo 
under the new rules proposed by UNICITRAL", (1977) L.M.C.L.O. 39 at p. 46.
^  [1961] 1 Lloyds Rep. 57, per Viscount Simonds at p. 67.
77
respects” before he w ould  be allowed to re ly  on any excepted 
perils. A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le 1, read w ith  A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 of the Hague 
Rules, make i t  clear th a t the req u irem en t of due diligence is a 
condition fo r exem ption of lia b ility  fo r uniseaworthiness.
The P r iv y  Council in  the M ax im e  F oo tw ea r case19 has 
construed A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 as a general o ve rrid in g  condition , 
func tion ing  in  the same manner as section 3 of the H arte r Act, 
1893. As a general o ve rrid ing  obligation, i t  has to be com plied 
w ith  regardless of causal connection between unseaworth iness 
and the damage or loss.
2 - Due D iligence and D e le ga tion :
The concept of "Due d iligence” ba ffled  the t r ia l cou rt and the 
Court of Appeal in  the case of The M uncaster Castle.20 Both 
tr ib u n a ls  though t th a t so long as the sh ipow ner h im se lf had 
exercised due diligence in  the selection of his agents he had 
successfully discharged his respons ib ility  under A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 
of the Hague Rules. A delegation of the repa ir w o rk  to a f irm  of 
reputab le  repa ire rs  was considered su ffic ie n t fu lf i lm e n t of the 
obligation to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy.
I t  was conceded tha t the ca rrie r h im se lf had exercised due 
diligence. The issue was w he the r he was to be held responsible 
fo r  the negligence of the f i t te r  em ployed by the independen t 
con tractors- a f irm  of ship repairers.
The House of Lords, in  a unanim ous decision, pu t fo r th  in  a 
most poignant and fo rce fu l manner, th e ir v iew s of the no tion of
19 [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 105.
20 [1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 255, [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 553.
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"Due Diligence" and the exten t of the ca rrie r's  re s p o n s ib ility  
under A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1. They ove rtu rned  the decisions of the 
low er courts and held the carrie rs  liab le  fo r the loss caused by 
unseaworthiness w h ich  resu lted from  the negligent conduct of 
the ship re p a ire r ’s f i t te r .  T h e ir Lo rdsh ips  had no do ub t 
w hatsoever as to the degree of the ca rrie r's  l ia b i l i ty  under 
A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le 1.
The House of Lords has settled th is  issue d e fin it iv e ly , and 
the re fo re  i t  is needless to re fe r to the ea rlie r au tho rities  w h ich  
the House has cited w ith  approval.
V iscount Simonds held the opin ion tha t:21
"...no other solution is possible than to say tha t the 
sh ipow ners' ob liga tion  of due diligence demands 
due diligence in  the w ork  of repa ir by whosoever it  
may be done."
He emphasised that:
"The ob lig a tio n  im posed by  the Act is not...to  
"exercise due diligence...to p rov ide  a seaw orthy
ship" bu t "to make the ship seaw orthy."22
Lord Keith using d iffe re n t expressions pointed out tha t A rtic le  
I I I ,  ru le  1 is "an inescapable personal ob liga tion ". He then  
continued:23
21 [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57 at p. 71.
22 Ibid at p. 72.
23 Ibid at p. 87.
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"The c a rr ie r  cannot c la im  to have shed his 
ob liga tion  to exercise due diligence to make his 
ship seaw orthy by selecting a f irm  of com petent 
sh ip -repa ire rs  to make his ship seaworthy. The ir 
fa ilu re  to use due d iligence to do so is his 
fa ilure ...Perform  it  as you please. The perform ance 
is the ca rrie r 's  perform ance. As was said in  a 
corresponding case under the Harter Act: "The act 
requires due diligence in  the w o rk  itself."
The above speeches have made i t  pa ten tly  clear tha t a ca rrie r 
is responsible fo r the negligence of the delegate, w he the r he is 
the carrier's servant, agent or independent contractor.
Members of the House, by w ay of ob ite r dictum , qua lified  th e ir 
"N on-de legab ility" doctrine w ith  an exception. A d is tinc tion  was 
draw n between bu ild ing  and repa iring  a ship. V iscount Simonds 
considered tha t:24
" I t  is a reasonable construction o f the words..."to 
exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy" 
to say th a t in  the case of a ship b u ilt  fo r  the 
carrier, or new ly come in to  his hands by purchase, 
the ca rrie r fu lf i ls  his ob liga tion  i f  he takes the 
precautions...Until the ship is his, he can have no 
fu r th e r  re sp o n s ib ility ...B u t i t  is fa r  o th e rw ise  
w here the shipowner puts his ship in  the hands of 
th ird  parties fo r repair."
Lord Keith comments on this subject were of the same opinion. 
He rationalised tha t a carrie r cannot be liab le for:
"unseaworthiness in  a ship w h ich  results from  lack
24 Ibid at p. 70.
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of due diligence at a tim e when the ship was not 
his to possess and contro l and w h ich  could not be 
detected by due diligence a fte r the ship came in to
his possession."25
He then cau tiously proceeded to in se rt a rese rva tion  to th is  
broad exception. He added tha t a prospective owner could w e ll be 
made liab le for:
"unseaworthiness in  the case w here he had taken 
some part in  the project of the bu ild ing  of the ship, 
e ither in  the m atter of design, or by supervis ion in  
the course of bu ild ing, or o t h e r w i s e . . . " 2 6
The ru le  of "no lia b il i ty  fo r an te rio r fa ilu re  of diligence by a 
previous ow ner or by  someone w ith  whom  the ca rrie r had no 
previous c o n c e r n " 2 ?  was the b ra in -ch ild  of W right.J (as he then 
was).
His judgem en t in  Angliss & Co. (A u s tra lia )  P tv. L td . V. 
P e n in s u la r  & O r ie n ta l S team  N a v ig a t io n  Co.28 was 
en thus ias tica lly  accepted by the House of Lords as stating the 
correct ru le  of Law.
The d is tinc tion  made by Lord Hodson was the most subtle of 
all. He rem arked:
" I t  could be argued tha t the Angliss case, in  so fa r
25 [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57 at p. 86.
26 Ibid at pp. 86-87.
27 ibid at p. 86 per Lord Keith.
28 [1927] 2 K.B. 456, (1927) 28 LI.L.Rep. 202, Hereafter reffered to as The 
Angliss case.
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as i t  deals w ith  sh ipbu ilde rs , was dealing w ith  
something outside the scope of A rtic le  I I I ,  fo r to 
make a ship seaworthy is not the same as to make 
a seaw orthy ship, bu t the expression "to make a 
ship seaw orthy" is in  my opin ion w ide enough to 
cover the w o rk  of repa ir however extensive those
repairs may be."29
A s ligh t m ovem ent in  the placement of one w ord  in  a phrase 
com ple te ly changes the sense of a sentence.30 Fine and delicate 
i t  may be, the d istinction was offered as the basis of an exception 
to the "inescapable personal obligation" of the carrie r.
The concept of due diligence was apparen tly  adopted in  the 
Hague Rules to a lle v ia te  the ca rr ie r fro m  the s e v e r ity  and 
harshness w h ich  emerge from  the s tr ic t l ia b ili ty  of the Common 
Law. The p rim a ry  and obvious objective of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1, was 
to re lieve the shipowner from  th is onerous burden cast upon him  
by  the absolute fe a tu re  of the Common Law  w a rra n ty  of 
seaw orth iness and to f i l l  in  its  place a lo w e r s tanda rd  of 
resp on s ib ility . The question is: Has A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 achieved 
th is aim ?
In  S m ith  Hogg & Co.. L td . V. Black Sea & B a ltic  General 
Insurance Co.. L td .. Lord W rig h t3 1 declared th a t the q u a lifie d  
exception of unseaworth iness w i l l  "on ly  excuse against la te n t 
defects."
29 [196 1] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57 at p. 90.
30 Lor(j Keith obviously had the same idea in mind when he said: "...a 
carrier cannot, in general, make a ship seaworthy unless he has first a 
ship to make seaworthy." [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57 at p. 87.
31 [1940] A.C. 997 at p. 1001.
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M ackinnon L.J, who in  the Court of Appeal of the same case, 
stated that:32
■ ^ ■
"The lim ita t io n  and q u a lifica tio n  of the im p lie d  
w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness, by cu tting  i t  down to 
use "due diligence on the part of the shipowner to 
make the ship seaworthy",...is more apparent tha t 
real, because the exercise of due diligence involves 
no t m ere ly  th a t the sh ipow ner pe rsona lly  sha ll 
exercise due diligence, bu t tha t all his servants and 
agents shall exercise due diligence..."
S c ru tton 33  expressed doubts of the p ractica l va lue  of the 
v a r ia tio n  as la te n t defects causing unseaw orth iness are "not 
lik e ly  to occur often."
A no the r w r i t e r 3 4  has expressed tha t there is "in  fact l i t t le  
d iffe rence between absolute w a rra n ty  and the standard of due 
diligence."
The tw o  instances in  w h ich  a ca rr ie r w i l l  no t be le ga lly  
responsib le  fo r a loss caused by unseaw orth iness under the 
Hague Rules were summarised by Lord Keith in  The M uncaster 
Castle.35 as follows:
"He w i l l  be protected against la ten t defects, in  the
32 (1939) 64 LI.L.Rep. 87 at p. 89.
3 3 See Scrutton, T.E., The contract of affreightment as expressed in 
charteroarties and bills of lading. 14th ed. by W.L. Me Nair &. A.A. Mocatta, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1939, p. 110.
3^ See Greenwood, E.C.V, "Problems of negligence in loading, stowage, 
custody, care and delivery of cargo; Errors in management and navigation; 
Due diligence to make seaworthy", (1971) 45 Tul.L.Rev. 790 at p. 792.
33 [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57.
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s tr ic t sense, in  w o rk  done on his ship, th a t is to 
say, defects not due to any neglect w orkm anship  of 
repairers or others employed by the repairers and, 
as I see it ,  ag a ins t de fec ts  m a k in g  fo r  
unseaw orth iness in  the ship, how ever caused, 
before i t  became his ship, i f  these could no t be 
discovered by him , or competent experts em ployed
by him , by the exercise of due diligence."36
From the above statem ent one can, the re fo re  conclude that, 
A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 is not as generous as the carrie r had imagined 
and hoped it  w ould be.
The carriers were surprised and sadly disappointed w hen the 
House of Lords decided against them in  The Muncaster C a s t l e 3 7  
w ith  an in te rp re ta tio n  of the concept of "Due d iligence" w h ich  
they did not anticipate. They had expected more of the provis ion 
th a t i t  be ing  ju s t a m ere e xce p tio n  o f l ia b i l i t y  fo r  
unseaworthiness by reason of la ten t defects. A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 
has lif te d  on ly  one aspect of the absolute characte r of the 
Common Law w a rra n ty  from  the shoulders of the carrier. Its on ly 
concession is exception of lia b ility  fo r unseaworthiness caused by 
la ten t defects.
Jud ic ia l a ttitudes, such as th a t voiced by Lord  Keith, have 
made i t  p la in tha t the carriers should count th e ir blessings. He 
stated that;38
"The ca rrie r w i l l  have some re lie f which, weighed
36 Ibid at p. 87.
3^ [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57.
3  ^ Ibid at p. 87.
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in  the scales, is not inconsiderable when contrasted 
w ith  his previous Common Law position."
The Act a fter all, according to Lord Hodson;39
"was not passed fo r the re lie f of shipowners, bu t to 
standardise w ith in  certa in  lim its  the righ ts  of the 
h o ld e r o f e v e ry  b i l l  o f la d in g  aga inst the  
shipowner."
I I - U n d e r  the  H am burg  R u les:
The W ork ing  Group on In te rn a tio n a l Shipping Leg is la tion  of 
UNCITRAL had devoted the session, held in  February 1972 to a 
p re lim in a ry  co n s id e ra tio n  of the basic ru le s  g o v e rn in g  
re sp o n s ib ility  of the carrie r. A lte rn a tive  schemes of l ia b il i ty  to 
replace the existing A rtic les I I I  and IV  of the Hague Rules were 
considered.
Both c a rr ie r  na tions and sh ipper nations suppo rted  the 
p rinc ip le  of ca rrie r lia b ility  based on fau lt, and i t  was believed to 
be desirable, at the outset, th a t the basic p rinc ip le  of fa u lt  be 
s im p ly  stated w h ile  the ru les fo r  the b u rde n  of p ro o f be 
separate ly elaborated together w ith  a separate considera tion of 
the exceptions to lia b ility .40
The basis fo r discussion in  the D rafting Group was paragraph 
269 of the Secretaria t Report (A/CN. 9 /6 3 /  Add 1 of December 
3rd, 1971) w h ich  was redra fted  as paragraph 42 of the w o rk in g  
paper prepared by the secre taria t fo r  the September m eeting
Ibid at p. 91.
40 See Sweeney, J.C., "The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on carriage of 
goods by sea", (part I), (1975-76) 7 69 at p. 102.
85
(A/CN 9/W.G I I I /W P  6 of 31 August, 1972).41
A fte r  le n g th y  and heated discussions, the m a jo r ity  of the 
members w o rk in g  group reached on agreem ent at the fo u r th  
session42on the princip les tha t should be incorporated in a set of 
r u l e s 4 3 tha t w ou ld  govern the re sp o n s ib ility  of the ca rrie r fo r 
damage or loss of cargo and w h ich  would replace A rtic les I I I  and 
IV  of the Hague Rules.
The draftsm en of the Hamburg Rules have accordingly chosen 
to state an a ffirm a tive  ru le of resp ons ib ility  based on presumed 
fa u lt  and to abolish the catalogue of exceptions conta ined in 
A rtic le  IV , ru le 2 of the Hague Rules.
A lm ost all tha t is to be found in the Hamburg Rules re la ting  to 
the basis of lia b il i ty  (the most im p o rtan t and most cen tra l top ic 
of all) is to be found in A rtic le  5, ru le 1, w h ich states as fo llow s:
"The ca rrie r is liab le fo r loss resu lting  from  loss of 
or damage to the goods, as w e ll as from  delay in  
de live ry , i f  the occurrence w h ich  caused the loss, 
damage or delay took place w h ile  the goods w ere 
in  his charge as defined in  A rtic le  4, unless the 
ca rrie r proves tha t he, his servants or agents took 
all measures tha t could reasonably be requ ired  to 
avoid the occurrence and its consequences."
41 See the Report of the third session U.N. Doc series A/CN. G No. 63.
42 it  was held in Geneva from 25 September to 6 October 1972. See 
UNICTRALY.B, Vol. IV  (1973) p. 138/139.
43 See Cleton, R., "The special features arising from the Hamburg  
Diplomatic Conference", Published in The Hamburg Rules, a one-day  
Seminar organised by Lloyds of London Press Ltd, September 28, 1978, p. 5.
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I t  is convenient to m ention here tha t A rtic le  5, ru le  1 of the 
Hamburg Rules is pa tte rned broad ly , on A rtic le  18 (1) of the 
Warsaw Convention fo r the un ifica tion  of certa in Rules re la ting  to 
In te rn a tio na l carriage by A ir of 1929 as amended by the Hague
Protocol 1955.44
I t  is obvious th a t the basis of l ia b il i ty  under the Ham burg 
Rules is a ffirm a tive  in  nature, and based on fa u lt or negligence.
The test proposed by A rtic le  5, ru le 1 is tha t i f  goods are short 
de livered or are de livered damaged, then you f ir s t  look to see 
w he the r the loss or damage was caused by an occurrence w h ich  
took place w h ile  the goods were in the carrier's custody. I f  i t  did, 
you then ask w he the r the "occurrence" was due to the fa u lt of 
the shipowner or his servants or agents. I f  there is fau lt, there is 
lia b ility . Conversely i f  there is no fau lt, there is no lia b ili ty .45
I t  is n o te w o rth y  tha t th is test replaces a ll the prov is ions of 
the Hague Rules w ith  regard to seaworthiness, as w e ll as a ll the 
provisions setting out the carrier's du ty  "p rop e rly  and ca re fu lly " 
to look after the goods in  other respects, together w ith  so-called 
"catalogue of exceptions" w h ich  qu a lify  the la tte r duty.
Since the system of lia b ili ty  proposed by the new Convention 
is based exclusive ly on fau lt, th is is genera lly  true of the Hague 
Rules as w e ll. The fu n d a m en ta l d iffe rence  be tw een the tw o  
systems lies in  the va ry ing  ways in w h ich the "fau lt'' p rinc ip le  is
44 See Shah, M.J., "The revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of lading 
within the U.N system, Key issues", published in the Hamburg Rules on the 
carriage of the goods bv sea, edited by S. Mankabady, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 
1978, p. 17.
45 See Diamond, "The division of liability as between ship and cargo 
under the new rules proposed by UNICITRAL". on.cit.. at p. 45.
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applied in each.46
1- Nature of L iab i l i ty :
In  comparing the provisions of the Hague Rules w ith  those of 
the H am burg Rules w ith  respect to the c a rr ie r 's  d u ty  of 
seaworthiness, the resu lting s ituation can be described as fo llows:
The basic d u ty  of the ca rrie r set fo r th  in  the present A rtic le  
I I I ,  ru le  1 of the Hague Rules is th a t the c a rr ie r is under an 
obligation to exercise due diligence before and at beginning of the 
voyage to make the ship seaworthy. This Rule has not re tu rn ed  
in to  the new Convention, bu t since there is a general ob liga tion to 
take all measures to avoid any occurrence w h ich could cause loss 
or damage and to avoid the consequences of such occurrence. 
This du ty  is obviously subsumed under this general ob liga tion of 
A rtic le  5, ru le  1 of the Hamburg Rules and would rem ain in  effect 
under th is A rtic le  as pa rt of the carrier's  ove ra ll re sp o n s ib ility  to 
perfo rm  all of his obligations under the contract of carriage w ith  
due care.
The o n ly  issue re m a in in g  to be reso lved  w i l l  be the 
construction to be placed by national courts on the carrie r's  du ty  
to take "a ll measures tha t could reasonably be requ ired  to avoid 
the occurrence and its consequences”. W ill B ritish  courts construe 
th is as negligence lia b ility  or w i l l  they s till hold the ca rrie r liab le 
fo r  the negligence of in d e p e n d e n t co n tra c to rs  as in  The 
Muncaster Castle?
46 See Williams, B.K., "The consequences of the Hamburg Rules on 
Insurance", published in the Hamburg Rules on the carriage of the goods 
bv sea, edited by S. Mankabady, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1978, p. 252.
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This is, in  fact, one of the great areas of uncerta in ty  tha t seem 
to be inhe ren t in  the new Convention since there is a great deal 
of room fo r controversy in  A rtic le  5, ru le  1, as to precise ly who 
are to be regarded as the shipowner s agents and who are not.
Under A rtic le  5, ru le  1 of the Ham burg Rules the ca rrie r 
assumes lia b il i ty  fo r the negligence of the master and the crew 
as part of his overa ll respons ib ility  to exercise due care to avoid 
loss or damage to the cargo,47 nam ely, the ca rrie r is liab le  fo r 
damage caused by fa u lt o f his servants or agents. U n fo rtuna te ly  
there is no A rtic le  in  the Hamburg Rules attem pted to define the 
meaning of "servant" and "agent".
There is no d iff ic u lty  to define the w ord "servant". I t  re fers to 
a person, usually employed on a regular basis and subject to the 
command of his em ployer as to the manner in  w h ich  he shall do 
his w o rk .48
But the d if f ic u lty  seems to appear in  try in g  to de fine the 
concept "agent", because i t  is not always easy to de term ine the 
exact role of the in te rm ed ia ries  and w he the r they are acting as 
servants, agents or independent con tracto rs .49 For example, a 
fre ig h t fo rw a rd e r may act as an independent c o n t r a c t o r , 50 or as
47 See Kimball, J.D., "Shipowner’s liability and the proposed revision of 
the Hague Rules", (1975 /76 ) 7 JJyLLX. 217 at p. 236.
48 See Diamond, A., "A legal analysis of the Hamburg Rules" (part I), 
fljLSii., at p.,13.
49 See Mankabady, "Comments on the Hamburg Rules", op.cit.. at p. 69.
5°  In LEvans & Sons (Portsmouth) Ltd. V. Andrea Merzario Ltd. [1976] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 165, Roskill L.J. said at p. 168: "The defendants are not 
carriers...they are forwarding contractors who arranged for the transport 
of goods...The work which they do is performed by them through many 
sub-contractors."
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an agent acting on behalf of the shipper, the consignee or the 
carrie r.
Perhaps, stevedores are the most im p o rta n t category in  th is 
respect. But the position of the stevedores is not obvious in  most 
countries, and the courts adopted d iffe re n t so lu tions in  th is  
m a t t e r . 51 However, tw o points are to be considered in  deciding 
w he the r the stevedore is a servant, an agent or an independent 
contractor:
1) The degree of con tro l and supervis ion of his w o rk  by the 
principal.
2) The w o rk  to be done and w hether i t  is part of the o rig ina l
contract.52
I t  is im p o rta n t to m ention here that, i f  the meaning of the 
w ord  "servant" or "agent" is le ft  to be decided according to the 
concepts established under each local legal system , d iffe re n t 
in te rp re ta tio n s  w ou ld  p reva il, because eve ry  con tracting  state 
w i l l  app ly  its own rules of v ica rious l ia b i l i ty  w hen app ly ing  
A rtic le  5, ru le  1 of the Hamburg Rules and tha t w id e ly  d iffe rin g  
results are to be expected in  d iffe ren t countries.53
2 - C a rr ie r and "A c tu a l C a rr ie r" :
F ina lly, i t  should be noted that, sometimes whole or pa rt of
5 1 i n England in the case of Hevn V. Ocean S.S. Co. (1927) 47 T.L.R 338. It 
was held that "the stevedores are the ship's servants, and the shipowner or 
charterer, as the case may be, is vicariously liable for damage done by 
stevedores."
52 gee Mankabady, "Comments on the Hamburg Rules", op.cit.. at p. 70.
5 3 See Diamond, "A legal analysis of the Hamburg Rules" (part I), 
op.cit.. at p. 13.
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the carriage is sub-con tracted  by the con trac ting  c a rr ie r to 
another ca rrie r term ed the "actual c a r r i e r " , 54 w ho may or may 
not be named in  the b ill of lading.
M oreover, the b ill of lading may provide tha t the contracting 
ca rrie r shall no t be liab le  in  respect of sub-contracted carriage, 
or as regards such carriage, shall be deemed to be an agent 
only. 5 5
The position of the actual ca rrie r is governed by A rtic le  10, 
ru le  2 of the Ham burg Rules, w h ich  p rov ides  th a t a ll the 
provisions of the Rules governing the respons ib ility  of the carrie r 
shall also app ly to the resp on s ib ility  of the actual ca rrie r. This 
means, of course, tha t the ca rrie r is responsible fo r the acts or 
omissions of the actual ca rrie r and fo r the acts or om issions of 
h is servan ts  and agents acting w ith in  the scope of th e ir  
em p loym ent.56 Moreover, A rtic le  10, ru le 2 gives the shipper the 
r ig h t to b ring  his claim  against the actual ca rrie r i f  the loss, 
damage or delay of the goods occurred w h ile  the y  w ere  in  his
charge.57
However, i t  is to be noted that, in most cases i t  is v e ry  d iff ic u lt 
to prove th a t the occurrence w h ich  damaged the goods or
54 See Article 10 of the Hamburg Rules.
5 5 See Pollock, G., "A legal analysis of the Hamburg Rules" (part I I ) ,  
published in the Hamburg Rules, a one-day seminar organised by Lloyd’s of 
London Press Ltd, September 28, 1978, p. 8.
5 6 See Diamond, "A legal analysis of the Hamburg Rules" (part I), 
op.cit.. at p. 15, see also Tetley, W„ "Articles 9 to 13 of the Hamburg Rules", 
published in the Hamburg Rules on the carriage of the goods bv sea, edited 
by S. Mankabady, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1978, p. 197 at p. 199.
57 See Mankabady, S., "Comments on the Hamburg Rules", op.cit.. at p.
77.
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delayed th e ir d e live ry  occurred w h ils t they w ere in  his charge. 
In  most cases, i t  w i l l  be easier to sue the ca rrie r as w e ll as the 
actual ca rrie r.58
In  dealing w ith  the question of the ca rrie r s lia b il i ty  fo r the 
acts of his sub-contractors in  making the ship seaw orthy, one 
w ou ld  expect that, in  these cases (i.e: seaworthiness), A rtic le  5, 
ru le  1 of the Hamburg Rules w il l  in  practice cast a somewhat less 
onerous d u ty  on shipowners than did the Hague Rules. This is 
because The M uncaster Castle decision tended to im pose a 
somewhat in fle x ib le  approach in deciding tha t the carrie r's  du ty  
to exercise due diligence was a personal one w h ich  could not be 
delegated in  any circumstances. By contrast, i t  w i l l  a lways be 
necessary under the Hamburg Rules to ask w hether the re levan t 
act of negligence was actua lly  com m itted by an "agent" of the 
carrie r.
This approach is, undoubtedly, a fa r more fle x ib le  one since 
there m ust be some lim it  to the class of persons w ho can be 
called "agents" of the carrie r in w hatever sense.
Section tw o : The Period Covered bv the Obligation of 
Seaw orth iness.
I -  Under the Hague Rules:
The issues of seaworth iness and due d iligence under the 
Hague Rules, as under the Common Law, are on ly  re leva n t at a 
specified poin t of time. The pe rtinen t moment under the Common
58 See Thomas, R.J.L., "A legal analysis of the Hamburg Rules", (part 
I I I ) ,  published in The Hamburg Rules. A one-day seminar organised by 
Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, September 28, 1978, p. 7.
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Law  fo r  the  w a r ra n ty  o f c a rg o w o rth in e s s  is as the 
com m encem ent of loading, and fo r seaworth iness in  its  s tr ic t 
sense, at the beginning of the voyage. W ith  regard to A rtic le  I I I ,  
ru le  1 of the Hague Rules, one has to bear in  m ind th a t i t  
encompasses both seaworthiness and cargoworthiness w ith in  it: 
ru le  1 (a) and (b) re fe r to the fo rm er and (c) to the la tte r. Both 
aspects of seaw orth iness are governed by a com m on tim e  
stipu la tion.
According to A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le 1 of the Hague Rules, the ca rrie r 
is bound to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaw orthy 
"be fore  and at the beg inn ing of the voyage". I t  is, then, 
im p o rtan t to bear in  m ind tha t the question of due diligence can 
on ly arise when the ship is actually unseaw orthy at the re levan t 
tim e. In  fac t according to th is  A r t ic le ^ 9 the ship m ust no t be 
unseaw orthy w hen she starts on her voyage. And w ha teve r the 
ca rrie r and his agents do a fte rw ards may am ount to negligence 
in  the care and custody of the cargo, bu t i t  is ir re le v a n t, on 
princip le, from  the point of v ie w  of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1.
1- In te rp re ta t io n  of the Words "Before and at the  
Beginning of the Voyage":
The a ttitude of w rite rs  on the significance of the words "before 
and at beginning of the voyage" is a varied one.
Z a p h ir io u 60 in  search of greater precis ion of these w ords 
asserts that:
59 Article I I I ,  rule 1 of the Hague Rules.
60 See Zaphiriou, G.A., "Seaworthiness", (1963) I.B.L. 221 at p. 225.
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"The use of the verb  "make" as w e ll as the nature 
o f the opera tions  of m anning, e q u ip p in g  and 
su p p ly in g  the ship, ind ica te  th a t the d u ty  is 
perform ed by making in  one exhaustive operation 
the ship seaw orthy, in  a w ide  sense, before she 
receives the cargo and before she is about to sail."
Gotz61 appears to reach a d iffe re n t conclusion when he said:
"I believe tha t "before and at the beginning of the 
voyage" in  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1, does not re fe r to any 
m oment or period of tim e before the beginning of 
loading."
The Jud ic ia l Com m ittee of the P r iv y  Council in  M a x im e  
Footwear Co.. L td . V. Canadian G overnm ent M erchan t M arine  
Ltd..,62 had to determ ine the issue as to w hen a ship m ust be 
seaworthy, and consequently when must the ca rrie r exercise due 
diligence to make her so.
In  th is case the loading of NQ.3 hold of a ship at Halifax, began 
on Tuesday, 3 F eb ruary , 1942, and fin is h e d  on F rida y , 6 
February. The loading of all cargo was completed at 8.15 p.m on 
tha t evening. The in ten tion  was to sail on Saturday.
On the F riday m orning three scupper pipes passing th rough  
the NQ.3 hold were found to be frozen, and were thaw ed out by 
an acetylene to rch  used by an em ployee of a f irm  w ho  had 
arranged to do this w o rk  fo r the shipowners. This w o rk  was done
61 See Gotz, H.N., "Comments on the Maxime Footwear case", (1960) 38 
Can.B.Rev. 96 at p. 98.
62 [1959] 2. Lloyd's Rep. 105.
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loading u n til the vessel starts on her voyage. The 
w ord  "before" cannot, in  th e ir opinion, be read as 
meaning "at the commencement of the loading". I f  
th is had been intended, i t  would have been said."
The Jud ic ia l Com m ittee was ce rta in  th a t the o b liga tion  to 
exercise due diligence to make the ship seaw orthy continued 
over the whole period from  at least the beginning of loading u n til 
the ship sank. And as the cargo was damaged a fte r loading bu t 
before sailing, the cargo-ow ners w ere, the re fo re , e n tit le d  to 
succeed. By using the w ord "at least", the Judicial Committee has 
conven ien tly  evaded the troublesome task of having to nom inate 
a starting p in -p o in t exactly when the period commences. How fa r 
back from  "the beginning of the loading" must one go to make the 
ship sea w o rth y  is no t know n; the Jud ic ia l Com m ittee had 
de libe ra te ly  re fra ined from  answering th is question as it  was not 
necessary, under the circumstances of the case, fo r it  to do so. By 
the ingenious choice of the words "at least" they  had securely 
caught the carriers; w he the r the f ire  began before or a fte r the 
loading of the cargo (bu t before sailing) w ou ld  have made no 
difference to the outcome of the case.
W ith  regard to the w a rra n ty  of cargoworthiness, the ca rrie r 
has under A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1, a continu ing d u ty  to exercise due 
d iligence to make the ship " f it  and safe" fo r  each and e ve ry  
parcel of merchandise loaded. In  other words, a fresh  w a rra n ty  
of cargoworthiness arises as soon as each parcel is accepted on 
board. According to the opin ion of the Judicial Committee:
‘The com m encem ent of the load ing means the
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com m encem ent of the loading of each sh ippers ' 
parcel and not the commencement of loading any
cargo."64
I t  is con ven ie n t to m en tion  here th a t the r ig h ts  and 
im m u n itie s  set out in  the Hague Rules, are confined on ly  to a 
"con tract of carriage of goods by  sea". A rtic le  I (e) defines 
"carriage of goods" to cover the "period from  the tim e w hen the 
goods are loaded on to the tim e they  are discharged fro m  the 
ship." I f  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le 1, were to apply from  a moment p rio r to 
the beginning of loading it  would conflic t w ith  A rtic le  I (e) w h ich 
defines the scope of the Hague Rules. This w ou ld  subject the 
ca rrie r w ith  responsib ilities w h ich  may not be in tended by the 
Rules.
I f  the phrase "at the beginning of the voyage" w ere to stand 
on its  own, i t  w ou ld  not be adequate to cover the case of 
cargoworthiness under A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 (c) w h ich  i f  any sense 
were to be made of the provis ion has to re fe r to the cond ition of 
the ship at the commencement of loading. The use of the w ord  
"before", in  a d d itio n  to the "beg inn ing  of the voyage" was, 
therefore, necessary to provide fo r ru le 1(c)  of A rtic le  I I I .
I t  is im p o rta n t to note th a t the con tinued  o b lig a tio n  of 
seaworthiness, w h ich  the P rivy  Council6  ^ has accorded to A rtic le  
I I I ,  ru le  1, places the cargo-owner in  a v e ry  favourab le  position. 
Under A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  2, the carrie r has a continuing duty, w h ils t 
the cargo is in  his custody, to "p ro p e rly  and ca re fu lly " care fo r 
the goods "carried".
64[1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep 105 at p. 112.
6 5 In the Maxime Footwear Case [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 105.
97
Goods, according to the House of Lords in  Renton and Co.. L td . V. 
Pa lm vra  Trading corpora tion  of Panama.66 are being "carried" 
from  the m om ent they are pu t on board. The house was clear 
tha t the w ord  "ca rry" did not mean transpo rt fro m  one place to 
another; i t  has no geographical significance.
Lo rd  M o rto n 67 even w e n t to the extent o f saying th a t the 
w ord  "does not place any obligation on the carrie r to transpo rt at 
all". He was inclined to the v ie w  tha t "a ship does "ca rry" goods 
w ith in  the meaning of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le 2 from  the m om ent when 
they are loaded on board".
The cargo owner now has in fact tw o provisions, A rtic le  I I I ,  
ru le  1 and ru le  2, on w h ich  he could re ly  on in a claim  fo r loss or 
damage sustained by cargo after loading bu t before sailing. The 
d u ty  to take care of cargo under A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  2, w ou ld  
n a tu ra lly  in c lu d e  the d u ty  to secure and m a in ta in  the 
seaworthiness of the ship.68 A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  2, is of course w id e r 
in  scope than ru le  1 as i t  embraces any act or om ission to take 
care of the goods carried. A clear example of th is  is the case 
w here  the c a rr ie r is held responsib le , no t fo r  causing the 
unseaworthiness, bu t fo r loading the cargo in to  or sending i t  to 
sea on an unseaworthy vessel.
2 - The D octrine  o f Stages:
I t  is to be observed tha t the Maxime Footwear case d id  not 
deal w ith  the question of the effect of the Hague Rules on the
66 [1957] A C. 149.
67 [1957] A.C. 149 at p. 171.
68 See Gotz. op.cit.. at p. 101.
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doctrine of stages a fte r the vessel had sailed, though i t  seems 
im p lic it  in  the speech of Lord Som ervell th a t th is  doctrine  has 
ceased to exist in  the case of the b ill of lading to w h ich  the rules 
apply. Accord ingly he stated:69
"The doctrine  of stages had its  anomalies, and 
some im p o rtan t m atters were never e lucidated by 
a u th o r ity . W hen the w a rra n ty  was absolute, i t  
seems at any ra te  in te ll ig ib le  to re s tr ic t i t  to 
certa in  points of tim e. I t  w ou ld  be surp ris ing  i f  a 
d u ty  to exercise due diligence ceased as soon as 
loading began only to reappear la te r sho rtly  before 
the beginning of the voyage.”
In  th is respect Cadwallader observed tha t:70
"The o b liga tion  to make the ship seaw orthy  in  
respect of loading w il l  continue over the en tire  of 
the loading period, at w h ich  po in t the ob liga tion  
w il l  be to make the ship seaworthy fo r the voyage 
she is to undertake. I t  is at th is po in t tha t the ru le  
appears to c u r ta il the genera l Common Law  
approach, fo r i f  the c a rr ie r ’s d u ty  te rm ina tes  at 
the beginning of the voyage the doctrine of stages 
w ould appear to be irre levan t."
Indeed when th is particu la r problem  arose in  the case of The 
M akedon ia .7 ! the court made i t  clear tha t the doctrine of stages 
at least in  the bunkering sense, has no application in cases w here
69 [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 105 at p. 113.
70 See Cadwallader, F.J.J., "Due diligence at sea", (1972) 74 D irr ito  
Marittimo (Italy) 3 at p. 13.
71 [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 316.
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the term s of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 apply. But w hen i t  was argued72 
in  th is case tha t the im p orta tio n  of the words "before and at the 
beginning of the voyage" has changed no th ing in  the previous 
Law, M r Justice Hewson did not agree saying:73
"I see no ob ligation to read in to  the w ord  "voyage" 
a doctrine of stages, bu t a necessity to define the 
w ord  itself..."voyage" in  this context means w h a t it  
has always meant: the con trac tua l voyage fro m  
the po rt o f loading to the po rt of discharge as 
declared in  the appropriate b ill of lading. The ru le  
says "voyage" w ith o u t any q u a lifica tio n  such as 
any declared stage thereof."
Accordingly Hewson.J. a ffirm ed :74
"In  my v iew , the ob liga tion on the sh ipow ner was 
to exercise due d iligence  be fo re  and at the 
beginning of sailing from  the loading po rt to have 
the vessel adequa te ly  bunke red  fo r  the f i r s t  
stage...and to arrange fo r adequate bunkers...a t 
other selected in te rm ed ia te  ports on the voyage so 
tha t the contractua l voyage m ight be perfo rm ed. 
Provided he did that, in  my v iew , he fu lf i l le d  his 
obligation in  tha t respect."
Thus, in  the case of Leesh River Tea Co. L td . V. B rit is h  Ind ia  
Steam N avigation Co..73 a storm  va lve  cover p late was stolen
72 [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 316, per. Mr Brandon, at p. 329.
73 [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 316 at p. 329.
74 [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 316 at p. 330.
73 [1966] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 193.
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w h ile  the vessel was ca lling  at an in te rm e d ia te  p o rt and 
consequently the cargo was damaged. The Court of Appeal held 
th a t the vessel was seaw orthy at "the beginning of the voyage" 
w ith in  the meaning of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le 1 of the Hague Rules.
I t  is im p o rta n t to note here th a t th is  in te rp re ta tio n  of the 
w ords "before and at the beginning of the voyage" may cause 
li t t le  d iff ic u lty  in  re la tion  to bunkering stages bu t i t  does present 
problem s in  so fa r as there may be various other stages o f the 
voyage re q u ir in g  d iffe re n t factors to be attended to at each 
stage.
The best exam ple of th is  can be found in  the ship w h ich  
sailing fro m  an in land  p o rt is p e rfe c tly  seaw orthy  fo r r iv e r  
voyage, b u t w i l l  re q u ire  certa in  a lte ra tions or repa irs  to be 
attended to before she proceeds in to  the open sea. In  th is case, is 
the ca rrie r re lieved of th is  fu r th e r  l ia b il i ty  because the ship is 
seaw orthy at the "beginn ing of the voyage" (in  the re s tr ic te d  
sense), or must he ca rry  out those a lterations or repa irs  at the 
r iv e r  po rt before they are required?
The solution w h ich  has been offered is tha t in  these cases the 
w o rd  "beg inn ing" should be g iven its o rd in a ry  meaning of the 
process of entering upon action, and not lim itin g  i t  to one po in t of 
tim e, and tha t there fore  the ca rrie r m ight postpone pa rt of his 
d u ty  to exercise due diligence to p ro pe rly  man, equip and make 
the ship seaw orthy u n til the req u is ite  m om ent w h ich , w hen  
perform ed, w ould m ark the "beginning of the voyage".76 That is 
to say, tha t the end of the "beginning of the voyage" is regarded
76 See Carver, T.G., Carriage bv sea. 13th ed. by Raoul Colinvaux, 
London, Stevens & Sons, 1982, Vol. 1, p. 359, See also Cadwallader, on.cit.. at 
p. 14.
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as no t y e t reached before th a t d u ty  has been pe rfo rm ed ; 
m eanwhile he remains under a continu ing du ty  of due diligence 
to keep the vessel seaw orthy in  o ther respects by v ir tu e  of the 
Maxime Footwear case.
R igh tly  i t  is suggested tha t th is in te rp re ta tio n  should be used 
on ly w here commercial practice shows i t  to be necessary.77
I I -  U nder the  H am burg  R ules:
I t  has been seen earlie r tha t under A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 of the 
Hague Rules, the obligation of the carrie r to provide a seaw orthy 
ship was lim ite d  to a du ty  to exercise due diligence "before and 
at the beginning of the voyage". This was construed as meaning 
th a t the ca rrie r w ould  com m it no breach of th is  ob liga tion  by 
a llow ing  the ship to become unseaw orthy du ring  the voyage, 
w h ile  any negligence in  th is  respect w ou ld  be covered by the 
exception regarding fa u lt in  the management of the ship.
On the o ther hand, he was req u ired  to look "p ro p e rly  and 
ca re fu lly " a fter the cargo throughout the period of carriage.
In  in te rp re tin g  these tw o provisions,78 the courts have found
tha t some incongru ities and inconsistencies had arisen fro m  the
ambiguous w ord ing used in these provisions.
The aim of the Hamburg Rules was, therefore, to rem ove these 
inconsistencies. The in tro d u c tion  of a un ifo rm  test of l ia b i l i ty  
based on fa u lt was designed to obviate these problem s.79 Under 
th is  new Convention the c a rr ie r ’s d u ty  to p rov ide  a seaw orthy
77 See Cadwallader, oo.cit.. at p. 14.
78 Article I I I ,  rule 1 & 2 of the Hague Rules.
79 See Wilson, op.cit.. at p. 141.
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ship is to be judged on the same basis as his du ty  tow ards the 
cargo, and both obligations are to run  th roughou t the period of 
ca rriage .80 The undertak ing  of "due diligence" to make the ship 
seaw orthy, w h ich  exists under A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 of the Hague 
Rules, is covered by  the te rm  "reasonable measures" th a t 
appears in  A rtic le  5, ru le  1 of the Hamburg Rules, and i t  should 
be exercised not m ere ly  "before and at the beg inn ing of the 
voyage" bu t all tim es.8! This term  also covers the undertaking of 
care fo r the cargo.
The v ie w  is, the re fo re , tenab le  th a t the d u ty  to ensure 
seaworthiness w i l l  persist fo r the du ra tion  of the voyage, thus 
in troducing  the s ign ifican t change tha t the ca rrie r being under a 
general duty, w i l l  be liab le  fo r his specific fa ilu re  to reestablish 
seaworthiness in  the event of any inc ident during the voyage.
I t  is n o te w o rth y  tha t, the u n ita ry  concept of fa u lt  l ia b il i ty  
under the Hamburg Rules, has been re inforced by the rem oval of 
the e xce p tio n  to l ia b i l i t y  fo r  n e g lig e n t n a v ig a tio n  and 
management of the sh ip82 and the e lim in a tio n  of the l im it  on 
the carrie r's  du ty  to ensure seaworthiness on ly  at the beginning 
of the voyage.83
From th is  la tte r  obse rva tion  one can argue tha t, i f  the
80 See Wilson, J.F., Carriage of goods bv sea. London, Pitm an  
Publishing, 1988, p. 204.
8  ^ See Tetley, W., "The Hamburg Rules; A commentary", (1979 )  
L.M.C.L.O. 1 at p. 7.
82 See Article IV, rule 2 (a) of the Hague Rules.
8 3 See Report of the Working Group on In ternational Shipping 
Legislation on its fourth (special) session, Annex 1 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9 /7 4  
(1972), reprinted in (1973) 4.Y.B UNCITRAL 146, 149 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9 SER. 
A/1973.
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naviga tion  and management exception has not been abolished 
under the Hamburg Rules, the im position  of a continu ing d u ty  of 
seaworthiness w i l l  have no significance and the carrie r's  position 
under the new Rules w il l  be the same as it  is under the present 
Hague Rules. In  order to understand th is s itua tion i t  is necessary 
to leave the Hamburg Rules and go back to the Hague Rules.
There is a d is tinc tion  to be draw n in  the Hague Rules between 
a loss caused by unseaworthiness and one caused by neglect or 
de fau lt "in  the nav iga tion  or in  the management of the ship" 
w ith in  the meaning of A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (a). In  the fo rm e r case 
the shipowner is liable, in  the la tte r he is not.
In  th is  connection, one f ir s t  has to fin d  ou t w h e th e r the 
re le va n t act occurred before or a fte r the voyage began. I f  i t  
occurred before the voyage, then i t  constitu tes a fa ilu re  in  
making the ship seaworthy and the owner is liable. I f  i t  occurred 
a fte r the voyage began, i t  is considered as a fa u lt  in  "the 
navigation or in  the management" of the ship.
For example, if  a ship sails in  a cond ition  as to be f i t  to s ta rt 
bu t not f i t  to continue th rough the voyage unless som ething is 
done, such as the closing and fastening of a port, w h ich  can and 
w ould o rd in a rily  be done during the voyage. In  th is case the ship 
is not considered to be unseaworthy at starting; and an omission 
to do the th ing requ ired fo r safety, at the proper tim e, is treated 
as a fa u lt in  "navigation or management".
Thus, in  In te rna tiona l packers London. L td . V. Ocean steamship 
Co.. L td .84 a cargo of tinned  meat shipped fro m  Brisbone fo r 
Glasgow was damaged by seawater du ring  the voyage as the
84 119551 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 218, See also The Silvia (1898) 171 U.S. 462.
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resu lt of ta rpau lins  being stripped from  the hatch covers during 
a storm . On hearing th a t the vessel was equipped w ith  locking 
bars designed to secure the hatches, the tr ia l judge held tha t the 
loss was caused not by the unseaworthiness of the vessel bu t by 
the negligence of the crew  in  fa ilin g  to make use of the 
equipm ent provided.
On the other hand, i f  a port is not designedly le ft  open, bu t is 
understood to be closed, and is not in tended to receive a tten tion  
at sea, the case w il l  be treated as one in  w h ich  due diligence has 
not been exercised to make the ship seaworthy, by the ow ner 
and his subord inates, and no t as a fa u lt  of "n a v ig a tio n  or 
management".
In  th is  connection re ference can be made to the case of 
In te rn a tio n a l Navigation Co. V. Farr and Bailev Mfg. C o .8 5 In  this 
case the ship sailed w ith  ports open near cargo, the hold w here 
the parts w ere located was used exc lu s ive ly  fo r  cargo, the 
hatches were battened down over the hold, and no one had any 
plans fo r inspecting or otherw ise dealing w ith  these ports. When 
the vessel reached its destination, the cargo was found w e t w ith  
sea w ater, w h ich  had obviously come in  th rough the ports. This 
damage was held to be a ttr ib u ta b le  to the unseaw orth iness of 
the vessel.
Having established a clear d is tinc tion  between w h a t m ight be 
considered to be a fa u lt in  the management or in  the naviga tion  
of the vessel and a fa ilu re  to exercise due diligence to make the 
ship seaw orthy, one must ask the fo llow in g  question: I f  these
8 5 (1 9 0 1 )1 8 1  U.S. 218, See also The Schwan [1909] A.C. 450, The Elkton 
(1931) 40 Ll.L.Rep. 263.
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cases86 w i l l  arise under the Hamburg Rules, w h a t w i l l  be the 
c a rr ie r ’s position and w h a t defences, i f  any, w i l l  be availab le to 
h im  under the new Convention?
The answer is that, the ca rrie r w i l l  be held liab le  in  both 
situations because:
1) He cannot in vo ke  the "n a v ig a tio n  or m anagem ent" 
exception , since a fte r the re m o va l o f th is  excep tion , the 
d is tin c tio n  betw een seaworthiness and opera tiona l negligence 
w ould no longer be legally significant.
2) By the im position of a continuing du ty  of seaworthiness, the 
c a rr ie r cannot p re tend th a t the ship was sea w o rth y  at the 
beginning of the voyage, as any fa u lt of the ca rrie r du ring  the 
period he is in  charge of the goods as defined in  A rtic le  4 of the 
Ham burg Rules, rendering  the ship unseaw orthy and a ffecting  
the cargo e ither d irec tly  or in d ire c tly  through naviga tiona l e rro r 
or m anagem ent w ou ld  re su lt in  ca rrie r lia b il i ty ;  courts could 
assess damages w ith o u t  assum ing the  d i f f ic u l t  task  of 
p inpo in ting  the exact cause of loss.
I t  must be borne in  m ind that, the d ra fte rs of the Convention 
sought to e lim inate  the Hague Rules navigation and management 
e xce p tio n  because its  m any v a r ia t io n s  a lone place a 
d isproportionate  burden of risks and losses on cargo ow ners.87 
Under the Hague Rules, the carrier's o p p o rtu n ity  to avoid lia b ili ty  
fo r nav iga tiona l erro r, although inconsistent w ith  fa u lt  l ia b ility ,
86 See cases dealing with the distinction between unseaworthiness and 
fault in navigation or managementof the ship.
87 See Pixa, R.R., "The Hamburg Rules fault concept and common 
carrier liability under U.S. Law", (1979) 19 Va.I. In t ’l.L. 433 at p. 445.
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offsets the du ty  to ensure seaworthiness at the beginning of the 
voyage.
There fore , the e ffec t of the absence of the exception  of 
negligent navigation is to some extent m itigated by the fact tha t 
in  some major stranding cases, the carrie r is unable even under 
the Hague Rules to escape lia b ili ty  because the court may decide 
th a t the  loss os damage was caused as a re s u lt  o f 
unseaworthiness ra ther than fa u lt in  navigation.
Indeed in  m any countries the courts are a lready re luc tan t to 
give e ffec t to the exception of neg ligen t nav iga tion  and have 
shown a tendency in recent years to fin d  as a fact tha t there has 
been unseaworthiness and not jus t negligence in  navigating the 
ship.88
But the f in a l d ra ft of the Hamburg Rules sought the re la ted 
advantages of both the e lim ina tio n  of the naviga tion  exception 
and the end of the tim e lim ita tio n  on seaworthiness.
I t  is clear enough, then, tha t the im pos ition  of a con tinu ing  
d u ty  of seaworthiness is contingent upon the to ta l rem ova l of the 
navigation and management exception.
88 See Honour, J.P. "The P & I clubs and the New United Nations 
Convention on the carriage of goods by sea 1978", published in the  
Hamburg Rules on the carriage of the goods bv sea, edited by S. Mankabady, 
Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1978, p. 244, see also Diamond, A., "The division of 
liab ility  as between ship and cargo under the new Rules proposed by 
UNCITRAL", op.cit.. at p. 48.
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Section t h r e e : S tandard of Care R equired  by the 
Obligation of Seaworthiness.
I -  Under the Hague Rules:
I t  has been seen th a t at Common Law a w a rra n ty  th a t the 
ship is seaw orthy is im p lied  in  all contracts fo r the carriage of 
goods by sea. But at the same tim e the shipowner is at lib e r ty  to 
con tract ou t or l im it  the e ffect of th is  w a rra n ty  by expressly 
stating in the contract of carriage tha t he is not to be responsible 
fo r loss or damage arising out of unseaworthiness of his ship. In  
fac t i t  has been established th a t p rov ided  the clause in  the 
contract making such provis ion was set out in  clear and express 
words, w ith o u t am b igu ity , the im p lied  unde rtak ing  at Common 
Law tha t the ship is seaworthy could be avoided.
But w hen the Hague Rules w ere g iven legal e ffe c t in  the 
United Kingdom by the passing of the Carriage of Goods by  Sea 
Act 1924, the im p lie d  unde rtak ing  th a t the ship is seaw orthy 
was abrogated. Section 2 of the Act provides that:
"There shall not be im p lied  in  any contract fo r the 
carriage of goods by sea to w h ich  the Rules app ly  
any absolute unde rtak ing  by the ca rr ie r o f the 
goods to provide a seaworthy ship."
Thus, w ith  the in tro d u c tio n  of the Hague Rules th is  im p lie d  
w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness no longer obtained bu t in  its place i t  
is provided in  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le 1 of the Rules that:
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"The ca rr ie r shall be bound before  and at the 
beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence 
to:
a) Make the ship seaworthy:
b) P roperly  man, equip, and supply the ship;
c) M ake the  ho lds, re fr ig e ra t in g  and cool 
chambers, and a ll other parts of the ship in  w h ich  
goods are carried, f i t  and safe fo r th e ir reception, 
carriage and preservation."
1- The S tandard  o f "Due D ilig e n ce ":
In  the search fo r the meaning of the w ords "exercise due 
diligence to make the ship seaw orthy", the courts have been 
faced w ith  an e x tre m e ly  d i f f ic u lt  task w h ic h  cons is t of 
determ in ing the k ind  of ob ligation im ported by th is expression.
The standard im posed by the ob liga tion  to exercise due 
diligence has been in te rp re te d  by the courts as being ro u gh ly  
equ iva len t to tha t of the Common Law du ty  of care,89 b u t w ith  
the im p o rta n t d iffe rence  th a t it  is a personal ob liga tion  th a t 
cannot be delegated.
I t  is im p o rtan t to note here tha t w h a t has been said about the 
equivalence of the du ty  "to exercise due diligence" to th a t of the 
Common Law "d u ty  of care" cannot be true . The standard of 
Common Law d u ty  of care to p rov ide  a seaw orthy ship, w h ich  
w ou ld  no t req u ire  express m ention in  the contract, is in  fac t 
embodied in  the absolute l ia b il i ty  w h ich  arises by v ir tu e  of the 
undertak ing  im p lie d  at Common Law. The prom ise to use due 
diligence is an express reduction of tha t du ty  of care.
89 See Cadwallader. op.cit.. at p. 5, See also Scrutton, T.E., Charteroarties  
and bills of lading. 19th ed. by A.A. Mocotta, M.J. Mustill &. S.C. Boyd, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1984, p. 435.
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In  estab lish ing the standard imposed by the ob liga tion  to 
exercise due diligence, Lord Justice W illm e r in  The M uncaster 
Castle case, a ttem p ted  a ju d ic ia l d e fin itio n  of the te rm  and 
stated:90
"An ob liga tion  to exercise due diligence is to my 
m ind in d is tin g u is h a b le  fro m  an o b lig a tio n  to
exercise reasonable care."
Now, i f  one can use the substitu tion  made by Cadw allader9 1 
of the w ords "d iligence" fo r "care", then we are le ft  w ith  the 
obligation to use "due diligence" being ind istingu ishab le  from  the
use of "reasonable diligence", of w h ich Dr. Lush ing ton92 gave the
fo llow ing  de fin ition  over a hundred years ago:
"Reasonable d iligence (means) no t the doing of 
eve ry th in g  possible, bu t the doing of th a t w h ich  
under the o rd in a ry  circum stances, and hav ing  
regard  to the expense and d i f f ic u lty  can be
reasonably required."
In  the case of The Am ste ls lo t. Lord Reid stated tha t:93
"The question always is w hether a reasonable man 
in  the shoes of the defendant, w ith  the s k ill and
90 Riverstone Meat Co. Ptv. Ltd. V. Lancashire Shipping Co.. L td . [1960] 1 
All. E.R. 193 at p. 219.
91 See Cadwallader. op.cit.. at p. 6.
92 The Eurooa (1863) 2 New Reo. 194 at p. 196.
93 Union of India V. N.V Reederii Amsterdam [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 223 at
p. 230.
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know ledge w h ich  the defendant had or ought to 
have had, w o u ld  have ta ke n  those e x tra  
precautions."
The answer to th is  question is th a t the standard  of due 
diligence requ ires not m ere ly w ha t shipowners usua lly  do, bu t 
w h a t a reasonably p ruden t one w ould  do and not w h a t he m ight 
do in  another vessel b u t in  th is  vessel under the p a rtic u la r 
circumstances here present.94
Thus, i f  an inspection of the vessel's m ach inery by  or on 
beha lf of the sh ipow ner fa ils  to revea l a defect , the question 
w h e the r the fa ilu re  amounts to w a n t of due diligence must be 
answered by considering:
(1) W hether the exam ination was, in  the circumstances, of a 
characte r such as a sk ille d  and p ru d e n t sh ipo w n e r should 
reasonably have made, and (2) I f  so, w he the r the exam ination 
was carried out w ith  reasonable sk ill, care and c o m p e t e n c e . 9 5 
Accord ingly, there is no fa ilu re  of due diligence m ere ly  because 
precautions are not taken w hich subsequent experience shows to 
be necessary.
I t  must be borne in mind tha t the French vers ion of the Hague 
Rules uses the words "diligence raisonnable". This illu s tra te s  the 
standard of diligence.
In  order to determ ine the standard imposed by the ob liga tion 
of due diligence, i t  is necessary to consider i t  from  the fina nc ia l 
point of v iew . s
94 See Sorkin, S., Goods in transit. Vol. 1. Chapt. 5 at p. 98.
.Union Of India V. N.V.Reederii Amsterdam [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 336, 
per Diplock L.J., at p. 345.
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The am ount tha t carriers spend on safety measures, tra in ing , 
equipm ent, ship construction and the like  w il l  be reflected in  the 
am ount of loss or damage to cargo tha t takes place. I f  the ca rrie r 
spends too l i t t le ,  fa il in g  even to p u t in  some re la t iv e ly  
inexpens ive  safe ty item s, th a t w i l l  be uneconom ic fro m  the 
standpoin t of m in im izing the to ta l costs of w o rld  shipping. I t  w i l l  
be uneconomic because the am ount spent fo r the safe ty item  
would, by assumption, save more in  cargo damage than i t  costs.
Thus, a higher standard of care may be equated to a greater 
expenditu re  of funds, because each higher leve l of care w i l l  cost 
more and save less damage than the preceding one.96
I t  has been said tha t the th re a t of l ia b il i ty  is not the sole 
cause of ca rrie rs  tak ing  precautions against loss or damage to 
cargo. Clearly a carrie r has an in te rest in  protecting cargo to keep 
the sh ipper as a customer. But it  is h ig h ly  d o u b tfu l th a t th is  
cons idera tion  by its e lf  w i l l  lead to an op tim um  standard  of 
care.97
I t  is convenient to m ention here tha t under the Hague Rules 
w here  the ca rrie r is w h o lly  or p a rtia lly  re lieved  of l ia b i l i ty  in  
tw o  m ajor instances nam e ly  ( fo r fa u lt  in  n a v ig a tio n  and 
management of the ship and f ire )  he has an add itiona l incen tive  
to act w ith  due diligence quite apart from  any th re a t of l ia b il i ty  
to the shipper, tha t is, to p reven t damage to the ship. However, 
th a t in cen tive  may not be su ffic ie n t to prom ote an o p tim u m  
standard of care. For example, the ca rrie r w ou ld  p resum ab ly  
spend £ 99 to p reven t £ 100 damage to his ship. But id e a lly  he
96 See Kimball, J.D., op.cit.. at p. 244.
97 See Hellawell, R., "Allocation of risk between cargo owner and 
carrier", (1979) 27 A.l.C.L. 357 at p. 365.
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should spend up to £ 199 to p reven t a com bination of £ 100 
damage to the ship and £ 100 damage to the cargo. Yet w ith o u t 
lia b ility  to the cargo he may be un w illing  to do so.
I t  is also theore tica lly  possible tha t a shipper w ould  be w illin g  
to pay an extra 99 p. fre ig h t to save £ 1 of damage to cargo and, 
by  agreeing to pay th is to ca rrie r, w ou ld  th e o re tica lly  bu y  an 
optim um  standard of care.98
Having established a financ ia l po in t of v ie w  on the standard 
imposed by the obligation of due diligence, i t  is now im p o rta n t to 
note th a t the analogy between the d u ty  to take reasonable care 
and the d u ty  to exercise due diligence, tha t the B ritish  Courts 
have assumed has served to determ ine the standard of l ia b il i ty  
under the Hague Rules. But i t  should be m entioned th a t the 
correctness of th is analogy has been in  doubt since the decision 
of the House of Lords in The Muncaster Castle. "
In  fact th e ir Lordships have expressed a lo t of concern about 
the w a y  the sh ip o w n e r’s d u ty  to exercise due d iligence is 
apprehended by the courts. In  th is  respect Lord  M e rrim a n  
observed th a t:100
"M uch depends...on the context in  w h ich  the d u ty  
is postulated. I am not convinced tha t cases of to r t 
based on the re la tionsh ip  of master and servant, 
in v ito r  and invitee, and the like, a fford a su ffic ien t 
basis fo r construing words embodied by statute in  
a b i l l  of lading, the in te rp re ta tio n  of w h ich  has 
been the subject of a long series of decisions”.
98 Ibid, at p. 365.
99 [1961] A.C. 807.
100 [1961] A.C. 807 at p. 849.
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Despite a severe critic ism  of the House of Lords fo rm u la ted  in 
th is  case, against the analogy established between the d u ty  to 
exercise due d iligence and th a t of ta k in g  reasonable care, 
however, la te r cases have continued to assert tha t the carrie r's  
d u ty  is one of reasonable care and th a t lack of due diligence is 
negligence.
In  th is  respect Me N air J. observed in  the case of The  
Am stelslot:101
"As regards the standard of care in vo lved  in  the 
exercise of due diligence, I was usefu lly  re fe rred  to 
the observa tions of Lord W r ig h t l02...W here he 
equ ipa ra ted  the exercise of due d iligence w ith  
taking reasonable care, and to the statem ent of Mr.
Justice Porter 1 ° 3 . . . in (a case dealing w ith  fa ilu re  to 
detect leaky rive ts ), in  w h ich  the learned judge 
defines the exam ina tion  re q u ire d  as "such an 
exam ination as a reasonably care fu l man skilled  in  
th a t m a tte r w ou ld  make". To th is  s ta tem e n t I 
w ou ld  on ly  add tha t the standard must be judged 
in  the lig h t of the facts known, or w h ich  ought to 
have been know n at the time."
As a re s u lt of the re luctance  of the cou rts  to o ffe r  a 
determ ined standard w h ich  is imposed by the ob liga tion  of due 
diligence, some w rite rs  have attem pted to be more precise on th is
101 [19621 1 Lloyd's Rep. 539 at p 553.
* 02 Wilsons and Clvde coal company Ltd. V. English [1938] A.C. 57 at pp. 
80-81.
10 3 Charles brown and Co.. Ltd. and others V. N itra te  producers  
steamship company Ltd. (1937) 58 LI.L.Rep. 188 at p. 191.
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subject. Cadwallader declared th a t:104
"The most simple w ay to in te rp re t the te rm  w ou ld  
appear to be to ask just w hat the pa rticu la r w ords 
used mean, "due" means "a ll tha t w h ich  is proper" 
w h ils t "d iligence" can be in te rp re te d  as "a tte n tion  
to duties" pu t together th is  means tha t a ca rr ie r 
re ly ing  on th is fo rm  promises tha t "he w i l l  pay all 
tha t a tten tion to his duties to provide a seaw orthy 
ship as is p ro p e rly  to be expected of a ca rrie r of 
goods by sea."
Consequently, he a ffirm ed :l°5
"Fram ed in  the above m anner the test of due 
diligence in  fac t reve rts  to th a t of the actions of 
the p ru d e n t c a rr ie r as u tilise d  in  the im p lie d  
undertak ing  of the Common Law, but...the test is 
shorn of the re tro sp e c tive  im p la n tin g  of the 
knowledge of the la ter discovered defect."
In  fact i t  is subm itted tha t the carrie r's  diligence is su ffic ie n t 
on ly i f  the loss or damage has been caused by a defect of la te n t 
na tu re . La ten t defect seemed the more p e rtin e n t sub ject of 
de fin ition .
2 - Due D iligence and L a te n t D e fect:
The e ffec t of the abo lition  by Section 3 of the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act 1971 (COGSA), in  re la tion  to any con tract to 
w h ich  the Act applies by opera tion  of Law of the absolute
104 See Cadwallader, op.cit.. at p. 6.
105 Ibid, at pp. 6-7.
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undertak ing  at Common Law to prov ide  a seaw orthy ship and 
the su b s titu tio n  of the lesser ob liga tion  under the Rules to 
exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy has thus been 
summarised:
"The c a rr ie r  w i l l  be p ro tec ted  against la te n t 
defects, in  the s tr ic t sense, in  w o rk  done on his 
ship, tha t is to say, defects not due to any negligent 
w orkm ansh ip  of repa ire rs  or others em ployed by 
the repa ire rs , and as I see it, against defects 
making fo r unseaworthiness in  the ship, how ever 
caused, before i t  became his ship, if  these could not 
be d iscovered b y  h im , or com peten t experts  
em p lo yed  by  h im , by  the exercise of due
diligence."106
As a resu lt i t  has become apparent under the Hague Rules 
tha t unseaworthiness caused by la tent, undiscoverable defect is 
not cause of action against the shipowner.
A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (p) of the Rules provides that:
"Neither the carrie r nor the ship shall be liab le  fo r 
loss or damage aris ing or re su ltin g  fro m  la te n t 
defects not discoverable by due diligence."
The prob lem  of the in te rp re ta tio n  of th is  im m u n ity  fro m  
lia b il i ty  conferred upon the ca rrie r by th is exception of la te n t 
defect not discoverable by due diligence, invo lves tw o  p a rticu la r 
considerations. W hat is a la ten t defect, and w ha t constitu tes due 
diligence w ith in  the meaning of the exception?
106 Riverstone Meat Co.. Ptv. Ltd. V. Lancashire Shipping Co. L td . [19611 
A.C. 807, per Lord Keith of Avonholm, at p. 872.
116
In  considering the e ffect of the exception covering loss or 
damage arising or resu lting  from  la ten t defects not discoverable 
by  the exercise of due diligence, one can notice tha t the m atter is 
in e x trica b ly  bound up w ith  unseaworthiness and the d u ty  of the 
ca rrie r to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaw orthy, 
because even before the sub s titu tio n  of due d iligence fo r  the 
Common Law undertaking, carriers had experim ented w ith  term s 
w hereby they sought to exclude lia b il i ty  fo r la ten t defects. Some 
a ttem p ts  at exclusion fa ile d  because th e y  d id  no t lin k  the 
exclusion of lia b ility  fo r la tent defects w ith  the undertak ing  as to 
seaworthiness, and thus the exception served on ly  in  respect of 
the common carrie r liab ilities .
W ith  the in troduction  of the obligation to use due diligence the 
need to m en tion  la te n t defects in  respect of seaw orth iness 
became superfluous, since "a defect is said to be la te n t w hen i t  
cannot be discovered by a person of com petent s k il l using 
o rd in a ry  care.“ I 07
I t  is im p o rta n t now to f in d  out to w h a t exten t a sh ipow ner 
must use due diligence as to enable him  to secure the be ne fit of 
the exception, tha t is the im m u n ity  from  lia b il i ty  in  respect of 
cargo loss or damage arising or resu lting  from  la te n t defects not 
discoverable by the exercise of due diligence.
The answer can be found in  the case of Union of Ind ia  V. N.V. 
Reederii A m s te rd a m . ! 08 w h ich  in fac t deals in  de ta il w ith  the 
extent to w h ich a classification surveyor should probe in  order to 
discover defects tha t may be of a la ten t nature.
IQ7 See Carver, op.cit.. p. 382.
108 [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 539.
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In  th is  case the m otor vessel "A m ste ls lo t" proceeded on a 
voyage fro m  P ortland  (Oregon) w ith  a cargo o f w h ea t fo r 
d e live ry  at Bombay. Having reached a position some 900 miles 
fro m  Honolulu, she sustained an engine breakdow n due to the 
fa ilu re  of her reduction gear. In  consequence of th is  breakdown, 
she was unable to proceed fu rth e r under her own power and had 
to be tow ed to H onolu lu. On a r r iv a l at H ono lu lu  and a fte r 
exam ination of her reduction gear, the damage was found to be 
severe as to requ ire  extensive replacement, and i t  was estim ated 
tha t repairs in  Honolulu would take eight or nine months.
As a resu lt of negotiations between the in te rested parties, i t  
was agreed th a t the vessel should be towed fro m  H onolu lu to 
Kobe (Japan), and tha t at Kobe the cargo should be de livered to 
the Union of In d ia  in to  a vessel charte red  by  them  fo r  on- 
carriage to Bombay. In  pursuance of th is agreem ent the vessel 
was so towed to Kobe, w here the cargo was discharged in to  the 
on-carry ing  vessel.
The Union of Ind ia  claimed damages from  the charte re rs  of 
the Am stels lot (N.V. Reederij Am sterdam ), fo r breach of contract 
alleging the fa ilu re  on the pa rt of the charterers to exercise due 
diligence.
The grounds fo r th is claim were tha t the breakdow n was due 
to the im p ro p e r f ix in g  of a he lix  ty re  on the d rum , or an 
undiscovered fa tigue crack in  the ty re . The cla im ants accepted 
tha t i f  the o rig ina l breakdow n was not due to an actionable fa u lt 
on the pa rt of the charterers e.g. due to "a la te n t defect no t 
discoverable by the exercise of due diligence" the voyage was
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p ro p e rly  abandoned and th a t the expense to w h ich  they  had 
been put, w h ich they now sought to recover from  the shippers in 
p ro v id ing  fo r the on-carriage of the cargo to Bombay, was fo r 
th e ir account, and tha t they w ould be liab le  fo r th e ir p roportion  
of the general average fo r which, on tha t hypothesis, th e ir cargo 
w ould be liable.
The vessel was a d m itte d ly  unseaw orthy  on sa iling  fro m  
Portland because there must have been at th a t tim e  a crack in 
the he lix  ty re  of the drum  in the reduction  gear w h ich  broke 
du ring  the voyage. I f  the y  w ere to escape l ia b il i ty  under the 
above exception, the charterers would need to prove the exercise 
of due diligence on the pa rt of the classification surveyors who 
surveyed the gear bu t fa iled  to discover the crack. The crack is a 
fa tigue crack, w h ich  began in the metal and gradua lly  got larger. 
In  the op in ion of the court, the crack had p robab ly  reached the 
surface at the tim e of the exam ination of the surveyors, and was 
possib ly v is ib le  on a care fu l inspection of a more thorough k ind  
than tha t made by the surveyors.
I t  was subm itted  by the cla im ants tha t, in  ad d ition  to the 
inspection made by the surveyors th rough the inspection cover, 
the upper housing should have been rem oved, p e rm ittin g  closer 
exam ination; o il should have been w iped from  the tee th  of the 
gear wheels, and one helix should have been examined at a tim e.
The question fo r the court was w hether reasonable surveyors, 
exerc is ing  p ro pe r care and s k ill,  w o u ld  have take n  those 
measures. There was no lack of care or skilled know ledge in  th is 
case and the surveyors were fa m ilia r w ith  the three methods of 
exam ina tion  w h ich  i t  was suggested th a t th e y  should have
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adopted, and they  could easily have fo llow ed them  if  the y  had 
chosen to do so. They decided not to do so, and the court said 
th a t the issue in  th is  case is w h e the r there  was an e rro r of 
judgm ent tha t amounted to professional negligence.
The cou rt reached the conclusion tha t, in  conducting the 
survey as they did, the surveyors w ere not g u ilty  of negligence 
and tha t they had exercised due diligence, there being no du ty  
on them  to adopt these add itiona l measures or to probe fu r th e r  
than  th e y  did. The fa u lt  was, in  fact, a " la te n t de fect not 
discoverable by the exercise of due diligence”.
The standard of due diligence necessarily to use w h ich  the 
court is re fe ring  to here, has been c learly  established ea rlie r in  
the case of The D im itrios.N . R a llias109 in  w h ich  cargo-ow ners 
sued fo r damage to th e ir cargo of cotton-seed shipped under a 
b il l o f lading by the term s of w h ich  the shipowner's w a rra n ty  of 
seaworthiness was not to extend to damage caused by "la ten t 
defect in  h u ll provided such la ten t defect do not re su lt fro m  w an t 
of due diligence of the owners or any of them j or of the sh ip ’s 
husband or manager". v
In  th is  case the damage was caused by sea-w ater en te ring  
the ho ld th ro ug h  the fra c tu re  of ce rta in  r ive ts  by w h ich  the 
plates were attached to the sh ip ’s frames. Rust had been allowed 
to accum ula te  be tw een the p lates and th e f r a m e s ,  ' thus ' 
subjecting the rive ts  to undue stress, w h ich  u lt im a te ly  caused 
them to break.
The damage occurred du ring  a voyage in August 1921. In  
1920 the vessel had passed Lloyd 's special survey,, and in  July
109 (1922) 13 Ll.L.Rep. 363.
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1921, she had been su rveyed  fo r  f ire  damage, w hen  the 
condition of the rive ts  was reported to be satisfactory, bu t certa in 
cleaning and coating of steel w o rk  in  the holds w h ich  was 
recommended in  the repo rt had not been carried ou t at the tim e 
the cargo was damaged. The damage was augm ented by the 
fa ilu re  of the master w ho was a pa rt owner, to have the bilges 
p rope rly  pumped.
The judge gave judgm ent fo r the shipowners on the ground 
th a t a lthough a care fu l exam ination w ou ld  have disclosed the 
existence of the ru s t w h ich  caused the defect, the su rve yo rs ’ 
reports  ind ica ted  no lack of due diligence on the p a rt o f the 
ow ner or his advisors. The damage was the re fo re  caused by a 
la ten t defect in  respect of w h ich  the owner was protected by the 
b ill of lading.
But in  de live ring  judgm ent, Lord Justice A tk in 110 re fe rre d  to 
the d e fin itio n  propounded by C arver111 tha t la te n t defect is ”a 
defect w h ich  could not be discovered by a person of com petent 
sk ill and using o rd ina ry  care".
And as a re su lt the court ru led  tha t, by the exercise of 
o rd ina ry  care by a competent person, the existence of the rus t in  
the r ive ts  w ou ld  have been found, and i t  was common ground 
tha t something should have been done to rem edy it; and then i f  
the ship sailed w ith o u t anything being done, there was a breach 
of the w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness. In  other words, the court held 
tha t the defect was such tha t it  w ould  have been discovered by 
a reasonably carefu l and d iligen t exam ination, and e x tra o rd in a ry
1 10 (1922) 13 Ll.L.Rep. 363 at p. 366.
* * 1 Carver, on.cit.. at p. 382.
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care was not necessarily to make i t  apparent.
The question w hether a defect was or was not la ten t is in  fact 
trea ted as being the same as w he the r the person charged w ith  
the care of the vessel was or was not negligent.
In  th is  connection i t  is im p o rta n t to re fe r to the observa tion 
made by Cadwallader:112
"In  looking at the effects of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1, i t  is 
re leva n t to in q u ire  w he the r a fa ilu re  to exercise 
due diligence in respect of a defect not discoverable 
by due diligence w hich subsequently causes loss or 
damage is l ik e ly  to a ffec t the position  of the 
carrier. The answer to this, at least on the basis of 
A rtic le  IV , ru le 1, must be tha t i t  is not, since i t  can 
h a rd ly  be said tha t the inc ident complained of was 
caused by a w an t of due diligence on the pa rt of 
the carrier."
Faced w ith  a s im ila r problem  in  Corooracion A rg e n tin a  de 
Productors de Carnes V. Roval M ail Lines L td ..113 w h ich  concerned 
the question of lia b ili ty  fo r damage to a cargo of frozen meat on 
the voyage fro m  Buenos A ires to London, Mr. Justice Branson 
stated th a t:114
" I f  the defect is such tha t it  cannot be discoverable 
by due diligence i t  becomes im m ate ria l to consider 
w h e th e r due d iligence was exercised or not, 
because ex hypo thes i  i f  i t  had been exercised i t  
w ould have been useless." [o rig ina l emphasis].
112 See Cadwallader, op.cit.. at p. 17.
H 3  (1939) 64 Ll.L.Rep. 188.
114 Ibid, at p. 192.
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In  th is connection, Cadwallader a ffirm ed th a t:115
" I f  i t  is accepted tha t a la ten t defect is one "w hich 
could not be discovered by a person of com petent 
s k ill and using o rd in a ry  care", i t  is d iff ic u lt  to see 
w h a t is gained by the inclusion of the w ords "not 
discoverable by due diligence."
F ina lly  one can sympathise w ith  Mr. Justice Porter who, faced 
w ith  the problem  of the exercise of due diligence in  respect of 
seaw orth iness and la te n t defects no t d iscoverab le  by  due 
diligence, said:
"I am bound to say th a t in  dealing w ith  these 
cases I always found a certa in  am ount of d iff ic u lty  
in  d istinguishing between a particu la r la ten t defect 
and a p a rticu la r due diligence to get r id  of th a t
la tent defect."116
I I -  Under the Hamburg Rules:
Under Article 5, rule 1 of the Hamburg Rules:
"The ca rrie r is liab le fo r loss resu lting  from  loss of 
or damage to the goods as w e ll as fro m  delay in  
de live ry , i f  the occurrence w h ich  caused the loss, 
damage or delay took place w h ile  the goods w ere 
in  his charge as de fined A rtic le  4, unless the 
ca rrie r proves tha t he, his servants or agents took 
all measures tha t could reasonably be requ ired  to
1 ^  Cadwallader. on.cit.. at p. 17.
116 Charles Brown & Co.. Ltd. V. Nitrate Producers' steamship Co.. Ltd. 
(1937) 58 Ll.L.Rep. 188 at p. 192.
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avoid the occurrence and its consequences."
The form of this new provision is heavily influenced by the 
language used in conventions concerning the international 
transport of cargo by A ir,117 Rail.l l § and Roadl I 9 carriage.
The f ir s t  pa rt of th is  ru le  is in  the fo rm  of a s tr ic t l ia b il i ty  
p rov is ion  w h ile  its f in a l clause exonerates the ca rrie r i f  he "took 
a ll measures tha t could reasonably be requ ired". I t  is essentia lly 
a l ia b ility  fo r fa u lt provision.
I t  is noteworthy that this second part of Article 5, rule 1 is 
closely modeled in accordance with the other International cargo 
conventions.
The W arsaw Convention of 1929 states tha t the ca rrie r is not 
liab le  i f  "he and his agents have taken a ll necessary measures to 
avoid the damages or tha t it  was im possible fo r h im  or them  to 
take such m easures".!20 yj^e c iM  Convention (Rail) states tha t 
the ca rrie r is not liab le i f  the loss or damage resu lted  "th rough 
c ircum stances w h ich  the ...(carrie r)...cou ld  no t avoid and the 
consequences of w h ich  he was unable to p re v e n t" . !2 1 The 
w ord ing  of the CMR C onven tion !22 [s almost iden tica l to th a t of
! ! 7 Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to 
International carriage by Air (The Warsaw Convention) signed at Warsaw  
on 12 Oct, 1929.
! ! 8  International Convention concerning the carriage of goods by Rail 
(CIM) signed at Berne on 25 oct, 1952.
! !  ^ Convention on the contract for the International carriage of goods 
by Road (CMR) signed at Geneva on 19 May, 1956.
! 2  ^ The Warsaw Convention, Article 20 para. 2.
! 2 ! CIM Convention, Article 27 para. 2.
! 22 CMR Convention, Article 17 para. 2.
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the CIM Convention.
I t  is im p o rta n t to observe in  th is connection tha t the dra fte rs  
o f the new C onvention (H am burg Rules) could have used 
tra d itio n a l carriage of goods by sea language and s till fashioned 
a general l ia b ility  fo r fa u lt provision. This would in  essence have 
entailed provisions requ iring  the carrie r to exercise due diligence 
to make the ship seaw orthy, to care fo r  the cargo and to 
p ro p e rly  and ca re fu lly  navigate and manage the ship. But they 
re jected  th is  tra d it io n a l language in  o rder to conform  more 
closely to the language used in  o ther In te rn a tio n a l tra n sp o rt 
conventions. This may be an advantage in  fa c il ita t in g  the 
m ultim oda l transporta tion  of c a r g o . i2 3
But th is  la tte r observation has been critic ized on the ground 
th a t the H am burg Rules by changing the language of the 
standard from  "due diligence" in  the Hague Rules to tha t w h ich  is 
used in  the other transpo rt conventions "liab le  fo r  loss ...unless 
(he )...p roves th a t he took a ll measures w h ic h  cou ld  be 
rea son ab ly  re q u ire d ..." c la r ity  and p re d ic ta b il ity  is be ing 
sacrificed. I t  is argued tha t had the "due diligence" language of 
the Hague Rules been reta ined, the bene fit of ex isting case law  
construing the standard and c la rify in g  its application could have 
been r e t a i n e d  I 24. As the Rules presen tly  stand the meaning of 
the standard is vague and ambiguous.
In  th is  connection, one can argue tha t th is c ritic ism  can, on 
one hand, be true  because w h a t the new Convention has no t 
resolved is the standard of care imposed upon the shipow ner. Is
* 2 3 See Zamora, S., "Carrier liability for damage or loss to cargo in 
International Transport", (1975) 23 A.l.C.L. p. 391.
* 2  ^ See Hellawell. op.cit.. at p. 3 59.
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the obligation in  A rtic le  5, ru le 1 of the Hamburg Rules, the same 
as "due diligence" in  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le 1 of the Hague Rules?
In  fact, i t  is uncerta in how the new general ru le  under A rtic le  
5, ru le  1, of the new Convention w i l l  w o rk  out in  practice since 
there is v e ry  li t t le  guidance in  the Convention as to the standard 
of care to be applied by the courts.
One can im agine th a t the adop tion  of a genera l ru le  of 
negligence expressed in  term s of "reasonable" conduct exposes 
undoub ted ly  the ca rrie r to considerable u n ce rta in ty  as to the 
consequences of his action. W hat are "a ll measures th a t could 
reasonably be requ ired? Only years of case Law under the new 
Rule would provide increased certa in ty.
On the other hand, th is critic ism  fa ils  to consider tha t due to 
the s im ila r ity  between the standard in  the Ham burg Rules and 
the other tran spo rt conventions, the courts m ight analogize and 
app ly  decisions c la r ify in g  and constru ing the standards of the 
other transpo rt conventions to the Hamburg Rules. Specific duties 
m igh t be s lig h tly  d iffe re n t ow ing to the pe cu lia ritie s  o f the 
d iffe re n t modes of transporta tion , But the general na ture  of the 
du ty  of care owed could easily be analogized.
Furtherm ore, a standard based on th a t of o ther com parable 
conventions was adopted because of the po ten tia l fo r fa c ilita tin g  
m u ltim o d a l contracts and because of the a n tic ip a tio n  of a 
m ultim odal transport convention in the fu tu re .
1- The S tanda rd  o f "Reasonable M e a su re s ":
The issue tha t remains to be resolved w il l  be the construction
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to be placed by the courts on the ca rrie r's  d u ty  to take "a ll 
measures th a t could reasonab ly  be re q u ire d  to  avo id  the 
occurrence and its consequences". 125
In  th is connection, reference must be made to the statem ent of 
Mr. R ichardson,126 where he described the w ord ing  of A rtic le  5, 
ru le  1 of the Hamburg Rules as:
" I t  is perhaps one of the vaguest phrases I have ever heard".
Accordingly he a ffirm e d :127
"Can you im agine the fie ld  day w h ich  la w ye rs  
w ou ld  have in de te rm in ing  w h a t measures could 
and w h a t measures could no t reasonab ly  be 
re q u ire d  in  a m y r ia d  o f c ircu m s ta n ce s?  
Furtherm ore, if  the courts were to place the same 
sort of in te rp re ta tio n  on these w ords  as th e y  
placed on "due d iligence" in  The M u n ca s te r
C astle128 case, the ca rrie r w ould  be issuing, w h a t 
w ould  am ount to s tric t l ia b il i ty  b ills  of lading and 
cargo insurance would become superfluous."
One of the most im p o r ta n t questions w h ic h  arises in  
connection w ith  th is  po in t is: w h a t is it  th a t the ca rrie r has to 
prove in  order to escape lia b ility ?  Does he have to show m ere ly 
th a t the reasonable shipow ner in  his position w ou ld  no t have 
done more to safeguard the cargo than he did? or is i t  necessary
125 See Wilson. (1988 edition), op.cit.. at p. 204.
1 2  ^ Richardson, J.W., "The Hague-Visby Rules; a carrier's view". 
Published in The Hague Visbv Rules and the carriage of goods bv sea Act 
1 9 7 1 . A one-day seminar organised by Lloyd's of London press Ltd, 
December 8, 1977, p. 5.
127 Ibid at p. 5.
128 [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57.
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fo r h im  to go fu r th e r and prove tha t i t  would have been to ta lly  
im practicable to take fu r th e r steps in  th is respect?
I f  a ll one had to go on w ere the words "could reasonably be 
re q u ire d " one m ight have had some doubt as to w h e the r the 
Rule (A rtic le  5, ru le  1) did not impose a h igher d u ty  on the 
shipowner than tha t of o rd in a ry  reasonable care.
I t  should be m entioned tha t the te rm  "reasonable measures" 
is an un lim ited  term . However, it  seems pla in tha t the standard 
of these measures is an objective one, or, as i t  is com m only said 
of the "p rud en t ow ner" w h ich  corresponds to th a t of the "bon 
pere de fam ille " in  French Law. 129
Accord ingly, in  de term in ing  the reasonable measures, regard 
m ust be g iven to the course w h ich  w ou ld  be pursued by  a 
prudent carrie r in  the circumstances of the case.130 .
I t  is believed tha t paragraph 1 of A rtic le  5 did no t impose a 
h igher du ty  on the shipow ner than tha t of o rd in a ry  reasonable 
care.
The Common U n d e rs ta n d in g 131 makes i t  clear th a t a ll the 
shipowner needs to do is to show tha t he took reasonable care of
the g o o d s  1 3 2 .
I t  is convenient to mention here an im portant observation 
made by Judge Haight. As to the term of "reasonably" he said:
129 gee Mankabady, S., "Comments on the Hamburg Rules", on.cit.. at p.
56.
130 ibid at p. 56.
131 See Annex I I  of the Hamburg Rules.
132 See Diamond, A., "A legal analysis of the Hamburg Rules" (part I), 
op.cit.. at p. 11.
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"I am stuck, however, by the dram atic appearance 
of th a t hero of the M aritim e  Law. The Ham burg 
Rules m ight w e ll be subtitled : "The reasonable man 
puts to sea". The v is ion  of the fu tu re  is that, in  an 
in f in i t iv e  v a r ie ty  o f s itu a tio n s , the c a rr ie r 's  
l ia b i l i t y  fo r  cargo damage or loss w i l l  be 
determ ined by the question of w he the r or no t the 
shipowner, master, officers, crew or agents, acted 
"reasonably", w h ile  I constan tly  in s tru c t Juries to 
em ula te h im , I have never met the reasonable 
man...My p red ic tion  is tha t the applica tion of th is  
p a rtic u la r p r in c ip le  w i l l  su b s ta n tia lly  increase 
litig a tio n ."133
W hereas, the Hague Rules used te rm s w e ll kn o w n  to the 
M a ritim e  Law such as "seaworthiness", "perils  of the sea" and 
"devia tion". These term s have disappeared under the Ham burg
Rules.*34
The carrie r's  l ia b il i ty  under the Hamburg Rules "is based on 
the p rin c ip le  of presum ed fa u lt  or neglect" *3-5 to induce the 
carriers to keep the ir standard of care at the op tim um  level.
I t  must be borne in  m ind tha t during the fo rm u la tio n  of the 
H am burg Rules, the d ra fte rs  have take n  in to  account the 
te ch n o lo g ica l advances o f sh ip p in g  and n a v ig a tio n  and 
communication. Shipping by sea is not as perilous as i t  was at the 
tim e of the passage of the Hague Rules, and there fore , a h igher
*33  see Haight.. C.Ir.. in: The Speakers' Papers for the Bill of Lading 
Conventions Conference. New York, November 29 /30,  1978, organised by 
Lloyd's of London Press, p. 4.
^34 See Diamond, A., "A legal analysis of the Hamburg Rules" (part I), 
op.cit.. at p. 7.
*35 See Annex I I  of the Hamburg Rules.
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standard of care should be expected of c a r r i e r s . 1 36
But, as it has been noted earlier, the form of the new provision 
(Article 5, rule 1 of the Hamburg Rules) is heavily influenced by 
the language used in the other three international cargo 
conventions which impose a standard of reasonable care rather 
than absolute liability , then one might argue that no higher 
standard should be applicable under the Hamburg Rules.
A system of lia b ility  fo r fa u lt may tend to produce a standard 
of care near the optim um . Carrier w il l  presum ably spend 99 p. to 
avoid a fa u lt causing £ 1 in  cargo damage. A system of l ia b il i ty  
fo r fa u lt is complicated; fa u lt may be d iff ic u lt  to prove and cases 
may be settled fo r less than the am ount of the damage. If, w ith  
certa in types of errors or claims, carriers could reasonably expect 
to settle each loss fo r 75 P, presum ably they w ould  be un w illin g  
to spend more than 75 p to avoid the £ 1 loss.
Perhaps more im portan t, fau lt, negligence or due diligence do 
not exist in  nature as constants. They are legal constructs w h ich  
both change over tim e and are dependent to some considerable 
extent on norm al in d u s try  practice. As technology changes, fa u lt 
does also. The nav iga tiona l equ ipm en t w h ich  w ou ld  serve to 
sa tis fy  the re q u ire m e n t of due d iligence to  make the ship 
seaworthy in  1910 would not suffice today.
Despite these weaknesses, a lia b ility  fo r fa u lt system does give 
ca rrie r a considerable incentive  fo r adopting a standard of care 
som ewhere near op tim um . W ith  regard to s tandard of care, 
th e re fo re , the  new  C o n ve n tio n  seems a c o n s id e ra b le
! 3 6  gee Shollenberger, D.K., "Risk of loss in shipping under the 
Hamburg Rules", (1981) 10 Den.l.I.L.P. 568 at p. 575.
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im provem ent over its predecessor.
F inally, in  the words of H e l l a w e l l ; 1 3 7
"The s tringen t standard of a s tr ic t l ia b il i ty  w ou ld  
no t be g e n e ra lly  acceptable today. The 1978 
Convention is therefore about the best compromise 
one could reasonably expect. I t  is a subs tan tia l 
im provem ent over the Brussels Convention in  tha t 
it  s im p lifies and almost unifies the rules on burden 
of proof and e lim inates the m u ltip le  exceptions of 
the Brussels Convention, especia lly the exception 
fo r navigation and management of the ship."
137 See Hellawell, on.cit.. at p. 367.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Carrier's L iab ility  for Unseaworthiness Under 
the Hague Rules and Hamburg Rules.
Generally fo r the holder of the b ill of lading to make his case, 
he has on ly to prove the loss, shortage or damage of the cargo.
On the other hand, when the b il l of lading came in to  use as a 
rece ip t fo r cargo and as a document of title , carriers began to use 
the b ill's  exceptions clauses, s tipu la ting  tha t they  should not be 
liab le  to the holders of the b il l o f lading fo r damage or loss of 
goods suffered in  certa in ways or from  certa in causes.
Under the Hague Rules the ca rrie r is en titled  to re ly  upon the 
defences set out in  A rtic le  IV  provided tha t he has exercised due 
diligence to make the ship seaworthy and has p ro pe rly  cared fo r 
the cargo du ring  its  carriage. In  p a rticu la r the ca rrie r is no t 
respons ib le  fo r  loss or damage a ris ing  fro m  fa u lt  in  the 
nav iga tion  or management of the ship. This means, of course, 
th a t in  the m a jo r ity  of cases the cargo-ow ner has no c la im  
against the shipowner, since the la tte r is protected by the term s 
of his b i l l of lad ing w h ich  incorpora tes the p rov is ions of the 
Hague Rules.
W hereas the H am burg Rules adopt a d if fe re n t  basis of 
lia b ility .  A r t ic le d  provides th a t the ca rrie r is liab le  fo r cargo 
damage unless he proves tha t he, his servants or agents took a ll
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measures th a t could reasonab ly  be re q u ire d  to avo id the 
occurrence and its consequences. The omission of the defence of 
fa u lt in  the management and navigation of the ship, p a rticu la rly  
the la tte r, c lea rly  imposes an add itiona l heavy bu rden  on the 
shipowner.
Therefore, th is chapter w i l l  be d iv ided in  tw o sections:
I) The burden of proof.
I I )  The ca rr ie r ’s im m unities from  unseaworthiness.
Section one : The B u rden  o f P ro o f.
I t  does not adm it of doubt tha t the position of the bu rden  of 
proof is a basic element in  the fix in g  of rights w ith  respect to any 
legal claim.
The Hague Rules set ou t in  clear language the burdens of 
cargo-owner and ca rrie r w ith  respect to p rov ing  or d isp rov ing  
the carrie r's  l ia b il i ty  fo r loss or damage suffered by the cargo- 
owner.
Where these Rules are not clear enough, jud ic ia l in te rp re ta tio n  
has f ille d  some of the gaps as to who bears the burden of p roo f 
at a given po in t in  the litiga tion  of a claim fo r loss or damage.
The W orking Group on In te rn a tio n a l Shipping Leg is la tion  of 
U N C ITR A L1 has proposed th a t these burden of p roo f ru les be 
changed and tha t the ca rrie r bears the burden of d isp rov ing  his 
lia b ility  under almost all circumstances.
I -  U nder the  Hague R u les:
I t  should be noticed that, the onus of proof is not set out in  the
* United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
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Hague Rules. Yet certa in  references are to be found in  particu la r 
artic les w here  the bu rden  of p roo f is prescribed, b u t these 
artic les do not constitu te  a general the o ry  fo r  the burden of 
proof.2
In  countries using the Hague Rules, the burden of proof is in  
some s itua tions  placed on the ca rr ie r and in  others on the 
shipper. Exactly how the burden is allocated is o ften a m atter of 
some uncerta in ty, and may v a ry  among countries.3
However, i t  is a general ru le  of Law tha t w hoever relies on a 
certa in fact must prove its existence. Accordingly, when the goods 
do not arrive , or a rrive  in  a damaged condition, the cargo-owner 
m ust make a p rim a  facie case against the ca rrie r by showing 
tha t the goods were not tu rned  out in  as good^ condition  as when 
shipped. This done, the burden passes to the carrie r, who must 
show th a t i t  fa lls  w ith in  an A rtic le  IV  exception of the Hague 
Rules. I f  he manages to do so, the burden may sh ift back to the 
ca rgo -ow ner, w ho m ust p rove  th a t the c a rr ie r 's  fa u lt  or 
negligence caused the exem pted act or concurred w ith  i t  in  
producing loss or damage.
W ith  respect to unseaworthiness, i t  should be noted tha t some 
d iffe rence of op in ion exists as to the incidence of the burden of 
proof re lating to the exercise of due diligence.
A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 provides tha t the carrie r shall not be liab le 
fo r  loss or damage arising or resu lting  fro m  unseaw orth iness 
unless caused by w an t of due diligence on his pa rt to make the
2 See Tetley, W., Marine cargo claims. 2nd ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 
1978, p. 47.
3 Approaches to basic policy decisions concerning allocation of risks 
between the cargo-owner and carrier. [1972] UNCITRAL Y.B at 289.
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ship seaworthy, as defined in  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1.
The section then continues:
"W henever loss or damage has resu lted  fro m  
unsea w o rth in ess  the b u rd e n  o f p ro v in g  the 
exercise of due diligence shall be on the ca rrie r or 
other person claim ing exeption under this A rtic le ."
The phraseo logy o f th is  A rtic le  has led to the genera l 
assumption tha t no onus is cast on the carrie r in  re la tion  to proof 
of due diligence u n til the other pa rty  has f irs t  established that:
1) The vessel was unseaworthy and;
2) th a t the loss or damage com pla ined of resu lted  fro m  
unseaworthiness.4
1- P ro o f o f U n se a w o rth in e ss :
The burden of proving unseaworthiness as a fact rests upon 
the p a rty  who asserts it, tha t is to say the shipper, and he must 
plead i t  w ith  su ffic ien t pa rticu la rity . There is no presum ption  of 
Law th a t a ship is unseaw orthy because she breaks dow n or
even sinks fro m  an unexplained cause, unless such occurrence
can be accounted fo r by su ffic ien t evidence of unseaworthiness.
M oreover a proof of no n -d e live ry  and damaged goods, do not 
raise a presum ption of unseaworth iness or a fa ilu re  to exercise 
due d ilig e n ce  to  make the  vesse l s e a w o rth y . A nd  i f
unseaworth iness is not specia lly pleaded and proved, the re  is
noth ing fo r the ca rrie r to re fu te , and hence there should be no
4 See Scrutton, T.E., Charteroarties and bills of lading. 19th ed. by A.A. 
Mocotta, M.J. Mustill &. S.C. Boyd, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1984, p. 446.
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need fo r h im  to show th a t he had exercised due diligence to 
make the ship seaworthy.
But once unseaworthiness is proved by the cargo-owner, i t  is 
then, fo r the shipow ner to re b u t i t  by e ith e r p rov ing  tha t the 
vessel was seaw orthy  in  fac t, or fa ilin g  . tha t, th a t he had 
exercised due diligence to make it  so, as requ ired  by A rtic le  I I I ,  
ru le  1 of the Hague Rules.
The p rinc ip le  tha t a ship is not presumed to be unseaw orthy 
is no doubt sound bu t th is  p rinc ip le  does not preclude certa in  
p resum ptions o f fact, i.e: p resum ptions aris ing from  age, low  
classing or non-su rvey of the ship or m achinery. The mere fact 
tha t the damage has occurred raises a prim a-fac ie  case tha t the 
ship was unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage.
Thus in  Fiumana Societa di Navieazione V. Bunge & Co.. L td ..5 
th e ir  Lordsh ips decided th a t an unexp la ined f ire  in  the coal 
b u n ke rs  at the p o rt o f lo ad in g  a ffo rd e d  a reasonab le  
presum ption tha t i t  was due to defect or unfitness of the bunker 
coal w h ich  in  tu rn  amounted to unseaworthiness.
I t  is therefore clear tha t the last sentence of A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 
of the Hague Rules imposes upon the ca rr ie r the bu rde n  of 
p rov ing  tha t the unseaworthiness of the vessel was not caused 
by w a n t of due diligence on his part. In  o ther words, he must 
prove th a t he had exercised due d iligence to make the ship 
seaworthy.
This, how ever, s t i l l  leaves the p r io r p rob lem  of p ro o f of 
unseaworthiness, a problem  w h ich  is harder on the sh ipper who 
has to prove also th a t the unseaworthiness was caused by the
5 [1930] 2 K.B. 47.
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carrier's w an t of due diligence.
An a lte rna tive  v ie w  is provided by Tetley w ho argues tha t on 
po licy grounds the burden of proof in  both cases should rest w ith  
the ca rr ie r w ho has a ll the facts ava ilab le  to h im  to prove 
seaworthiness and due diligence w h ile  the cargo-owner has few, 
i f  any.6
As was pointed out by Chief Justice Beste, in  the n ine teen th  
cen tu ry  decision of R ilev V. H o rne .7 the events re levan t to the 
lia b ility  of the carrie r occur fo r the most part out of the presence 
of the sh ipper, under c ircum stances m aking i t  exceed ing ly  
d iff ic u lt fo r the shipper to ascertain or approve the cause of loss 
or damage.
In  Tetley's op in ion the construction of A rtic le  IV , ru le  1, is 
con tra ry  to the s p ir it  of the Rules and to the express w ord ing  of 
A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 and 2.8 He holds the v ie w  tha t, due diligence 
to make the vessel seaw orthy in  respect to the loss m ust be 
proven by the ca rrie r before he may exculpate h im se lf under 
A rtic le  IV  of the Hague Rules.9
This was c learly  pointed out by the P riv y  Council in  M axim e 
Footwear Co.. L td . V. Canadian G overnm ent M erchan t M arine . 
Ltd. 1° where Lord Somervell said:11
"A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 is an ove rrid ing  ob ligation. I f  i t
6 See Tetlev. op.cit.. at p. 15 5.
7 (1828)Bing 217.
8 See Tetlev. op.cit.. at p. 15 5.
9 Ibid, at p. 153.
19 [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 105.
11 Ibid, at p. 113.
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is not fu lf i l le d  and the n o n -fu lf ilm e n t causes the 
damage, the im m u n itie s  of A rtic le  IV  cannot be 
relied on..."
The above statem ent made by Lord Som ervell in  the Maxime 
Footwear, seem ing ly  sim ple and innocuous, had engendered 
much co n tro ve rs ie s  and con fus ion  in  the Law  re g a rd in g  
seaworthiness under the Hague Rules.
In  th is  case, a consignm ent of lea the r was loaded in to  a 
bu rn ing  hold, i t  caught f ire  and became a to ta l loss. The f ire  
rendered the vessel uncargow orthy as i t  made her holds u n fit  
and unsafe fo r the reception, carriage and p reserva tion  of the 
goods. The unseaw orthy condition arose as a consequence of the 
negligent supervis ion of the ship's officers in  thaw ing  out, w ith  
an ace ty lene  to rch , some w aste  pipes. Th is caused the 
surrounding cork insu la tion to catch fire .
The cargo-ow ners pleaded th a t the sh ipow ners had no t 
exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy under A rtic le  
I I I ,  ru le  1, and tha t the unseaworthiness so resu lting  caused the 
damage.
The shipowners' defences were tha t they had perform ed th e ir 
ob liga tion s  under A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1, and th a t th e y  w e re  
exempted from  lia b ili ty  by A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 and ru le  2 (a) and 
(b).
The shipowners proceeded d irec tly  to A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (a) and 
(b) to defend th e ir case by passing and ignoring A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  
1. They argued tha t A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 never came in to  operation 
even though the fire  caused the vessel to be unseaworthy.
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In  making a d irect approach to A rtic le  IV, ru le  2 (a) and (b), 
the shipow ners w ere in d ire c tly  challenging the cargo-ow ners ' 
a llega tion  th a t unseaw orth iness caused the loss. In  p leading 
A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (b), the shipowners were in  e ffect a ttr ib u tin g  
fire  as the cause of loss and not unseaworthiness. The question is: 
Can a shipow ner make such a d irec t sho rt-cu t access to A rtic le  
IV , ru le  2 ?
The outcome of the proceedings (and in  pa rticu la r the speech 
of Lord  S om erve ll c ited above) seems to suggest th a t the 
sh ipow ners had to prove com pliance w ith  the p rov is ions of 
A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 before they would be allowed to re ly  on any of 
the im m unities spelt out in  A rtic le  IV.
Described as an "o ve rrid in g  ob liga tion", a sh ipow ner has to 
show th a t he had exercised due d iligence to make the ship 
seaworthy. A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le 1 has been considered the "gateway" 
to A rtic le  IV.
One has to bear in  m ind tha t in  the Maxime F oo tw ear12 case, 
the cargo-owners pleaded not on ly a breach of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1, 
b u t also th a t unseaworth iness caused the loss. An issue was 
made of unseaworthiness as the cause of loss. The shipowners, 
th e re fo re , had no a lte rn a tiv e  b u t to show th a t th e y  had 
exercised due diligence to make the ship seaw orthy in  order to 
qu a lify  fo r exem ption of lia b ility  under A rtic le  IV , ru le  1. Further, 
the court had to satis fy  itse lf tha t the allegations made by the 
p la in tiffs  were met and satis factorily  rebutted. A fa ilu re  to re fu te  
the claims w ou ld  leave the plea of unseaw orth iness hanging. 
S im ply by showing tha t f ire  (A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (b)) was the cause
12 [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 105.
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of loss does n o t b y  its e lf  a u to m a tic a lly  d is p ro v e  th a t 
unseaworthiness could not also be a concurrent cause.
The shipowners could not re ly  on A rtic le  IV  fo r tw o reasons. 
F irs tly , th e y  could no t show th a t the y  had exercised due 
diligence to make the ship seaworthy, and secondly, they  could 
not d isq u a lify  unseaworth iness as a cause of loss. A breach of 
A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 w ou ld  be inconsequentia l i f  unseaworthiness 
d id not cause the loss. Judgem ent was awarded to the cargo- 
owners on both grounds.
To defend an a llegation of unseaworthiness, the sh ipow ner 
has three defences at his disposal:
1) He could prove tha t the defect or m atter com plained of did 
not fa ll w ith in  the d e fin itio n  of "unseaworth iness" i.e: th a t the 
vessel was not unseaworthy.
2) Failing (1), he could prove tha t unseaworth iness did not 
cause the loss.
3) And i f  (1) and (2) were decided against h im , he could s t ill 
escape lia b ili ty  i f  he showed tha t he had exercised due diligence 
to make the ship seaworthy, and in  spite of th a t the loss s t ill 
occurred, he relies on A rtic le  IV , ru le 1.
The shipowners in  the M axim e F o o t w e a r l 3  could no t prove 
any of the three defences outlined above.
The procedures at the tr ia l, the sh u ttling  back and fo r th  of 
the burdens of proof, together w ith  Lord Som ervell's comments 
have led many judges and w r ite rs  to conclude th a t A rtic le  I I I ,  
ru le  1 is in  all cases, regardless of w he the r unseaworthiness is or 
is not pleaded, raised or proved, a general condition precedent fo r
13 ib id .
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exoneration of lia b ility  under A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 and ru le  2.
Before a carrie r could th in k  of g iv ing evidence to establish a 
case of im m u n ity  from  lia b il i ty  under A rtic le  IV , he has f irs t,  to 
prove th a t he had exercised due diligence to make the ship 
seaw orthy.14
As i t  was pointed out earlier, T e tley ,15 draw ing support from  
Canadian a u th o ritie s  and the above rem arks  made by Lord  
Som ervell, holds th is  v ie w : the exercise of due d iligence is a 
p re req u is ite  to p rov ing  the exceptions under A rtic le  IV . This 
v ie w -p o in t is iden tica l to the scheme under the H arte r Act, the 
fo re ru n n e r o f the Hague Rules, w here  the exercise o f due 
diligence was c learly  expressed as the basis of exem ption. But 
unseaw orth iness as a subject or basis of a su it stands on a 
d if fe re n t  p lane fro m  un seaw orth iness  as a c o n d itio n  o f 
exculpation. A causal connection between the loss and effect has 
to be traced in  the fo rm er, bu t not in  the la tte r. The w o rd ing  of 
section 3 of the Harter Act does sanction such a pre requ is ite , bu t 
not the w ord ing of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 of the Hague Rules.
However, i t  m ust be said th a t the judges are free  to d raw  
th e ir  own inferences from  a re la t iv e ly  ske le ta l fra m e w o rk  of 
facts b ro ug h t fo rw a rd  by the cargo-ow ner. The pos ition  was 
c la rifie d  in  The Hellenic D o lp h in 16 case, w h ich  tends to fa vo u r 
the m a jo rity  v iew .
14 See The lervis Bav (1940) 66 Ll.L.Rep. 184 at p. 193, per Wrottesley.J: 
"...the defendants raust...prove, firstly , that they had exercised due 
diligence laid down in Article I II .. .in  the matter of the ship, and, secondly, 
one of the exceptions contained in Article IV, rule 2..."
^  See Tetlev. op.cit.. at pp. 1 S3-170.
16 [19781 2 Lloyd's Rep. 336.
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The judgem ent of Lloyd.J in  th is case is of pa rticu la r in te rest. 
He said:17
"The cargo-ow ner can raise a p rim a  fac ie  case 
against the sh ipow ner by show ing th a t cargo 
w h ic h  had been sh ipped in  good o rd e r and 
condition was damaged on a rriva l. The sh ipow ner 
can meet th a t p rim a  facie case by re ly in g  on an 
exception, fo r example, perils at sea. The position 
in  th a t respect is exactly  the same w h e th e r the 
Hague Rules are incorpora ted or not. The cargo- 
owner can then seek to displace the exception by 
p rov ing  th a t the vessel was unseaw orthy at the 
com m encem ent o f the voyage and th a t the 
unseaworth iness was the cause of the loss. The 
burden in  re la tion  to seaworthiness does not sh ift. 
N a tu ra lly , the co u rt can d ra w  in fe rences: in  
L indsay V. Klein the inference of unseaworthiness 
at c o m m e n c e m e n t o f th e  v o y a g e  w as 
overw helm ing. But i f  at the end of the day, having 
heard a ll the evidence and draw n all the proper 
inferences, the court is le ft  on the razor's edge, the 
cargo-ow ner fa ils  on unseaw orth iness and the 
shipowners are le ft w ith  the ir defence of perils  of 
the sea. If,  on the o ther hand, the co u rt comes 
dow n  in  fa v o u r  o f the  c a rg o -o w n e rs  on 
unseaworthiness, the shipowners can s t ill escape 
by proving tha t the re levan t unseaworthiness was 
not due to any w ant of due diligence on th e ir pa rt 
or on the part of the ir servants or agents."
In  practice, however, most courts solve the problem  by calling 
on both  pa rties  to make w h a t p roo f is ava ilab le  to them . 
M oreover, the problem  is fre q u e n tly  solved by the readiness of
17 Ibid, at p. 339.
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the court to trea t the presence of seawater in  a vessel's hold as . 
p rim a facie evidence of unseaworthiness.
2 - U n seaw orth iness  M us t be the  Cause o f the  Loss:
In  the course of making out his prim a facie case, the cla im ant 
has to show tha t his loss or damage complained of resu lted from  
the unseaworthiness. In  other words, the fact th a t due diligence 
was not exercised to make the vessel seaworthy is not su ffic ien t 
to fin d  the ca rrie r responsible. The unseaworthiness must be the 
cause of the loss. That is not to say tha t the courts have requ ired  
th a t unseaworth iness be the prox im ate cause of the loss nor 
even the dom inant cause as long as i t  be "a" cause in  the sense of 
a real or effective cause.18
This requ irem en t tha t unseaworthiness resu lts in  the loss or 
damage com plained of is, p a rticu la rly , im p o rta n t in  the lig h t of 
the d is tinction  between the Harter Act and the Hague Rules, w ith  
respect to the c a rr ie r ’s du ty  to exercise due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy.
Under the H arte r Act, the w o rd ing  of section 3 made the 
exercise of due diligence by the sh ipow ner to make the ship 
seaw orthy a cond ition precedent to his r ig h t to re ly  on certa in  
specified defences,19 an e ffect re q u ir in g  no causal connection 
w h a te ve r betw een the exercise of the d u ty  and the in c id e n t
18 See Smith Hogg V. Black Sea and Baltic [19401 A.C. 997.
* 9 Section 3 of the Harter Act commenced: "If the owner of any vessel 
transporting merchandise or property...shall exercise due diligence to 
make the said vessel in all respects seaworthy" then he may rely on the 
defences provided in that section.
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resu lting  in  the loss or damage.
Whereas under the Hague Rules, and according to the w ord ing  
of A rtic le  IV , ru le 1, no question of due diligence arises unless the 
cargo-owner proves unseaworthiness.20
Therefore, the essential difference between the Harter Act and 
the Hague Rules is tha t the negligence or exception clause in  the 
H a rte r A ct (section 3) is cond ition a l: i t  never operates to 
exonerate the carrie r unless due diligence has been used to make 
the ship se a w o rth y  in  a ll respects regard less  of causal 
connection. In  o ther w ords, i f  unseaw orth iness is found , the 
ca rrie r cannot invoke the Harter Act exoneration clause, even i f  
no connection exists between the event causing the loss and the 
unseaworthiness.
The Hague Rules, however, calls fo r such causal re la tio n  as a 
p re requ is ite  to a fin d in g  of l ia b il i ty .21 The exception clause of 
the Hague Rules (A rtic le  IV ) is positive: i t  always operates to 
exonerate the ca rrie r unless the actual w a n t of due d iligence 
caused the pa rticu la r unseaworthiness.
I t  should be po in ted ou t th a t i f  the ca rr ie r has fa ile d  to 
exercise due d iligence  to make the ship s e a w o rth y  and 
unseaworthiness was the sole cause of loss, there is no problem . 
He cannot re ly  on A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 as he has fa iled  to com ply 
w ith  its terms. A rtic le  IV , ru le 2 is irre le va n t as unseaworthiness 
is not an excepted cause of loss under it.
Unseaworthiness, however, ra re ly  operates as a cause on its 
own. To quote Lord W right: “...unseaworthiness as a cause cannot
20 See Carver, T.G., Carriage bv sea. 13th ed. by Raoul Colinvaux, 
London, Stevens & Sons, 1982, Vol. 1, p. 336.
21 See Tetley, <2iL£ii., at p. 156.
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fro m  its  v e ry  na tu re  operate by itse lf...".22 I t  is in v a r ia b ly  
accompanied by another p e r il w h ich  i t  re lies upon to evince 
itse lf, to show up the in fe rio r qualities of the ship. As there w il l  
a lw ays  be a co m b in a tio n  o f causes, one o f w h ic h  is 
unseaworth iness and the o th e r/s , possibly, an excepted pe ril, 
d ifficu ltie s  in  the selection of the decisive cause of loss arise. The 
ca rrie r w ould  n a tu ra lly  plead one of the causes under A rtic le  IV , 
ru le  2 as his defence. The question is: Can he do so w hen 
unseaworthiness is also responsible fo r the loss?
The Common Law has resolved this dilem m a by means of Lord 
W rig h t’s "a" cause theory  of c a u s a t io n .2 ^
I t  is im p o rta n t to cite here the Canadian Suprem e Court 
decision of Charles Goodfellow Lum ber Sales L td . V. V e rre a u lt 
N av iga tion  In c ..24 to illu s tra te  the same p rin c ip le  as applied 
under the Hague Rules. In  a case of m u ltip le  causes, Ritchie.J 
w ould determ ine the issue as fo llow s:2^
" I t  thus appears to me th a t even i f  the loss is 
occasioned by perils  of the sea, the sh ipow ner is 
neverthe less liab le  i f  he fa ile d  to exercise due 
d iligence to make the ship sea w o rth y  at the 
beginning of the voyage and tha t unseaworthiness 
was a decisive cause of the loss."
The English au thorities on causation declaring the same ru le
22 Smith Hogg V. Black Sea and Baltic (19401 A.C. 997.
23 In the Smith Hogg r 19401 A.C. 997.
24 [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 185.
25 Ibid, at p. 188.
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w ere approved by the judge.26 The "a" cause theo ry  is sim pler 
to  a p p ly  unde r the Common Law  as the  w a r ra n ty  o f 
seaworthiness is absolute; once unseaworthiness is established as 
a cause of loss, the shipowner is liab le. But as under the Hague 
Rules the w a rra n ty  is reduced to the exercise of due diligence, 
Lord  W righ t's  conception has to be adjusted accord ing ly; the 
ca rrie r has to be given the r ig h t to prove tha t he had exercised 
due diligence to make the ship seaworthy.
One has l i t t le  doubts th a t Lo rd  S om erve ll's  o v e rr id in g  
o b lig a t io n 27 was in tended to p re ven t the ca rrie r fro m  using 
A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 as a means of escaping from  l ia b il i ty  in  the 
c ircum stance w here  unseaw orth iness is on ly  a cause of loss 
opera ting together w ith  an excepted cause w h ich  fa lls  w ith in  
A rtic le  IV , ru le  2.
In  the M axim e Footw ear28 itse lf, f ire  and unseaw orth iness 
were the concurrent causes of loss, w ith  the fo rm er acting as the 
im m edia te cause. Lord Somervell's ru le  w ould not have been so 
severely critic ised and so grave ly m isunderstood i f  he had added 
to i t  a note on causation, one s im ila r to Lord W righ t's  "a" cause 
th e o ry 29 on the significance of unseaworth iness as a cause of 
loss. Such an elaboration w ould sure ly c la r ify  his in te n tio n  w h ich  
basically was to preven t a ca rrie r from  seeking refuge in  A rtic le  
IV , ru le  2 w here unseaworthiness is ev iden t as one of the tw o  or 
more causes of loss. And i t  w ou ld  bring  home more c lea rly  the
26 See for example the Smith Hogg [1940] A.C. 997, and Grill V. The  
General Iron Screw Collier Co. (1866) L.R 1 C.P 600.
27 In the Maxime Footwear [19 591 2 Lloyd’s Rep. IQS.
28 [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep 105.
29 In the Smith Hoee f 19401 A.C 997.
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p o in t th a t i f  A r t ic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 is n o t fu l f i l le d  and 
unseaworthiness acts as a cause of loss, none of the im m un ities  
in  A rtic le  IV  can be sought. I f  unseaworth iness was the sole 
cause of loss, there w ould have been no need fo r him  to comment 
the w ay he did as none of the causes under A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (a) 
to (q) would be applicable.
In  an earlie r P rivy  Council decision of Corporation of the Royal 
Exchange Assurance & others V. K ingslev Navigation Co.. L td ..30. 
w ith  facts  s im ila r to the M ax im e  F o o tw e a r.31 the same 
approach was adopted by the Board. The ca rrie r was not g iven 
the pro tection of A rtic le  IV, ru le  2 (b) even though the cargo of 
lim e was b u rn t as a resu lt of a w a te r leakage w h ich  came in to  
contact w ith  i t  and generated heat. Both parties concurred th a t 
the vesse l was u n se a w o rth y . The ca rg o -o w n e rs  p leaded 
unseaworthiness and the carriers, f ire  as the cause of loss.
The Board a rrived at the f irm  conclusion tha t the loss:32
"...is a loss n a tu ra lly  and d ire c tly  a ttr ib u ta b le  to 
the unseaworthiness of the ship, and is no t a loss 
arising from  fire  w ith in  the protection of S.7."
As the carrie rs could not show tha t they had exercised due 
diligence to make the holds safe fo r the carriage of lim e, they  
were held responsible fo r the loss.
In  a d ictum , the Board in tim a te d  tha t the onus was on the 
carriers to show tha t the loss did arise from  the fire . Though the
30 [19231 A.C. 235.
31 [1959] 2 Lloyds Rep. 105.
32 [1923] A.C. 235 at p. 244.
147
cargo was in  fact damaged by fire , unseaworthiness was held by 
the Board to be the proxim ate cause of loss and this deprived the 
carrie r of the im m u n ity  under A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (b).
Unseaworthiness opera ting side by side w ith  a cause w h ich  
fa lls  w ith in  the protection of A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (a) to (q) has often 
occasioned em barrassm ent to judges. On one hand, the ca rrie r is 
exem pted fro m  lia b il i ty  by one of the provis ions of A rtic le  IV , 
ru le  2, and on the other, he is not, on account of his fa ilu re  to 
exercise due diligence to make the ship seaw orthy under A rtic le  
I I I ,  ru le  1 read w ith  A rtic le  IV , ru le  1. To preven t a ca rrie r from  
escaping scot-free in  such a s itua tion , the English Courts have 
utilised Lord W right's "a" cause theory of causation.
In  the United States, the D istrict judge in  Lockett Co. V. Cunard 
S.S. Co..33 applied a s im ila r ru le  to the "a" cause doctrine  of 
causation. I t  was held that:
"...such u n s e a w o rth in e s s  w as, at le a s t, a 
con tribu ting  cause, and there fore  the exception did 
no t exonerate the respondents fro m  one of the 
perils  to w h ich  th e ir negligence, or th a t o f th e ir
servants, con tribu ted."34
In  the Maxime Footwear.35 as i t  has been pointed out earlie r, 
i t  was reasonable and proper to make the shipowner prove tha t 
he had complied w ith  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 as unseaworthiness as a 
cause of loss was in  dispute. In  cases w here unseaworthiness is 
not specifica lly pleaded or proved, it  would seem to ta lly  pointless
33 (1927) 28 Ll.L.Rep. 181.
34 ibid, at p. 183.
33 [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 105.
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to compel the carrie r to take the f ir s t  step in  adducing evidence 
on seaworthiness. Unseaworthiness may not exist, and even i f  i t  
did, i t  may have nothing to do w ith  the loss.
In  M in is te r of Food V. Reardon Sm ith Line. L td ..36 the vessel 
was found to be unseaw orthy as cement was used to seal the 
scupper pipes instead of bu rlap , the standard m ate ria l. The 
carrie rs w ere also found to have fa iled  to exercise due diligence 
to make the ship seaworthy in  this regard. The Um pire, however, 
found tha t the damage w ould have occurred in  any case even i f  
the pipes were covered w ith  burlap. He made an express find in g  
of negligence, one amounting to an ’’act, neglect or de fau lt" w ith in  
the meaning of A rtic le  IV , ru le 2 (a), as the cause of loss.
As the re  was no evidence w h e th e r unseaw orth iness had 
anyth ing  to do w ith  the damage at all, the court exem pted the 
carrie r from  respons ib ility  by reason of A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (a). In  
th is case Me Nair.J stated that.*37
"...the second sentence in  A rtic le  IV , ru le  1, strong ly 
supports the submission made...that no onus as to 
seaworth iness is cast on the sh ipow ner, except 
after proof has been given by the other p a rty  tha t 
the damage has resulted from  unseaworthiness."
The case of W a lk e r V. Dover N a v ig a t io n s fa lls  w ith in  the 
same groove. The vessel was overloaded at the commencement of 
the voyage. But by reason of consum ption of bunkers and stores
36 [19511 2 Lloyd's Rep. 265.
37 Ibid, at p. 272.
38 (1950) 83 Ll.L.Rep. 84.
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during  the course of her voyage, she regained her s ta b ility  and 
at the tim e of loss was not below her marks. The cargo-owners 
p leaded  th a t  the  ve sse l fo u n d e d  b y  reason  o f he r 
unseaworthiness in  th a t she was overloaded w hen she le ft port. 
The defendants denied th is w ith  the submission th a t at the tim e 
of loss she was no longer unseaw orthy and unseaw orth iness 
could not possibly be responsible fo r the damage.
Lynskey.J. awarded judgm ent in  favo u r of the carrie rs  w ho 
w ere no t even asked to prove the exercise of due diligence. He 
declared that:39
"Even i f  i t  (unseaworthiness) amounted to a breach 
of contract, i t  was not one of those m atters w h ich  
was a cause of th is  p a rticu la r loss, or such as to 
p reven t the exception of perils  of the sea apply ing 
in favour of the carrier."
The above a u th o r it ie s  do il lu s tra te  the im p o rta n ce  of 
causation in  a contract of carriage. As under the Common Law 
unseaworthiness, as a basis of lia b ility , has to be shown to have 
caused the loss. This requ irem ent of a causal connection between 
unseaworthiness and the damage, stems from  the character of 
the unde rtak ing  of seaworthiness as a con tractua l te rm . In  a 
con trac t o f a ffre ig h tm e n t, the w a rra n ty  is no t a co n d itio n  
precedent a breach of w h ich  w ou ld  a ttrac t legal re sp o n s ib ility . 
Its  cou n te r-p a rt in  M arine insurance, in  contrast, is a cond ition  
precedent a breach of i t  alone is s u ffic ie n t to discharge the 
insurer from  lia b ility .
39 ibid at p. 90.
150
I I -  Under the Hamburg Rules:
We have a lready seen tha t the Hague Rules dealt specifica lly  
w ith  the question of the burden of proof in  on ly  a few  lim ite d  
s itua tions, w ith  the re s u lt th a t the courts have fre q u e n t ly  
reached conflic ting conclusions in  in te rp re ting  th e ir provisions on 
th is  issue. Depending on the s itua tion , the bu rden  of p roo f is 
sometimes placed on the carrie r, sometimes on the sh ipper and 
sometimes on a com bination of the two. Thus, the a llocation of 
the burden is subject to considerable uncerta inty.
However, the general ru le  appears to be tha t, the sh ipper 
must f ir s t  make out a prim a facie case by proving d e live ry  of the 
cargo to the ca rrie r in  good condition and receipt in  bad order, or 
non-rece ip t. This done, the burden passes to the ca rrie r. Now 
suppose the ca rrie r proves tha t the damage resu lted  fro m  an 
exception under A rtic le  IV , ru le  2. In  tha t event the burden shifts 
back to the sh ipper to prove, fo r  example, th a t fa u lt  o f the 
ca rrie r contribu ted to, or was the real cause of the loss.4°
I t  should be noted tha t the above ru le  has been critic ized  on 
the fo llow ing grounds:41
First, the cited ru le  is common bu t i t  is not un iversa l. Some 
cases and ju risd ic tions take a d iffe re n t approach or the m atter is 
unsettled, and the resu lt may v a ry  depending on the p a rticu la r 
exception re lie d  on. For exam ple, i f  the c a rr ie r  seeks the 
pro tection of the la ten t defects exception he m ust f i r s t  establish
See Wilson, J.F., "Basic carrier liability and the right of limitation", 
published in the Hamburg Rules on the carriage of the goods bv sea, edited 
by S. Mankabady, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1978, p. 137 at p. 141.
4 * See Hellawell, R., "Allocation of risk between cargo owner and 
carrier", (1979) 27 A.l.C.L. 357 at p. 361.
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tha t such defects were not discoverable by due diligence.42
Second, the burden is v e ry  lik e ly  to fa ll on the sh ipper to 
prove something tha t is pecu lia rly  w ith in  the know ledge of the 
carrie r, i.e: w ha t did the ca rrie r do, or fa il to do, w h ile  at sea or 
at a d is tan t port. In  most of the cases, shippers have a d if f ic u lt  
tim e securing evidence to meet the burden of proof.
Therefore, it  was suggested that, i t  w i l l  be reasonable to place 
the bu rden  on the p a rty  most l ik e ly  to be able to produce 
evidence on the m atter.43
The H am burg Rules seek to rem ove th is  con fus ion  by  
presum ing fa u lt  in  a ll cases of loss or damage to cargo and so 
imposing a un ifo rm  burden of proof on the carrier.
The Ham burg Rules' fo rm u la tio n , there fore , places upon the 
ca rrie r the in it ia l burden of proving his freedom  from  fa u lt fo r 
any loss.44 As i t  has been noted earlier, th is p rovis ion is ju s tified  
on the ground of the d e s ira b ility  of placing the burden of proof 
on the p a rty  most lik e ly  to have know ledge of the facts. The 
basic provis ion is in  A rtic le  5, ru le 1:
"The ca rrie r is liab le fo r loss resu lting  from  loss of 
or damage to the goods, as w e ll as from  delay in  
de live ry , i f  the occurrence w h ich  caused the loss, 
damage or delay took place w h ile  the goods w ere 
in  his charge as defined in  A rtic le  4, unless the 
ca rrie r proves tha t he, his servants or agents took 
all measures tha t could reasonably be req u ired  to 
avoid the occurrence and its consequences."
42 See Wilson, op.cit.. at p. 141.
43 See Hellawell, op.cit.. at p. 362.
44 See Annex I I  of the Hamburg Rules.
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I t  is im p o rtan t here to make i t  clear tha t ru le  1 of A rtic le  5 
contains tw o stages fo r the c a rr ie r ’s lia b ility . The f ir s t  stage is to 
prove tha t the "occurrence” w h ich  caused the damage took place 
w h ile  the goods were in  the ca rrie r's  hand. I f  i t  did, then the 
second stage w i l l  come in to  play. In  th is  stage i t  is allowed fo r 
the c a rr ie r  to prove th a t he took a ll measures th a t could 
rea son ab ly  be re q u ire d  to avo id  the occurrence and its
consequences."15
As to the f ir s t  stage, tw o main questions are to be discussed. 
F irst, w ha t is an "occurrence"? Second, on whom  lies the burden 
of proof?
W hat is an "occurrence"? I t  is to be noted th a t th is  is 
som ething o ther than the fac t th a t the goods have sustained 
damage or th a t the y  have become lost w h ile  in  the c a rr ie r s 
charge. The occurrence is w ha teve r caused this. M oreover, the 
occurrence need not be of an ex tra o rd ina ry  nature or arise fro m  
irre s is tib le  force. A ll tha t is requ ired  is tha t i t  happens w h ile  the 
carrie r is in  charge of the goods.46
To illu s tra te  th is point, we can take the example w here  the 
shipow ner is due to ca rry  a liq u id  cargo and in  p repa ra tion  fo r 
th is he causes the tanks of his vessel to be cleaned. However, the 
cleaning is bad ly  or in s u ffic ie n tly  done. He then takes d e live ry . 
The cargo is pu t in to  the d ir ty  tank and as a re su lt i t  become
4 5 See Diamond, A., "A legal analysis of the Hamburg Rules" (part I), 
published in the Hamburg Rules. A one-day seminar organised by Lloyd's 
of London Press Ltd, September 28, 1978, p. 9.
46 See Mankabady, S., "Comments on the Hamburg Rules", published in 
the Hamburg Rules on the carriage of the goods bv sea, edited by S. 
Mankabady, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1978, p. 27 at p. 55.
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contam inated. Now the question to be asked in  th is  s itua tion  is: 
W hat was the occurrence w h ich caused the loss?
The im m edia te  answer w i l l  ce rta in ly  be: "Failing p ro p e rly  to 
clean the tank". But i t  should be noted that, in  th is  example, the 
occurrence w h ich  is "the fa ilu re  to clean the tank", took place 
before the goods came in to  the sh ipow ner’s charge, and i f  th is  
answer w ere to be given, then the shipow ner w ould  escape a ll 
lia b ility .  One can there fore  expect tha t a court w i l l  be forced to 
give a stra ined in te rp re ta tio n  to A rtic le  5, ru le  1 in  such a case 
and to say tha t the occurrence was not the fa ilu re  to clean the 
tank bu t the pu tting  of the cargo in to  a d ir ty  one.
The second question on th is pa rt of the ru le  is: Is i t  fo r the 
shipow ner to prove tha t the re levan t "occurrence" did no t occur 
w h ile  the goods were in  his charge or must cargo-ow ner prove 
tha t i t  did?
The answer to th is question does not seem to be a m atte r of 
f ir s t  im portance. To illu s tra te  this, reference can be made to the 
w ords of Lord Reid in  Me W illiam s V. A ro l.^7 w here he stated 
tha t:
"...in the end, w hen a ll the evidence has been 
b ro u g h t out, i t  ra re ly  m atte rs  w ere  the onus 
o r ig in a lly  lay, the question  is w h ich  w a y  the 
balance of p ro ba b ility  has come to rest."
H ow ever, in  some cases w here  goods have a rr iv e d  in  a 
damaged co n d ition  and the cause of the damage is e ith e r
47 [1962] 1 W.L.R. 295 at p. 307.
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unknow n or is a m atter of hot debate between parties, i t  is not 
easy fo r the ca rrie r, p a rticu la rly  in  the la tte r s ituation, to prove 
tha t the re levan t "occurrence" did not occur w h ile  the goods were 
in  his charge. For example, w ere fresh  f r u i t  or vegetable have 
a rr iv e d  in  a m ou ldy cond ition . The consignee says th a t the 
occurrence w h ich  caused th is was tha t the goods w ere  bad ly  
stowed or im p ro p e rly  ven tila ted , tha t is to say th a t the ship was 
unseaw orthy in  the sense of uncargow orthy fo r  the reception, 
carriage and preserva tion  o f the goods. The sh ipow ner re to rts  
th a t the on ly  re leva n t occurrence was the in h e re n t vice of the 
goods. Is i t  fo r  cargo to prove im p ro p e r stowage or fo r  the 
shipowner to prove inheren t vice?
Annex I I  of the Hamburg Rules w h ich  contains the "Common 
Understanding" makes this po in t v e ry  clear. I t  states:
" I t  is the common understanding tha t the lia b il i ty  
of the ca rrie r under th is  Convention is based on 
the princ ip le  of presumed fa u lt or neglect..."
But though this Annex points in  favour of the solution tha t the 
burden usually rests on the carrier, i t  does not re a lly  answer the 
question "w hat is to give rise to the p resum ption  of fa u lt  or 
neglect".48
Undoubtedly, the in te n t of the dra ftsm en of the Convention is 
th a t the cargo-owner w ould make out a p rim a facie case against 
the ca rrie r by showing tha t the goods were not tu rned  out in  as 
good condition as when they were de livered to the custody of the 
ca rrie r. A ccord ing ly , the courts w ou ld  p ro ba b ly  decide th a t
48 See Diamond, op.cit.. at p. 10.
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w here a clean b ill of lading has been issued, then d e live ry  in  a 
damaged cond ition  is su ffic ient, in  itse lf, to raise a presum ption 
th a t the re leva n t occurrence occurred w h ile  the goods were in  
the c a rr ie r ’s charge. Once the cargo-owner had made out a prim a 
facie case, i t  w ou ld , then be the shipowner's task to re b u t th is  
presum ption.
We come, then, to the second stage of A rtic le  5, ru le  1 w here 
the ca rrie r is req u ired  to prove tha t the cause of the loss or 
damage was not an act of negligence fo r w h ich he is responsible. 
A ccord ing ly, the burden of proof w h ich  is against the ca rrie r, 
shall be reversed i f  the ca rrie r proves tha t he, his servants or 
agents took a ll measures th a t could reasonably be req u ired  to 
avoid the occurrence and its consequences. In  o ther w ords, the 
ca rrie r can escape lia b il i ty  i f  he proves tha t n e ith e r he nor his 
servants or agents caused the loss or damage by th e ir  fa u lt or 
neglect.49
As under the Hamburg Rules there is no basic req u irem en t of 
due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel, the s itua tion  seems 
to be more complicated. I f  the ship is unseaworthy and cargo loss 
or damage results, the ca rrie r w ould presum ably be liab le  as he 
w ould not be able to prove tha t "he...took all measures tha t could 
reasonably be requ ired  to avoid the occurrence."
Assuming, how ever, tha t seaworthiness is no t an issue, bu t 
there is a loss fo llow ing  negligent navigation. In it ia lly , the ca rrie r 
w i l l  be liab le  unless he discharges his burden of p roo f to show
49 See Cleton, R., "The special features arising from the Hamburg 
Diplomatic Conference", published in the Hamburg Rules. A one-day  
seminar organised by Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, September 28, 1978, p. 5.
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tha t he took all reasonable measures to avoid the occurrence. To 
discharge his burden of proof, the ca rrie r, of course, w i l l  have 
m any argum ents at his disposal, technica l deta ils of w ea the r 
conditions, nav iga tiona l problem s fro m  other ships, and o ther 
aspects re la tive  to sea perils w h ich  prevented the effectiveness 
of his "reasonable measures" being successful.
I t  is n o tew o rth y  that, in  respect of the burden of proof, the 
d ra fte rs  of the Hamburg Rules chose a method of exoneration 
s im ila r to the ca tcha ll exception under the Hague R u l e s , 5 0  
A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (q).51 The carrie r, there fore  carries the in it ia l 
burden of p rov ing  n o n -fa u lt ra th e r than a ff irm a tiv e ly  p rov ing  
the  c ircum stances  of an excep tion ; unde r the l ia b i l i t y  
presum ption of the new Rules the shipper need adduce no actual 
evidence of carrie r negligence.
W ith  respect to seaworth iness, i t  is w e ll estab lished th a t 
under the Hague Rules, the carrie r could respond to the shipper's 
p rim a  facie case e ith e r by p rov ing  an excepted cause under 
A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 or by dem onstrating due diligence in  a ttem pting 
to avoid the loss or damage. I f  the ca rrie r, successfully, could 
make out an exception, the burden of proof then sh ifted to the 
p la in t if f  shipper to establish unseaworthiness or the supervening 
negligence of the ca rrie r. But under the Ham burg Rules, the 
ca rrie r must meet the shipper's p rim a  facie case w ith o u t the 
b e n e fit of the sh ipper's  n a rro w in g  of the issues. Thus the 
inco rp o ra tion  of the Hague Rules "q" clause defence no t o n ly  
constricts the opportun ities fo r exem ption bu t also m odifies the
5 0 See Report of the Working Group on International Legislation on 
Shipping (fourth session), (1973) 4 Y.B UNCITRAL, at 153.
51 See Article IV, rule 2 (q) of the Hague Rules.
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adduction of evidence.
I t  is con ven ien t to note here th a t the H am burg Rules' 
m odifica tion of the burden of proof does not change the u ltim ate  
burden of proof, as the delegates of one country  suggested,52 bu t 
ra the r shifts the burden of expla in ing the cause of the loss.
Accord ingly, under the Hague Rules, the shipper w i l l  lose his 
case i f  he cannot show the specific negligence of a ca rrie r who 
has d raw n  h im se lf w ith in  an exception. W hereas, under the 
Hamburg Rules, the ca rrie r bears the risk  of loss fo llow ing  from  
his own negligence, and in  cases w here he w i l l  no t be able to 
meet the burden of proof, such as in  unexplained losses, he w i l l  
be liab le even w ith o u t fa u lt.53 The Hamburg Rules c learly  in tend 
to place financ ia l resp on s ib ility  fo r an unexplained loss upon the 
carrier.
The burden of p roo f re q u ir in g  the ca rrie r to come fo rw a rd  
w ith  an exp lana tion  of the loss was designed by  Professor 
H e lla w e ll. He recom m ended th is  scheme fo r  tw o  p o lic y  
r e a s o n s . 54 First, he suggested tha t the ca rrie r is the p a rty  more 
lik e ly  to have know ledge of the circumstances of the loss, and 
second, tha t the ca rrie r is the p a rty  more capable of achieving
52 The comments of the United Kingdom suggest that the Hamburg 
Rules effect a general reversal of the burden of proof from shipper to 
carrier. See Comments and proposals by Governments and International 
organizations on the draft Convention on the carriage of gooods by sea, 
(comments of the United Kingdom, para 9) U.N. Doc A/conf. 8 9 /7 .  Add 1. 
(1977).
53 See Hellawell, op.cit.. at p. 363, see also Schollenberger, D.K., "Risk of 
loss in shipping under the Hamburg Rules." 10 Den.T.I.L.P. 568 at p. 575.
54 see Hellawell, op.cit.. at pp. 362-364, see also (1972) 3 Y.B. UNCITRAL 
at 302.
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an op tim a l standard of care.
Under H e lia w e li’s reasoning, and according to the "Common 
Understanding", one can there fore  conclude that, the d ra fte rs  of 
the Convention in tended th a t the ca rrie r exp la in  the loss and 
prove his freedom  from  fault.55
But w hen we re fe r to the language of A rtic le  5, ru le  1, i t  may 
a llow  some d ilu tion  of tha t result, because the Rules may requ ire  
the shipper to con tribu te  to the adduction of causation. He may 
have to prove th a t the in c id e n t causing the loss or damage 
occurred w h ile  the goods were in  the charge of the ca rrie r. In  
order to prove the tim e of the incident, the shipper may have to 
a ttem p t to id e n tify  the cause of the loss itse lf. This req u irem en t 
surpasses the prim a facie test contem plated by the ru le  w h ich  
requ ires on ly de live ry  in  good condition and re tu rn  in  damaged 
condition as the sh ipper’s sole burden of proof.56
1- B u rd e n  o f P ro o f in  th e  Case o f Loss or Damage 
Caused b v  F ire :
Generally, as i t  has been seen, i t  is fo r the ca rrie r to prove 
th a t he took a ll reasonable care of the goods. This seems 
undoub ted ly  correct i f  the re levan t "occurrence" occurred w h ile  
the goods w ere in  his charge. For a ll the re le va n t evidence is 
lik e ly  to be in  the ca rr ie r ’s control.
However, A rtic le  5, ru le  4, enunciates an exceptiona l case 
where the burden of proof has been m odified so as to produce a
55 See Annex I I  of the Hamburg Rules.
5 6 See Report of the Working Group on International Legislation on 
Shipping (fourth session), (1973) 4 Y.B. UNCITRAL, at 150-131.
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d iffe re n t result. A rtic le  5, rule 4, w h ich deals w ith  loss caused by 
fire , provides:
"(a) The carrie r is liable
(i) fo r  loss of or damage to the goods or delay in  
d e live ry  caused by fire , i f  the c la im ant proves tha t 
the f ire  arose from  fa u lt or neglect on the pa rt of 
the carrier, his servants or agents;
( ii)  fo r  such loss, damage or de lay in  d e liv e ry  
w h ich  proved by the c la im an t to have resu lted  
fro m  the fa u lt  or neg lect of the c a rr ie r, his 
servants or agents, in  tak ing  a ll measures th a t 
could reasonably be requ ired  to pu t ou t the f ire  
and avoid or m itigate its consequences."
Reading these tw o sections together, i t  appears tha t i f  a f ire  
arose w ith o u t the fa u lt of the ca rrie r, he w ou ld  no t be liab le  
unless he fa iled  to take a ll measures th a t could reasonably be 
requ ired  to put out the fire . Conversely, i f  the fire  arose fro m  the 
fa u lt  or neglect of the carrie r, his servants or agents, l ia b il i ty  
w ould fo llow .
From the w ord ing of A rtic le  5, ru le  4, it  is there fore  clear that, 
in  the case of loss or damage caused by fire , the burden of proof 
is sh ifted away from  the carrier, presum ably fo r the reason th a t 
i t  is d iff ic u lt to establish the precise o rig in  of a f ire  at sea.57 This 
provision, w h ich  is in favour of the carrier, is supported on the 
ground th a t most fire s  on ships are caused by  spontaneous 
com bustion  o r ig in a tin g  in  the c a r g o , 58 and thus i t  w i l l  be
57 gee Wilson, op.cit.. at p. 142.
58 See Hellawell, op.cit.. at p. 363, see also Wilson, J.F., Carriage of goods 
by sea. London, Pitman Publishing, 1988, p. 205.
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reasonable to place the burden of proving fa u lt or neglect of the 
carrie r, his servants or agents, on the claimant.
Accord ingly, under A rtic le  5, ru le  4 of the Ham burg R u l e s , 59 
the ca rrie r is liab le  fo r loss or damage caused by  fire , i f  the 
cargo-ow ner proves e ith e r th a t the f ire  arose fro m  fa u lt  or 
neglect on the pa rt of the carrier, his servants or agents, or from  
th e ir  fa u lt  or neglect in  no t tak ing  a ll measures th a t could 
reasonably be requ ired  to pu t out the fire  and avoid or m itigate 
its consequences.60 In  o ther words, carrie r's  l ia b il i ty  may arise 
bo th  fro m  the actua l causation o f the f ire  and fro m  the 
inadequacy of the measures used to extinguish it .61
From the la tte r provision, one can there fore  conclude that, by 
im posing lia b ility  upon the carrie r fo r measures used to pu t out 
the f ire , the d ra fte rs  o f the Convention hoped to avoid the 
poss ib ility  tha t carriers m ere ly could com ply m echanically w ith  
m ateria ls  requ irem en ts , such as f ire  f ig h tin g  equ ipm ent, and 
thus fa il to select and tra in  the crew p rope rly , a re sp o n s ib ility  
s ingu la rly  under the control of the carrier.
However, i t  is no tew orthy  tha t the f ire  clause in  the Hamburg 
Rules has been a source of critic ism  since i t  places the burden on 
the shipper to prove the fa u lt of the carrie r. This burden w ould  
be d iff ic u lt  fo r a shipper to sustain since he n o rm a lly  w ou ld  not
59 w ith regard to rule 4 of Article 5 the Developing Countries argued 
that it was unjust to put the entire burden of proof on the claimant. See 
Cleton, op.cit.. at p. 6.
60 See Wilson. "Basic carrier liab ility  and the right of lim itation", 
op.cit.. at p. 142.
6 * I t  must be noted that damage through fire includes damage by fire  
and also by water used to put out the fire.
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be in  a position  to w itness the negligence at the tim e  of its  
occurrence, and servants of the carrie r w ould  be adversaria l and 
probably of lit t le  help in  determ in ing the cause of the loss.
Accordingly, i t  seems to be unjust to make the shipow ner w in  
the action s im p ly  because the cargo-owner m ight be unable to 
present the necessary evidence o f negligence, in  spite of the 
c a rr ie r ’s fa ilu re  to give detailed evidence as to the cause of the 
outbreak of the fire .
But i t  can be said that, th is  change of the bu rden  of proof 
fro m  c a rr ie r  to sh ipper, was o ffe re d  to sh ipo w ners  as a 
concession in exchange fo r the ir non-exem ption from  lia b il i ty  fo r 
negligent navigation.62 In  this connection H ellawell stated:6^
"...basically th is  p ro v is ion  is p a rt of a p o litic a l 
compromise between carrie r and cargo interests. I t  
was p re p a re d  in  the  f in a l days o f h a rd  
bargaining..."
2 - P a rt ia l L ia b i l i t y  o f the  C a rr ie r :
F ina lly, i t  must be mentioned tha t some problem s could arise 
w here  fa u lt  of the ca rr ie r com bined w ith  another cause to 
produce loss or damage.
The question w hich must be asked in  th is connection is: How is 
l ia b il i ty  to be dealt w ith  i f  there are tw o causes of the loss or 
damage, negligence by the carrie r and another cause beyond the 
carrier's control?
I t  has already been mentioned that, under the Hague Rules, i f
the fa u lt  of the ca rrie r com bined w ith  an A rtic le  IV , ru le  2
62 See Diamond, op.cit.. at p. 12.
63 See Hellawell, op.cit.. at p. 363.
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exception  to cause damage to the cargo, fo r  exam ple, one 
co n s titu tin g  in it ia l unseaw orth iness caused by  a fa ilu re  to 
exercise due diligence, and the o ther consisting of neg ligen t 
nav iga tion , the ca rrie r is 100 per cent liab le  fo r  the loss or 
damage fo r breach of his du ty  to exercise due diligence, and the 
exception w il l  not exonerate the ca rrie r.64
However, there is a d iffe re n t s itua tion  w here  there  are not 
tw o  co-operating causes of the whole loss or damage, bu t some 
cargo is damaged by e.g. unseaw orth iness fo r  w h ich  the 
sh ipow ner is liab le  under the Hague Rules, and o ther damage 
caused by an excepted p e ril e.g. a la ten t defect in  the ship. Here 
the ca rrie r w i l l  be liab le fo r tha t p ropo rtion  of the loss w h ich  is 
a ttr ib u ta b le  to his fau lt, p rov ided tha t the am ount of th is  loss 
can be id e n tifie d .65
Therefore, the question w h ich  arises here is, w he the r the new 
Hamburg Rules make any difference to e ither of these concepts? 
A rtic le  5. ru le 7 of the Hamburg Rules provides:
64 Per Lord W right in Smith Hogg & Co.. L td . V. Black Sea & Baltic 
General Insurance Co.. L td . [1940] A.C. 997 at p. 1005. "...if her unfitness 
becomes a real cause of loss or damage to the cargo, the shipowner is 
responsible, although other causes from whose effect he is excused either 
at Common Law or express contract have contributed to cause the loss."
6 5 Per Viscount Sumner in Gosse M illard Ltd . V. Canadian Government 
Merchant Marine L td . [1929] A.C. 223 at p. 241. "...it is incumbent on the 
shipowner, on whom the whole burden of proving this defence falls, to 
show how much damage was done in the subsequent operations, because it 
is only in respect of them that he can claim protection. This he has failed to 
do, and in consequence he has failed to show to what extent in money his 
prima facie liability for the whole damage ought to be reduced."
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"W here fa u lt or neglect on the part of the carrie r, 
his servants or agents com bines w ith  another 
cause to produce loss, damage or delay in  de live ry  
the ca rrie r is liab le on ly to the extent tha t the loss,
damage or delay in  de live ry  is a ttribu tab le  to such
fa u lt  or neglect, p rov ided tha t the ca rrie r proves 
the am ount o f the loss, damage or de lay  in  
d e live ry  not a ttribu tab le  thereto."
From th is provision, i t  is clear that, w here the carrie r's  fa u lt 
or negligence concurs w ith  another cause to produce loss or 
damage, the carrie r is liab le  on ly  fo r th a t po rtion  of the loss or 
damage a ttr ib u ta b le  to his fa u lt or negligence, p rov ided  he can 
es ta b lish  the p ro p o rtio n  of the loss a ttr ib u ta b le  to o th e r 
fa c to rs .66 In  o ther words, the onus being placed upon h im  to 
p rove  the e x te n t w h ich  is no t a ttr ib u ta b le  to  h is fa u lt .  
A ccord ing ly, the ca rrie r w i l l  be liab le  fo r the en tire  loss i f  he 
fa iled  to establish tha t proportion.
Perhaps the effects of th is provis ion can be seen most c learly  
in  the case of a collis ion between the carrie r's  ship and another 
ship w here  both are equa lly  to blame. Assuming, here tha t, i f
the carry ing  ship is held 20 per cent to blame, the ca rrie r w i l l
presum ably be liab le fo r on ly 20 per cent of any resu ltan t cargo 
damage, and w i l l  expect the ca rg o -o w n er to reco ve r the 
rem ain ing 80 per cent from  the other vessel.
66 See W illiams, B.K., "The consequences of the Hamburg Rules on 
insurance", published in the Hamburg Rules on the carriage of the goods 
fry ..sea, edited by S. Mankabady, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1978, p. 251 at p. 256.
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Se ct ion  two:  The C a r r i e r ’s I m m u n i t i e s  f r o m
Unse aw orth ines s .
I -  Under the Hague Rules:
A rtic le  IV  of the Hague Rules set fo r th  certa in  defences upon 
w h ich  the c a rr ie r is e n tit le d  to re ly  p ro v id e d  th a t he has 
exercised due diligence to make the ship seaw orthy  and has 
p ro pe rly  cared fo r the cargo during its carriage. I t  is outside the 
scope of th is w o rk  to examine in  deta il these exceptions.
As our study is m ain ly based on the seaworthiness du ty, i t  is 
su ffic ien t here to deal w ith  the most im p o rta n t exceptions w h ich  
are re la ted to th is  d u ty  (i.e: seaworthiness). These im m u n itie s  
are:
1) Exception of unseaworthiness contained in  A rtic le  IV , ru le  1.
2) Exception of la ten t defects contained in A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 
(p).
3) The catch-all exception contained in  A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (q).
However, the im p o rta n t question w h ich  is lik e ly  to appear
here is: Can a carrie r s till re ly  on these defences i f  he has fa iled  
to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship?
This p o in t was c la r ifie d  in  the M axim e F o o tw e a r67 case 
w h e re  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 was described as an "o v e r r id in g  
ob liga tion ”.
Therefore, in  order to com prehend the app lica tion  of these 
im m u n itie s  in  fa vo u r of the ca rrie r, i t  w ou ld  be appropria te  to 
analyse f irs t  the controversia l issue of w hether A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1
67 [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 105.
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is an ove rrid ing  ob ligation before the above cited exceptions are 
discussed.
1- Is A r t ic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 an O v e rr id in g  O b liga tion?
In  M axim e Footw ear Co.. L td . V. C anadian G o ve rn m e n t 
M erchant Marine. L td ..68 Lord Somervell said:69
"A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 is an ove rrid ing  obligation. I f  it  
is no t fu lf i l le d  and the n o n -fu lf ilm e n t causes the 
damage, the im m u n itie s  of A rtic le  IV  cannot be 
re lied  on..."
In  analysing Lord Somervell's statement, one can notice tha t i t  
contains tw o limbs:
1) I f  the ca rrie r did no t exercise due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy, and
2) That w a n t of due diligence to make the ship seaw orthy has 
caused the loss or damage,
the carrie r is liable. He cannot re ly  on:
a) A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 as he has fa ile d  to com p ly  w ith  the
condition fo r exemption under it, nor
b) A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 because the loss or damage did not arise 
or resu lt from  any of the causes under (a) to (q).
This is the on ly circumstance in  w h ich  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 is an
"overrid ing  obligation" and when the im m unities under A rtic le  IV  
cannot be relied on by the carrier.
To illu s tra te  th is  point, reference can be made to the case of
68 [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 105.
69 Ibid at p. 113.
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Ball (New Zealand). L td . V. Federal Steam Navigation Co., L td -70 
In  th is case pipes were allowed to freeze w h ils t they were f ille d  
w ith  w a te r when the vessel was at the port of loading. A fte r the 
ship set sail, the ice melted causing the pipes to bu rs t and flood 
the hold in  w h ich  the p la in t i f f ’s cargo was stowed. The act of 
leav ing  the pipes to freeze was an act of "N eglect...in  the 
management of the ship” under A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (a). I t  was also 
the act w h ich  rendered the vessel unseaworthy; the presence of 
frozen  pipes liab le  to fra c tu re  made the ho ld u n f it  fo r  the 
re ce p tio n  and carriage of the p la in t i f f ’s cargo. The cou rt, 
therefore, had tw o causes to w restle  w ith .
The Supreme Court of W elling ton showed a pro tective  in s tinc t 
tow ards the in te rests of the cargo-owners. Fair.J had to exp la in  
w h y  he held the carriers liab le  when th e ir defence fe ll l i te ra lly  
w ith in  the w o rd in g  of A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (a). To ju s t i fy  his 
preference fo r A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 (read w ith  A rtic le  IV , ru le  1) 
instead of A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (a) as the basis of his judgem ent, 
Fair.J resorted to the fo llow ing  reasoning: A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 was 
construed to be an o v e rr id in g  ob liga tion , breach o f w h ich  
prevented the carrie r from  re ly ing  on A rtic le  IV, ru le  2 (a).
To substantia te  th is  point, Fair.J d rew  an analogy w ith  the 
provisions of the Harter Act. He declared tha t:71
"To hold A rtic le  I I I  not so qua lified  by A rtic le  IV , 
ru le  2 (a) means tha t i t  corresponds in  meaning 
w ith  the prov is ion  of section 3 of the H arte r Act 
(18 93 )...that section makes the exem ption  fro m  
lia b ility  fo r fau lts  or errors in  navigation or in  the
70 [19501 N.Z.L.R 954.
71 Ibid at p. 964.
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management of the vessel depend on due diligence 
having been exercised to make i t  in  a ll respects 
seaworthy..."
In  th is  connection one can argue tha t, the d iffe re n ce  in  
w ord ing  between the Harter Act and the Hague Rules makes th is 
p ropos ition  d if f ic u lt  to support. As a cond ition  of exem ption, 
section 3 of the Harter Act requires tha t the owner shall exercise 
due diligence to make the vessel seaw orthy "in  a ll respects". A 
s tr ic t and lite ra l in te rp re ta tio n  was g iven to these th ree  w ords 
by the Am erican Court in  The Is is .72 I t  was there held that:
"the condition had to be met before the im m u n ity  
could be availed of, w he the r or not the actual loss 
or damage was causally connected in  any w a y  
w ith  the unseaworthiness defect le ft  uncorrected 
through a fa ilu re  to use due diligence."73
The words "in all respects" do not appear in  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 
of the Hague Rules.
A ccord ing  to a s tr ic t  and l i te ra l in te rp re ta t io n  o f Lo rd  
Somervell's comment, both the n o n -fu lf ilm e n t of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  
1 and unseaw orth iness as a cause of loss w o u ld  have to be 
proved before  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 can be considered as an 
ove rrid ing  obligation. In  the absence of one or the other, i t  is not 
an ove rrid ing  obligation and the im m un ities  of A rtic le  IV  can s till 
be invoked.
72 (1933) 290 U.S. 333.
73 Quoted from Gilmore, G. k  Black, C„ The l.aw of Adm iralty 2nd ed„ 
New York, The Foundation Press, Inc., 1975, p. 155.
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In  the fo llo w in g  va ria tio ns , A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 is no t an 
overrid ing  obligation fo r one of the requirem ents is not met:
a) A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 is not fu lf il le d  and unseaworth iness d id 
not cause the loss.
b )A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 has been fu lu f ille d  and unseaworthiness 
did not cause the loss.
In  both these circumstances, A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 is ir re le v a n t as 
the loss or damage did not arise or resu lt from  unseaworthiness. 
The ca rrie r can, therefore, plead A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 i f  he can show 
tha t the cause of loss fa lls  w ith in  one of the exceptions fro m  (a) 
to (q).
c) A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 has been fu lf i l le d  and unseaworth iness 
has caused the loss.
The ca rrie r in  th is case would have to re ly  on A rtic le  IV , ru le  
1 to exonerate h im se lf from  lia b il i ty  as i t  is specia lly enacted to 
protect h im  from  lia b ility  in  th is situation. I t  is unnecessary fo r 
the ca rrie r to re ly  on A rtic le  IV , ru le  274 as ru le  1 itse lf "a ffords 
a complete defence".7^
74 See Cranfield Brothers Ltd. V. Tatem Steam Navigation Co.. Ltd . (1939) 
64 Ll.L.Rep. 264, where leaky rivets allowed the entry of sea water into the 
hold and caused damage to the cargo of wheat. Inspection indicated that the 
vessel must have been unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage. 
The carriers were held not liable for the loss as they had exercised due 
diligence. Hilbery.J. at p. 271 stated that: "...this unseaworthiness is shown 
not to have been caused by the want of due diligence on the part of the 
carrier to make the ship seaworthy, that really answers the claim. I need 
not deal w ith  the question raised that the ingoing of the sea water into that 
hold was due to a latent defect w ithin the words of Article IV , rule 2 (p)...or 
whether it was due to perils of the sea..."
75 Per Branson.J in C,QLD_or.flcion Argentina de Productores de Carnes V. 
Roval Mail Lines. Ltd. (1939) 64 Ll.L.Rep. 188 at p. 192.
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The above s tud y  on the s ta tem ent of Lord  S om erve ll, is 
su ffic ien t in  itse lf to lead one to the conclusion th a t A rtic le  I I I ,  
ru le  1 is not a general ove rrid ing  ob ligation to be complied in  all 
s ituations before a carrie r can plead A rtic le  IV.
I t  is conven ient to note here that, i f  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 was 
in te n d e d  by  Lo rd  S om erve ll to be a gene ra l "o v e rr id in g  
ob ligation" to be applied in  a ll cases as suggested by Tetley,76 it  
w ou ld  have been adequate fo r the judge m ere ly to state th a t " if  
i t  is not fu lf il le d , the im m un ities  of A rtic le  IV  cannot be re lied  
on". The inse rtion  of the magical words "and the n o n -fu lf ilm e n t 
causes the damage" c learly  de lim it the am bit of th is ru le.
I t  is there fore  on ly  in  the case w here a breach of A rtic le  I I I ,  
ru le  1 is proved to have caused the loss or damage is the 
shipowner debarred from  re ly ing  on A rtic le  IV . A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 
m ere ly  spells out the ca rrie r's  ob liga tion  and the standard of 
conduct expected of h im  to make the ship seaw orthy, i.e, the 
exten t he has to go to make the vessel seaw orthy. I t  does not 
concern its e lf w ith  the legal consequences and e ffects  of a 
breach. The legal consequence regard ing seaworthiness is on ly  
made apparent w hen A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 is read w ith  A rtic le  IV , 
ru le  1.
2 - A r t ic le  IV . ru le  1 as a Defence to  A r t ic le  I I I ,  ru le  1:
In  the case of Leesh River Tea Co.. L td . V. B ritish  In d ia  Steam 
N avigation Co.. L td . (The Chvebassa).77 A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 was
76 See Tetley, W., Marine cargo claims. 2nd ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 
1978, pp. 153-170.
77 [1967] 2 Q.B. 250 C.A, hereafter reffered to as The Chvebassa.
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pleaded by the carriers as an o rd in a ry  exception of l ia b il i ty  fo r 
unseaworth iness w h ich  arose during  the course of a voyage. A 
storm  cover plate was stolen w h ils t the vessel was loading and 
discharging at an in te rm ed ia te  port. The rem ova l of the cover 
plate rendered the vessel unseaw orthy as i t  le ft  the vessel in  a 
condition in  w h ich  w a te r could enter the hold w ith  the ro lling  of 
the vessel. The absence of the cover plate could not reasonably 
have been detected by the ship's officers and crew.
A t the tr ia l,  the carrie rs  w ere found  no t to have fa ile d  to 
exercise due d iligence to make the ship sea w o rth y  at the 
beg inn ing  of the voyage at P ort Sudan w here  the in c id e n t 
occurred. The carrie rs  claimed tha t they  were e n title d  to re ly , 
in te r alia, on the im m u n ity  in  A rtic le  IV , ru le  1. The legal issue 
was w he the r A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 exempted them from  lia b il i ty  fo r 
unseaworthiness w h ich  arose during the course of a voyage.
The Court of Appeal was not im pressed w ith  th is  ground of 
the carrie r's  appeal, and i t  did not consider i t  in  any deta il. The 
plea was rejected on the ground tha t the exception in  A rtic le  IV , 
ru le  1 was confined to unseaworthiness arising before or at the 
beginn ing of the voyage. Salmon.L.J,78 held the v ie w  th a t the 
meaning w h ich  the ca rrie r had a ttr ib u te d  to A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 
was stra ined and an altogether im possible in te rp re ta tio n  to pu t 
to the A rtic le . The judges did not however go to the language of 
the ru le to determ ine its app licab ility .
Prim a facie, A rtic le  IV, ru le 1 does appear to contain a general 
exception of l ia b ility  fo r unseaworthiness as i t  makes no specific 
m e n tio n  of unseaw orth iness  e x is tin g  be fo re  and at the
78 Ibid, at p. 275.
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commencement of the voyage. Furthe r its opening w o rd s79 are 
alm ost id e n tica l to those found in  A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 w h ich  
w ith o u t doub t con ta in  genera l exceptions fro m  l ia b i l i ty  fo r 
specified causes. This seems to be the Am erican construction of 
A rtic le  IV , ru le  l 80 and of Carver81 who in  a footnote stated:
"For un like  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1, the due diligence to 
make the ship seaworthy is not here lim ite d  to due 
d iligence "be fore  and at the beg inn ing  of the 
voyage". The ca rrie r m ight otherw ise be liab le  fo r 
such loss under A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  2, bu t A rtic le  IV , 
ru le  2 (a) or (q), w ould  appear to exem pt h im  in 
such a case, and no purpose is served, th e re fo re /in  
om itting  these words from  A rtic le  IV, ru le 1."
According to th is in te rp re ta tio n  a ca rrie r can exem pt h im se lf 
from  lia b il i ty  fo r loss or damage resu lting  from  unseaworthiness 
(aris ing during the course of a voyage) i f  he can prove th a t he 
had exercised due diligence before and at the beginn ing of the 
voyage to make the ship seaworthy. This im plies tha t A rtic le  I I I ,  
ru le  1 is a general o ve rrid in g  ob liga tion  fo r exonera tion  fro m  
l ia b il i ty  fo r loss or damage caused by unseaworth iness w h ich  
arises during  the course of a voyage. The term s of A rtic le  I I I ,  
ru le  1 w ould have to be satisfied before the ca rrie r could re ly  on
79 Article IV , rule 1 provides: "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall 
be liable for the loss or damage arising or resulting from unseaworthiness 
unless..."
80 See Lockett Co. V. Cunard Steamship Co. (1927 ) 28 Ll.L.Rep. 181 
(U.S.A).
See Carver, T.G., Carriage bv sea. 13th ed. by Raoul Colinvaux, 
London, Stevens &. Sons, 1982, Vol. 1, p. 377.
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A rtic le  IV, ru le  1.
Such a scheme w ould  be ve ry  s im ila r to the Am erican Harter 
Act. The w ords "unless caused by the w a n t of due diligence..." 
p resum ably have been in te rp re ted  as a condition fo r exem ption 
of l ia b i l i t y  fo r  loss or damage caused b y  in te rv e n in g  
unseaworth iness, ra th e r than as a cond ition  fo r  exem ption  of 
l ia b il i ty  fo r loss or damage caused by unseaworth iness ev iden t 
"before and at the beginning of the voyage".
The question w h ich  arises in  th is connection is: I f  A rtic le  IV , 
ru le  1 is an exception to the carrier's  lia b ili ty  fo r loss or damage 
caused by unseaworthiness, w h ich  arises du ring  the course of a 
voyage, w h ich  A rtic le  is then the provis ion fo r exem ption fo r loss 
or damage caused by a breach of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 ?
A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 may be capable of the above construction, 
b u t i t  is also capable of another construction w h ich  seems to be 
more reasonable. A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le 1 is the only positive enactm ent 
in  respect of seaworthiness contained in  the Hague Rules. This 
ob liga tion is applicable on ly "before and at the beginning of the 
voyage". U nseaw orth iness  e x is tin g  at any o th e r t im e  is 
irre levan t, and of w hich the Rules are not concerned w ith .
The w o rd ing  of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 matches up w ith  th a t o f 
A rtic le  IV , ru le  1. The la tte r in  fact makes a special reference to 
A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 w ith  the w ords "...in accordance w ith  the 
p rov is ions  of paragraph 1 of A rtic le  I I I " .  This seems to be 
su ffic ien t to com plem ent the two A rtic les. A vessel need on ly  be 
seaw orthy "before and at the beginning of the voyage" to be "in 
accordance w ith  the provis ions of paragraph 1 of A rtic le  I I I " .  
The om ission of the words "before and at the beginn ing of the
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voyage" in  A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 is, therefore, w e ll compensated by 
the words "...in accordance w ith  the provisions of paragraph 1 of 
A rtic le  I I I " .
Seaworthiness is a concept w h ich  is re levan t at the inception 
of a voyage; th is is the on ly  m oment at w h ich  the w ord  has any 
legal e ffect or significance under the Common Law w h e the r the 
con tract is one of insurance or carriage of goods. The w o rd  
"seaw orthy" appearing in  A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 has to be read w ith  
th is  tim e association in m ind so tha t it  is consistently understood 
in  the same sense under the Hague Rules as i t  is under the 
Common Law. There is nothing in  the Rules w h ich  says th a t i t  is 
to be understood in  another way.
On th is  issue one can agree w ith  the decisions of the t r ia l 
judge and of the Court of Appeal in  The Chvebassa.82
S c ru tto n 8  ^ stated th a t the leg itim ate  construction of A rtic le  
IV , ru le  1 w ould be to read in to  i t  the words "before and at the 
beginning of the voyage". This w ou ld  "harm onise the p ro tection  
given by th is ru le  w ith  the obligation imposed by A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  
1...". This is a sensible construction as i t  leads to a reasonable 
resu lt and does not cause, unnecessarily, a r i f t  of the no tion  of 
seaworthiness between the Hague Rules and the Common Law.
3 - The E xception o f L a te n t D efects:
A la ten t defect in  a vessel could, bu t need not necessarily,
[1967] 2 Q.B. 250 C.A. The Court of Appeal did not reverse Me Nair.J's 
ruling on this point.
83 See Scrutton, T.E., Charterparties and bills of lading. 19th ed. by A.A. 
Mocotta, M.J. Mustill & S.C. Boyd, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1984, p. 446.
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cause a vessel to become unseaworthy. Such a defect w ould  on ly 
present a condition of unseaworthiness w hen it  affects the sh ip ’s 
a b ility  to encounter the o rd in a ry  perils of the seas, and w hen it  
exists at the beginning of the voyage.
We are here on ly in terested in  the s itua tion w here a vessel is 
re n d e re d  u n s e a w o rth y  b y  a la te n t de fec t, and th a t 
unseaw orth iness has caused a loss or damage. The fa m ilia r  
fea tu re  of concurrent causes arise, and the tussle fo r suprem acy 
is be tw een unseaw orth iness and la te n t defect, w h ich  is an 
excepted pe ril under A rtic le  IV, ru le 2 (p).
W here a cla im ant has not averred unseaworthiness or breach 
of A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 as the cause of loss, there is no th ing  to 
p reven t the ca rrie r from  heading d ire c tly  to A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 
and plead (p) as his defence. This is the "sh o rt-ro u te " w h ich  
C larke84 has recommended tha t the Englishman should adopt. A 
pu rsu it of th is path, the said w r ite r  reckons, would lead the court 
to the issue o f seaw orth iness as "an in te g ra l aspect o f the 
exception itse lf" invo lves proof by the ca rrie r tha t due diligence 
had been exercised to make the ship seaworthy.
This preposition  presupposes th a t the la ten t defect exists at 
the incep tion  of the voyage and also tha t i t  render the vessel 
unseaworthy, w h ich  may not be the case. A dem onstra tion tha t 
the loss or damage was caused by a la te n t defect is lik e ly , bu t 
need not necessarily in  the m a jo rity  of cases, to upheave the 
issue of seaworthiness and provide the proof tha t due diligence 
had been exercised to make the ship seaworthy. But th is  need
84 The "short-route" is the Frenchman's approach, see Clarke, M.A., 
"Aspects of the Hague Rules, a .Comparative study in English and French 
Law ". The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p. 174.
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not always be the case as the character of a la ten t defect is one 
tha t could not be discovered by the exercise of due diligence and 
not one th a t has not been discovered by the exercise of due 
diligence.
The exercise of due diligence in  (p) re fe rs  s tr ic t ly  to the 
character of the defect, ra the r than the conduct or behaviour of 
the carrier. The ca rrie r in  fact does not re a lly  have to show tha t 
he had actua lly  exercised due diligence to prove a case of la te n t 
defect under A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (p). The defect itse lf, e g, a h a ir ­
line frac tu re , metal fatigue, could sometimes te ll of its character 
and tha t even i f  due diligence was exercised, i t  w ou ld  no t have 
disclosed its existence. Where unseaworthiness is not specifica lly  
pleaded, the ca rrie r could take th is "sh o rt-ro u te " and re ly  on 
A rtic le  IV, ru le 2 (p) alone.
W here the issue of unseaw orth iness (b y  reason o f la te n t 
defects) as a cause of loss is in itia te d  by the p la in t if f  w hen he 
opens his case or is tendered as re b u tta l evidence to contest the 
r ig h t o f the ca rrie r's  re liance on (p) to exem pt h im se lf fro m  
lia b ility ,  the ca rrie r may have to re fe r to A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 to 
exonerate h im se lf from  legal respons ib ility . The ca rrie r may be 
able to prove th a t the loss was caused by a la te n t de fe c t8  ^
w ith in  the term s of A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (p), bu t can he also satisfy 
the cou rt th a t the loss was not caused by his "w a n t of due 
diligence to make the ship seaworthy" under A rtic le  IV , ru le  1?
I f  the ca rrie r can show tha t he did exercise due diligence, by 
w a y  of usual inspections and a tte n tio n , to make the ship
8 5 By showing the characteristics of the defect, i.e, one that could not 
be discovered by the exercise of due diligence.
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seaw orthy and insp ite  of tha t exercise the loss s t ill came about, 
he has succeeded.
The court w ou ld  have no choice, in  such a case, b u t to draw  
the in ference th a t the defect was of a la te n t na ture . I f  i t  was 
pa tent i t  w ou ld  have showed its e lf du ring  the exam ination; as 
the exercise of due diligence did not expose it, the defect has to 
be latent. The carrier, under this circumstance, is in  effect re ly ing  
on A rtic le  IV , ru le  1, and possibly A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (p) to free 
h im se lf from  lia b ility .
This was precisely the reason w h y  Lord W rig h t in  the S m ith  
Hogg86 case has declared tha t a qua lified  fo rm  of exception of 
l ia b il i ty  fo r unseaworthiness, one like  A rtic le  IV , ru le  1, bears a 
b u ilt- in  exception of lia b ili ty  fo r la te n t defects. He held th a t an 
exception of lia b ility  fo r unseaworthiness, w h ich  is subject to the 
exercise of due diligence as a condition, could on ly  excuse la te n t 
de fects .87 The proof of the exercise of due diligence fu rn ish e d  
w ou ld  itse lf establish the nature  of the defect. This is the on ly  
fo rg iveab le  fo rm  of unseaworth iness w h ich  A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 
contem plates. I t  was in tended by the Hague Rules w hen  th e y  
reduced the absolute Common Law ob liga tion to the exercise of 
due diligence.88
86 [1940] A.C. 997.
87 [1940] A.C. 997 at p. 1001.
88 See per Lord Keith in The Muncaster Castle [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57 at 
p. 87, "He w ill be protected against latent defects /in  the strict sense, in 
work done on his ship, that is to say, defects not due to any neglect 
workmanship of repairers or others employed by the repairers and, as I see 
it, against defects making for unseaworthiness in the ship, however 
caused, before it became his ship, if these could not be discovered by him, 
or competent experts employed by him, by the exercise of due diligence."
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A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 alone affords a com plete defence to the 
ca rrie r fo r a loss caused by unseaworthiness by reason of la ten t 
defects. I t  w ould not be necessary fo r him  to resort to A rtic le  IV , 
ru le  2 (p). This approach was adopted by H ilbery.J in  C ranfie ld  
B ro thers  L td . V. Tatem Steam N avigation Co.. L td ..89 w ho on 
a rr iv in g  at the conclusion tha t the unseaworthiness (caused by a 
correded r iv e t)  was not caused by the w an t of due diligence on 
the part of the carrie r to make the ship seaworthy, said tha t th is 
was su ffic ien t to answer the claim.
In  Union of Ind ia  V. Reederij Am sterdam  (The A m s te ls lo l),90 
McNair.J., the tr ia l judge and the House of Lords both discharged 
the carriers from  lia b ility  on the ground tha t the shipowners had 
established tha t they  had exercised due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy. The tribuna ls  paid lit t le  a tten tion to the c a rr ie r ’s 
plea, th a t the b reakdow n of the vessel's red uc tio n  gear was 
caused by a fa tigue crack w h ich  was unknow n to them  and was 
not detectable by v isua l inspection, and th e ir reliance on A rtic le  
IV , ru le  2 (p).
This approach irr ita te s  Clarke,9 ! who w ould ra th e r the courts 
to adopt A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (p) as the basis of th e ir  decision to 
a rrive  at the same conclusion.
As the vessel was adm itted to be unseaw orthy and th a t was 
specifica lly pleaded by the cargo-owners as the cause of loss, the 
court took pains to go th rough  the process of exam in ing  the
89 (1939) 64 Ll.L.Rep. 264.
99 [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 539, [19631 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223, hereafter reffered  
to as The Amstelslot.
9 ! See Clarke, op.cit. at p. 212.
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conduct of the carriers. They fe lt  th a t they had to be satisfied 
th a t the loss was not caused by the "w ant of due d iligence" on 
the p a rt o f the ca rrie rs  to make the ship se a w o rth y , in  
accordance w ith  the term s of A rtic le  IV , ru le  1. They realised 
tha t once th is issue was cleared up the question of lia b il i ty  w ould  
sort itse lf out. The court perhaps took a longer and more tedious 
rou te  than  Clarke w ou ld  have done to a rr iv e  at the same 
destination. But there are reasons fo r this.
F irs tly , the judges' reluctance to gallop s tra igh t to A rtic le  IV , 
ru le  2 (p) was la rge ly  a ttr ib u tab le  to the ir Common Law tra in in g  
and background.
Secondly, Lord W righ t's  "a" cause the o ry  of causation could 
have cautioned and deterred them from  invok ing  A rtic le  IV , ru le  
2 (p ) s tra ig h ta w a y  as the basis o f th e ir  ju d g e m e n ts ,
unseaworth iness being shown to exist as a cause of loss could 
d ilu te  or negate the operation of la ten t defect as a cause of loss, 
even though i t  was excepted by A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (p), assuming 
tha t i t  is capable of free ing the carrie r from  lia b ility  fo r a ll types 
of la te n t defects, includ ing those (existing at the com m encement 
of the voyage) w h ich  render the vessel unseaworthy.
Scrutton L.J's comment, on the applica tion of an exception of 
l ia b i l i t y  fo r  la te n t defects, in  The C h ris te l V in n e n 92 is 
p a rticu la rly  re levan t here.
The judge s itting  in  the Court of Appeal declared tha t a sim ple 
and unqua lified  exception of l ia b il i ty  fo r la te n t defects is on ly  
adequate to protect the ca rrie r from  lia b il i ty  fo r loss caused by 
la te n t defects w h ich  comes in to  life  du rin g  the course o f a
92 [1924] P. 208.
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voyage.9  ^ i f  th is was the reason fo r taking the longer route, the 
cou rt ought to have made th is  clear in  its  judgem ent. And 
Clarke's "short-rou te " w ould  have to be reconsidered fo r he has 
assumed th a t A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (p) shields the ca rr ie r fro m  
lia b i l i ty  fo r a ll la te n t defects, regardless of the  tim e  o f th e ir  
fo rm ation .
The outcome of The A m ste ls lo t94 has im p lic it ly  acknowledged 
the fact tha t there is an exception of l ia b il i ty  fo r a la ten t defect 
of a k ind  w h ich  causes a vessel to become unseaworthy, inhe ren t 
in  A rtic le  IV , ru le  1. I f  th is is the case, then A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (p) 
may, to p re ven t d u p lic ity  of exem ptions, have to be confined 
m ere ly  to la te n t defects w h ich  come in to  existence a fte r the 
com m encem ent of a voyage and w h ich  do not rende r a vessel 
unseaw orthy. A d irec t plunge in to  A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (p) w ould , 
therefore, be short-sighted as w e ll as unwise.
The question w h ich  must be asked in  th is connection is: W hat 
if  the ca rrie r has lit t le  or nothing on record to show th a t he had 
in  fac t exercised due diligence to make the ship seaw orthy as 
expected of him  by A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le 1 and A rtic le  IV , ru le  1, bu t is 
able to prove, by means of extraneous expert evidence th a t the 
defect w h ich  caused the loss is of a la ten t character, can he s till 
avoid l ia b ility  when he has not in  fact exercised any diligence?
I f  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 is a general o ve rrid in g  ob liga tion , the
9  ^ Article IV , rule 2 (p) states: "Latent defects not discoverable by due 
diligence". I t  is not qualified by any time element. According to Scrutton 
L.J's point of view, it would not be exact enough to protect the carrier from  
the case of loss or damage caused by a latent defect, which exists at the 
inception of the voyage, rendering the vessel unseaworthy.
94 [19631 2 Lloyd's Rep. 223.
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ca rrie r w ou ld  have f ir s t  to prove th a t he had exercised due 
d iligence to make the ship seaw orthy  be fore  he w o u ld  be 
allowed to go s tra igh t to A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (p) to show th a t the 
loss was caused by a la ten t defect or any other excepted peril. As 
he is unable to com ply w ith  th is  p re requ is ite  he w ou ld  be held 
liab le  fo r  the loss as there are no im m u n itie s  upon w h ich  he 
could lean on.
We have e a rlie r9  ^ commented tha t an o ve rrid in g  ob liga tion  
in  th is  broad sense is untenable, and have suggested a lim ite d  
ve rs io n  of it, one based on a li te ra l in te rp re ta tio n  of Lord  
Somervell's statement. The carrier is on ly p roh ib ited  from  re ly ing  
on A rtic le  IV  w hen he has fa iled  to exercise due d iligence to 
make the ship seaw orthy, and th a t w a n t of due d iligence has 
caused the loss. Now, how does an exception of la te n t defects f i t  
w ith in  such a scheme?
Prim a facie, i t  w ou ld  appear as though the ca rrie r is liab le  i f  
he is unable to show tha t he had exercised due diligence to make 
the ship seaw orthy, and tha t unseaworth iness has caused the 
loss. A fte r ta k i’ng a harder look at the problem , one could be 
persuaded th a t th is  may no t be the case. The c a rr ie r  on 
p rov id ing  the non-d iscoverable nature of the de fect w ou ld  also 
be bring ing home the po in t tha t even i f  due diligence was in  fact 
exercised, i t  w ould have made no difference, the loss w ou ld  have 
occurred in  any case.
The observa tion  of Branson.J in  the case of C o ro o ra c io n  
A rgentina de Productores de Carnes V. Roval M ail Lines. L td .96 is
95 See pp. 165, 167.
96 (1939) 64 Ll.L.Rep. 188.
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of particu la r in terest. He stated:97
"Supposing th a t one had a ta il-s h a ft w h ich  had a 
fla w  in  i t  w h ich  nobody could possibly discover by 
an exam ination short of destroying the th ing , and 
tha t ta il-sh a ft broke, i t  w ould  be no answer to the 
shipowner's defence tha t there was a la te n t defect 
not d iscoverable by due diligence, to say th a t i t  
m ight be he had not exercised any diligence to look 
at the ta il-sh a ft at all. I f  the defect is such tha t i t  
cannot be discoverable by due diligence i t  becomes 
im m a te ria l to consider w he the r due diligence was 
exercised or not, because ex h y p o t h e s i  i f  i t  had 
been exercised i t  w o u ld  have been useless." 
[o rig ina l emphasis].
According to Branson.J, i t  w ou ld  be fu t ile  in  such a case to 
enqu ire  w he the r the sh ipow ner had exercised due diligence to 
discover the defect w hen no am ount of care or diligence w ou ld  
have brought i t  to ligh t.
On th is  issue, one can agree w ith  the o b ite r d ic tum  of 
Branson.J, bu t i t  is also possible, in  th is connection, to re ly  on the 
actual w ord ing  of A rtic le  IV, ru le  1. The carrier, under th is  ru le, 
is o n ly  liab le  fo r  "loss or damage aris ing  or re su ltin g  fro m  
unseaworthiness unless caused by w a n t of due diligence" on his 
pa rt to make the ship seaworthy.
A d m itte d ly , th is is a loss caused by unseaworthiness. But can 
one e ffec tive ly  say tha t the unseaworthiness (by reason o f la ten t 
defect) is caused by the "w ant of due diligence" w hen no am ount 
of due diligence, even i f  exercised, w ou ld  have revea led  the
97 Ibid, at p. 192.
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presence o f the de fect w h ic h  rende red  her un se a w o rth y . 
According to th is construction of A rtic le  IV , ru le  1, the loss is not 
caused by  "the w a n t o f the exercise of due d iligence", and 
therefore the carrie r is not liable.
The specia l q u a lity  o f a la te n t defect, be ing  one no t 
d iscove rab le  by the exercise of due d iligence  and care, 
harmonises conven iently  w ith  the scheme of a reduced w a rra n ty  
of seaworthiness based on the exercise of due diligence to make 
the vessel seaworthy contained in  A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1.
I f  the defect, w h ich  rendered the vessel unseaworthy, was not 
a la ten t defect w ith in  the s tr ic t meaning of the term , there is no 
w ay the carrie r could re ly  on A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 or A rtic le  IV , ru le  
2 (p). The defect, i f  not la tent, has to be pa tent and the re fo re  
discoverable by the exercise of due diligence. The ca rrie r w ou ld  
have breached the w a rra n ty  to exercise due diligence to make 
the ship seaw orthy ; the n a tu re  of the de fect be ing one 
discoverable by the exercise of due diligence, the defect ought not 
to have passed unnoticed or undetected. I f  the patent defect was 
no t detected, the ca rr ie r could no t have exercised the due 
diligence and care expected of h im  by A rtic le  I I I ,  ru le  1 and 
A rtic le  IV, ru le  1.
I f  the cause of loss was a ttr ib u ta b le  to a la te n t defect not 
discoverable by the exercise of due diligence, A rtic le  IV , ru le  1 
w ould apply; the carrie r need not re ly  on A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (p) to 
extrica te  h im se lf from  lia b ility . I t  is no answer to say th a t the 
carrie r did not exercise due diligence fo r even if  he did, he w ould  
no t have le a rn t any th ing  regard ing  the defect, its  in h e re n t 
q u a lity  being one tha t "could" not be discovered by the exercise
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of due diligence.
Accordingly, one can conclude that, the regime of a reduced or 
lim ite d  w a rra n ty  of seaworthiness does incorpora te  w ith in  its 
fra m e w o rk  an exception of l ia b i l i ty  fo r la te n t defects w h ich  
render a vessel unseaw orthy. The exercise of due diligence or 
reasonable care, w h ich  is the standard of conduct set by A rtic le  
I I I ,  ru le  1 of the Hague Rules fo r the re sp o n s ib ility  as regards 
seaworthiness, coincides snugly w ith  the in tr in s ic  a ttr ib u te  of a 
la te n t defect, one not d iscoverab le  by the exercise of due 
diligence.
4 - The C a tch -a ll E xce p tio n :
Having lis ted sixteen specific instances in  w h ich  the carrie r's  
l ia b il i ty  fo r loss or damage w i l l  be excluded, the Hague Rules 
conclude the catalogue in  A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 w ith  the fo llo w in g  
general excu lpa tory provision:
"A ny other cause arising w ith o u t the actual fa u lt  
or p r iv ity  of the ca rrie r, or w ith o u t the fa u lt  or 
neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, bu t 
the burden of proof shall be on the person cla im ing 
the bene fit of th is exception to show tha t ne ithe r 
the actual fa u lt  or p r iv ity  of the ca rrie r nor the 
fa u lt or neglect of the agents or servants of the 
ca rrie r contributed to the loss or damage."98
I t  is n o te w o rth y  tha t the w ords "actual fa u lt  or p r iv ity "  in  
A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (q) appears also in  A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (b) w h ich  
is the exception fro m  l ia b il i ty  fo r loss or damage caused by
98 Article IV , rule 2 (q) of the Hague Rules.
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f i r e , "  and in section 502 of the M erchant Shipping Act 1894 
w h ich  has been replaced by section 18 of the M erchant Shipping 
Act 1979 on December 1, 1986. Section 502 provides:
"The ow ner of a B rit is h  sea-going ship, or any 
share there in , shall not be liab le  to make good to 
any e x te n t w h a te v e r any loss or dam age 
happening w ith o u t his actual fa u lt  or p r iv ity  in  
the fo llow ing  cases, namely:
(i) W here any goods, merchandise, or o ther th ings 
w hatsoever taken in or pu t on board his ship are
lost or damaged by reason of f ire  on board the
ship;..."100
Under A rtic le  IV , ru le 2 (q) of the Hague Rules, the ca rrie r can 
there fore  avoid lia b ility  fo r any loss or damage p rov id ing  tha t he 
can establish tha t i t  occurred w ith o u t his own fa u lt  or p r iv ity
and i t  did not resu lt from  any fa u lt or neglect on the p a rt of his
servants or agents.
However, i t  is im p o rta n t to m ention here tha t the use of the 
words "fau lt or p r iv ity "  in  A rtic le  IV , ru le 2 (q) have been held to 
mean "fa u lt and p r iv ity " .101 "Actual fa u lt or p r iv ity "  is d iff ic u lt  to 
app ly now tha t nearly  a ll ships are owned by companies ra th e r
"  Article IV , rule 2 (b) of the Hague Rules provides: "Neither the 
carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or 
resulting from  fire, unless caused by the actual fau lt or p riv ity  of the 
carrier."
100 For a discussion on the concept of "fault or privity" w ith in  the 
context of the Merchant Shipping Act, see chapter one at pp. 60-63.
101 Hourani V. Harrison (1927) 28 Ll.L.Rep. 120, see also per Lord W right 
in £al.ei.s.gn-Stgamships. Ltd. v. Canadian Co-Operative Wheat Producers. L td .
[1934] A.C. 538 at p. 549.
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than in d iv id u a ls  or pa rtne rsh ips. In  such a case the courts 
examine the fa u lt or p r iv ity  of the person actua lly  in  con tro l of 
the com pany.102
I t  must be noted tha t problem s have arisen w ith  regard the 
a p p lica b ility  of the th is exception to cases of p ilferage and the ft. 
Such actions are h a rd ly  com m itted "w ith o u t the fa u lt or neglect 
of the agents or servants of the carrier".
A questionable d istinction was, however, draw n in  Leesh River 
Tea Co. V .  B ritish  Ind ia  Steam N a v i g a t i o n  C o . 1Q3 w here damage to 
cargo resu lted  fro m  the th e ft  o f a storm  va lve  cover by 
stevedores employed b y  the carrie r to discharge a cargo of tea at 
Port Sudan. The ca rrie r satisfied the court th a t the th e ft  had 
invo lved no negligence on the part of the ship's officers and crew, 
b u t the question s t il l rem ained as to w h e the r he has to take 
re s p o n s ib ility  fo r the acts of the stevedores who, a d m itte d ly , 
were independent contractors.
The Court o f A ppea l d rew  a d is tin c tio n  be tw een  th e fts  
com m itted in  the course of em ploym ent, i.e. the fts  of cargo, and 
the fts  w h ich  had no connection w ith  the w o rk  the independent 
contractors were engaged to perform . As the th e ft of the storm  
va lve  cover fo rm ed no pa rt of the discharging opera tion , the 
ca rrie r was not requ ired  to take re sp o n s ib ility  fo r i t  and could 
accordingly invoke A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (q) exception to defeat the 
cargo-owners' claim.
Sellers L.J. jus tified  the decision in  the fo llow ing way:
102 See Lennard Carrying Company V. Asiatic Petroleum [19151 A.C. 705.
1Q3 [1966] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 193.
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" In  the present case the act of the th ie f ought, I 
th ink , to be regarded as the act of a stranger. The 
th ie f in  in te rfe r in g  w ith  the ship and making her, 
as a consequence, unseaworthy, was perfo rm ing no 
d u ty  fo r the shipowner at all, ne ithe r neg ligen tly , 
nor de libe ra te ly , nor d ishonestly. He was not in  
fact th e ir servant...The appellants were on ly  liab le  
fo r  h is acts w h en  he, as a se rva n t o f the 
stevedores, was acting on behalf of the appellants 
in  the fu lf i lm e n t  of the w o rk  fo r  w h ic h  the
stevedores had been engaged."104
In  th is connection T e tle y10  ^ argued tha t the d is tinc tion  draw n 
by the Court of Appeal is a tr if le  one. He declared tha t A rtic le  IV, 
ru le  2 (q) makes no m ention as to w h e th e r the servants or 
agents m ust be acting w ith in  the scope of th e ir em p loym en t in  
o rder th a t the ca rrie r be responsible fo r them . I t  is subm itted  
th a t to add such a meaning to the te x t w ou ld  be to assume 
something tha t is not there.
Accordingly, he stated:106
"To say th a t a se rvan t or agent is ou ts ide his 
e m p lo ym e n t w hen  he pe rfo rm s a to rtu o u s  or 
de lic tua l act, because th a t is no t the act he was 
em p lo yed  to do, seems to s tra in  the  Law  
p a rtic u la r ly  as A rtic le  IV , ru le  2 (q) makes no 
m ention tha t the fa u lt must be w ith in  the scope of 
the servants’ or agents' em ploym ent."
104 Ibid, at p. 200.
105 See Tetley, op.cit at p. 249.
106 Ibid, at p. 250.
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In the said case, Me Nair.J. in the f irs t  instance he ld :107
"...it was argued in  the present case tha t i t  could 
not be said tha t the act of the stevedore’s men in  
removing the cover plate was an act done by  h im  
in  the course or scope of his e m p lo ym e n t,  
p r im a r ily ,  as I understood the argument (bu t not 
w h o l ly )  on the ground tha t the stevedores were 
not engaged to perform  any function in re la tion to 
the p la in t i f f 's  goods in  the low er hold. In  my 
judgem ent, tha t argum ent is not w e ll  founded.
F irs t ly  because the s ta tu to ry  p rov is ion  in  sub­
para.(q) does not contain the words^ "in the course 
of or in the scope of his authority", and there is no 
necessity to im p ly  them; and, secondly, because the 
Common Law background againjst w h ic h  the 
exceptions in  A r t ic le  IV , ru le  2, have to be 
construed is not the background of an o rd in a ry  
bailee or o rd ina ry  principal."
The Court of A ppea l108 failed to consider the Hague Rules as a 
sta tute w h ich  spec if ica lly  cails on carr ie rs  to c a re fu l ly  and 
p ro pe r ly  care fo r  the cargo under A rt ic le  I I I ,  ru le  2 and on ly  
exculpates carriers  i f  they, th e ir  servants and agents do not 
contribute to the loss.
I t  is subm itted  tha t the op in ion of Me Nair.J. in  the f i r s t  
instance in Leesh River Tea Co. V. British India Steam Navigation 
Co.109 is a better in te rpre ta tion  of the Law.
107 [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 450 at p. 460.
108 [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 193.
109 [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 450.
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I I -  U nder the  H am burg  Rules:
I t  has already been mentioned tha t the Hague Rules set fo r th  
a lis t of causes for w h ich  the carrier shall not be responsible.
In  fra m in g  a un ifo rm  and com prehensive test of ca rr ie r  
l ia b i l i ty  the d ra ftsm en of the Hamburg Rules have chosen to 
state an a ff irm a t ive  ru le  of respons ib il i ty  based on presumed 
fa u l t  and to abolish the catalogue of exceptions contained in 
A rtic le  IV, ru le 2 of the Hague Rules as w e ll as the concepts of 
"due diligence" and "unseaworthiness".
Accord ing ly , A r t ic le  5 of the Hamburg Rules announces a 
single ru le  co n tro ll ing  ca rr ie r  e x o n e ra t io n 110 in  lieu of the 
catalogue of exceptions available under the Hague Rules.
The most s ign if ican t change th a t w ou ld  re su lt  f ro m  the 
adoption of the Hamburg Rules can be summarised in three main 
points.
First, the Hamburg Rules e lim inate the Hague Rules’ catalogue 
of exceptions and in  its place is the concept tha t the carr ie r is 
liab le unless he proves tha t he took all measures th a t could 
reasonab ly  be re q u ire d  to avo id the occurrence and its 
consequences. Second, the exception to l ia b i l i ty  fo r  negligence in 
the navigation and management of the ship as i t  existed under 
the Hague Rules has been abolished. Third , the new Convention 
narrow ed the f ire  exception to hold the ca rr ie r liab le fo r  the 
negligent acts of the crew in starting or f igh ting a fire.
110 Article 5, rule 1 of the Hamburg Rules provides in pertinent part: 
"The carrier is liable...unless the carrier proves that he, his servants or 
agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the 
occurrence and its consequences."
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1- The E l im in a t io n  o f the  Hague Rules' Cata logue of 
E x c e p t io n s :
I t  is convenient to observe here tha t the whole lis t  of the 
exceptions in  the Hague Rules can be said to be causes fo r loss or 
damage to cargo fo r  w h ich  the carr ie r cannot be blamed, or to 
bo rrow  the te rm  used in The M arine Su lphur Queen,111 the 
"u nco n tro l lab le  causes". In  o the r w ords , th is  catalogue of 
exceptions set fo r th  circumstances in which the carrier would not 
be considered at fau lt, and thus had no independent significance 
ou ts ide  the genera l ru le  th a t  the c a rr ie r  w o u ld  be he ld 
r e s p o n s ib le o n ly w h e r e h e is a t fa u l t . i l2
In  so fa r as the m ajority  of the exceptions listed in the Hague 
Rules did not in  fact invo lve fa u lt  on the part of the c a r r i e r , !  13 
the effect of the abolit ion of the catalogue on ca rr ie r  l ia b i l i ty  
should be minimal.
The W orking Group concluded that these exceptions were not 
satisfactory, as they did not describe all the circumstances tha t 
m ight arise in wh ich the carrier would be at fau lt, and therefore, 
had produced uncerta in ty and unnecessary l i t ig a t io n . ! !4
Accordingly, i t  should be beneficial from  a legal s tandpoin t in 
rem ov ing  unnecessary unce rta in ty  surround ing  the d e f in i t io n  
and exten t of such exceptions, w h ich  are m ere ly  examples of 
c ircum stances in  w h ich  fa u l t  cannot be a t t r ib u te d  to the
H I  [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 285.
112 See Kimball, J.D, "Shipowner's Liability and the Proposed Revision of 
the Hague Rules", (1975 /76 ) 7 T.M.L.C. 217 at p. 237.
113 See Article IV , rule 2 (c) - (p) of the Hague Rules.
114 See Report of the Working Group on International Legislation on
Shipping on the work of its fourth (special) session held in Geneva from 25
September to 6 October 1972, U.N. Doc A/CN. 9 /74 , at 9-11.
190
c a r r ie r .1 i5 in  this connection, the Egyptian delegate, during the 
conference, stated tha t the l is t  of exceptions w e re  m ere ly  
i l lus tra tive  and not m andatory.116
However, i t  is no tew o rthy  tha t w r i te rs  are not of the same 
opinion on the question of the e lim ination of the Hague Rules’ lis t 
of exceptions. On this issue, Carey117 stated:
"I do no t share the v ie w  of some th a t  the 
enumerated defenses set fo r th  in the excu lpatory 
p rov is ions  of the Hague Rules w o u ld  not be 
available to the carr ie r under the Hamburg Rules.
Indeed, i t  seems to me that under that portion  of 
A rtic le  5 (1 ) ,  w h ich  provides tha t the carr ie r w i l l  
be liab le "unless” , we must presuppose th a t the 
various defenses w h ich  would have been available 
to the c a r r ie r ,  absent, of course, e r ro r  in  
management and navigation surv ive. Thus, i f  the 
carrier can prove (and surely i t  is his burden to do 
so) th a t  he took a ll measures th a t  cou ld  
reasonably be required, he w i l l  not be liable."
This la tte r  v ie w  is supported by an im p o r ta n t  observa tion  
made by  the M arit im e  Law Association of the United States, 
w h ich  in  re fe rr in g  to the exoneration language conta ined in
1 1  ^ See Wilson, "Basic carrier liab ility  and the right of lim itation", 
op.cit.. at p. 140.
116 See Sweeney, J.C, "The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of 
Goods by Sea (Part I)", (1975 /76 ) 7 T.M.L.C. 69 at p. 105.
117 See Carey, J.E, "Will the Hamburg Rules Prove to be a Lawyer's  
Bonanza From the Cargo Plaintiff's Point of View", published in The  
Speakers' Papers for the Bill of Lading Conventions Conference. New york, 
November 29 /30 , 1978, organised by Lloyd's of London Press, p. 4.
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Artic le 5, rule 1 of the Hamburg Rules, stated that':118
"This language w o u ld  seem to abo lish  the  
trad it iona l defenses provided by  the Hague Rules, 
w i th  the exception of A rtic le  IV, rule 2 (q)...the f ire  
defense is retained in a modified form . In  rea lity , 
however, the on ly trad it iona l defenses tha t w ou ld  
be e ffec tive ly  abolished are the erro r in navigation 
or management defenses. A ll  o ther Hague Rules 
defenses, such as perils of the sea, act of God, act of 
war, strikes, insu ff ic iency  of packing, etc, w ou ld  
appear s t i l l  to be available. They are causes over 
w h ich  the ca rr ie r  may not have contro l, and 
which, therefore, would not l ike ly  be caused by his 
negligence."
From the above cited observations, one can therefore conclude 
that, the h istorica l exceptions to the carrier's l ia b il i ty ,  inc lud ing 
inheren t vice of the goods, act of God, fau lt  of the shipper or his 
agents, and all other causes beyond the control of the carrier and 
his agents and servants, i f  shown by the carrier to be the cause 
of the loss, w ould  s t i l l  exonerate the shipowner from  l ia b i l i ty  
under the Hamburg Rules.
2 - The A b o l i t io n  of the Exception fo r  Negligence in  the  
N a v ig a t io n  or M anagem ent o f the  S h in :
I t  is w e ll established that under the Hague Rules, there is an 
exceptional s itua tion  where the sh ipowner is pro tected f ro m  
l ia b i l i ty  fo r  loss or damage caused by the negligence of his own
118 Maritime Law Association of the United States, Special Report of the 
Committee on Bills of Lading Regarding the UNCITRAL Draft of New Rules 
for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, (1977), at 6.
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servants "in the navigation or in the management of the ship".119
Undoubtedly, th is is the most im p o rtan t exception from  the 
carrier's  po in t of v ie w  since i t  e ither e ffe c t ive ly  exempts the 
carrie r from  l ia b i l i ty  in  large num ber of cases invo lv ing  loss or 
damage to cargo, or at least i t  enables h im  in the m a jo r ity  of 
these cases to obtain a favou rab ly  compromising settlement. But 
i t  is also the exception w h ich  p rov ides the most d i f f ic u l t  
problems of in te rp re ta tion .120 As Giles said:121
"The d if f icu lty  of this clause lies in the fact that so 
many things are done on a ship in  the course of its 
voyage th a t i t  is sometimes not easy to say 
whether any one act was done in the course of the 
management of the ship."
Cargo interests had long contended tha t i t  was inv id ious tha t 
a carrier, in complete control of vessel and cargo, should exclude 
such l ia b i l i ty  wh ich  was basic to the contract of carriage.122 But 
the carriers alleged that such a change would substantia lly  alter 
the present balance of r isk  allocation, and the resu lt w ou ld  be 
the im position  of h igher fre igh ts  to account fo r h igher l ia b i l i ty  
insurance c o s t s .123
119 See Article IV , rule 2 (a) of the Hague Rules.
120 See Tetlev. op.cit.. at p. 171.
121 See Chorley, R.S., k  Giles, O.C., Shipping Law , 8th ed. by N.J.J. Gaskell 
et Al, London, Pitman Publishing, 1987, p. 204.
122 See Wilson. "Basic carrier liab ility  and the right of lim itation", 
fl.P.,cit., at p. 140.
1 2 3 See Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group on the w ork of its 
fourth session (A /CN.9/74), para. 22.
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However, in  the course of the UNCTAD and UNCITRAL's 
debates, there has been a great deal of co n trove rsy  as to 
w h e th e r  the exception of the negligence in  na v ig a t io n  or 
management of the ship should be retained.
I t  is believed by UNCTAD and UNCITRAL tha t the exceptions of 
negligent navigation and negligent management of the ship are 
something of an anachronism. And the historica l jus tif ica tion  for 
these odd defences has been explained as follows:
" I n  the n ine teenth  century, the era in w h ich  the 
princ ip les behind the 1924 Rules were maturing, 
shipowner and vessel were often out of contact fo r 
long periods. In  such circumstances, and w i th  
nav iga tion  dependent on f ine  judgem ent ra th e r 
than technology, a sea voyage was a common 
ven tu re  and risks were shared between ship and 
cargo. The special defences to protect the carr ie r 
f ro m  l ia b i l i t y  in  a catastroph ic  s itua t ion  were  
th e re fo re  no t necessarily  to be regarded  as 
unreasonabie."l24
I t  is n o te w o rth y  tha t the abo lit ion  of the exception fo r  
neg ligen t nav iga tion  and management of the ship was also 
ju s t i f ie d  on the ground that, the d ra fte rs  of the Ham burg  
Convention sought to harmonize the rules fo r d if fe re n t modes of 
transport.
The key argument fo r harmonization lay in the rem ova l of a 
s im ila r navigationa l exception from  the Warsaw Convention on
124 Quoted from McGilchrist, N.R., "The New Hague Rules", (1974 )
luMJLLQ. 255 at p. 259.
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air carriage.125
U nti l 1955,126 the Warsaw Convention had contained a clause 
exonerating the ca rr ie r  from  l ia b i l i ty  in  hand ling or p ilo ting  
a i r c r a f t . I27 The Hamburg Rules Conference assumed tha t the 
exception was no more necessary fo r  marine tran spo rt than i t  
was fo r air tran spo rt. !28
On the other hand, i t  is generally  recognised tha t under the 
Hague Rules, the conflict between the exception covering fa u lt  in 
the management of the ship and the c a r r ie r ’s d u ty  of care in  
re lation to the cargo (set out in Artic le  I I I ,  rule 2) had resulted in 
considerable uncerta in ty and li t iga tion .129
The W ork ing  group on In te rn a t io n a l Shipp ing Leg is la tion  
concluded th a t  an unnecessary source of l i t ig a t io n  can be 
avoided, b y  e l im in a t in g  the ca rr ie r 's  exone ra t ion  fo r  the
125 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air (The Warsaw Convention) signed at Warsaw  
on 12 Oct, 1929.
12  ^ Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention, September 28, 1955.
127 Warsaw Convention, supra note 125, Article 20 (2) provides:
"In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not be 
liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an error in piloting, 
in the handling of the aircraft, or in the navigation and that, in all other 
respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the 
loss."
128 A fina l attem pt by Belgium, Japan, Poland and the U.S.S.R to 
reintroduce the defense of negligent navigation alone failed because the 
Working Group viewed the economic data concerning projected shipping 
cost increases based on the removal of the exception1 as speculative. See 
Sweeney, J.C., "The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea 
(Part V)" (1977) 8 T.M.L.C. 167 at p. 1 8 1.
129 See Diamond, A., "The division of liability as between ship and cargo 
under the new Rules proposed by UNCITRAL", (1977) L.M.C L.O. 39 at p. 48, 
see also Gilmore & Black, op.cit.. at p. 156.
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negligence of the master or c r e w . 1 30
Finally, the ca rr ie r ’s exception from  l ia b i l i ty  fo r  loss caused by 
an e r ro r  in  n a v ig a t io n  or m anagem ent of the ship was 
elim inated, and this represents a defin ite sh ift in  r isk  from  cargo 
to ship.
The rem ova l of the nav igation and management exception, 
however, represented one side of a compromise between shipper 
and ca rr ie r  nations achieved by the W ork ing  Group at the 
suggestion of Nigeria. 131 The ca rr ie r  nations agreed to th is  
p rov is ion  in  exchange fo r  the re ten t ion  of the f i re  exception 
wh ich has been modified so as to produce a d iffe ren t result.
3 -  The M o d if ic a t io n  of the  F ire E xcep tion :
Under the Hague Rules, the carrier is protected from  l ia b i l i ty  
arising from  f ire  unless caused by his actual fa u lt  or p r i v i t y . 1 3 2  
This exception is amended by the Hamburg Rules. The carr ie r 
under the Hamburg Rules is liable fo r loss or damage caused by 
f i re  i f  the c la im ant proves th a t the f ire  arose fro m  fa u l t  or 
neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents.133
The Hamburg Rules' objective in effecting this change was the 
e l im in a t io n  of the l ia b i l i ty - f re e  pos it ion  tha t a ca r r ie r  can 
achieve under the Hague Rules by prov ing tha t a f i re  was the 
proximate cause of a loss. Proof of this fact shifts the burden of
!3 0  gee Sweeney, J.C., "The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of 
Goods by Sea (Part I)" (1975 /76 ) 7 T.M.L.C. 69 at p 111.
* 3 1 Ibid, at p. 112.
^ 2  see Article IV, rule 2 (b) of the Hague Rules.
^33 See Article 5, rule 4.a (i) of the Hamburg Rules.
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proof back to the cargo claimant, requ ir ing  him  to demonstrate 
th a t the carr ie r 's  actual p r iv i t y  ra th e r than the acts of his 
agents prox im ate ly  caused the fire.
The Hague Rules hold the carr ie r liab le  fo r  loss or damage 
resu lting from  f ire  on ly  i f  i t  is caused by by his actual fa u lt  or 
p r iv i ty .  The p ro m in en t fea tu re  of th is exception is tha t i t  is 
necessary to distinguish between the negligence of the shipowner 
and th a t  of his employees. The negligence of the ca rr ie r 's  
employees w i l l  not necessarily result in carrier l ia b il i ty ;  the fau lt  
must be that of the carrier himself.
Therefore, i t  can be said that, the app lica tion  of the f ire  
exception under the Hague Rules provides a useful analytical tool 
under the Hamburg Rules because its in te rp re ta t io n  under the 
Hague Rules foreshadowed the Hamburg Rules' im p os it ion  of 
re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  subord ina tes in  the con text of de f ic ie n t 
manning and materia l conditions. A lthough the Hague Rules hold 
the carr ie r liable on ly fo r f ire -re la te d  loss invo lv ing  his "actual 
fa u l t  or p r iv i ty " ,  courts have applied the ru le more broad ly , 
f in d in g  carr ie rs  liab le  fo r  un sea w o rth y  cond itions  causing 
f i r e s , 134 such as fa i lu re  to  m a in ta in  p rope r f i r e  f ig h t in g  
equipem ent, or in  some cases where  the negligence of crew 
members in  f igh t ing  a f ire  has been ascribed to th e ir  lack of 
tra in ing  and thus to the carrier 's  fa i lu re  to f u l f i l l  his d u ty  of 
seaworthiness.
A lth ou gh  the Hamburg Rules in tend  to hold the c a rr ie r  
v ica r ious ly  liable fo r the actions of his agents in f igh t ing  a f ire , 
the Hague Rules achieved the same resu lt through the device of
134 See, e.g., The Galileo (1932) 287 U.S. 420.
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seaworthiness.
Accordingly, one can conclude that the change w h ich  resulted 
from  the amendment of the f ire  exception by the Hamburg Rules 
is not an im portan t one fo r two reasons:
First, the f ire  on board the ship is v e ry  often found to have 
been caused by in i t ia l  unseaworthiness. I f  th is is so, then the 
ca rr ie r  is no t pro tected under the Hague Rules unless he 
exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. Secondly, 
under the Hamburg Rules, the onus of proof is pu t upon the 
claimant, namely the defence of f ire  ceases to be a defence i f  the 
cargo-owner can establish negligence of carrier, his servants or 
agents not on ly in respect of the outbreak of the fire , bu t also in 
respect of "measures that could reasonably be requ ired to put out 
the f i re  and avoid or m it iga te  its consequences."!35 But in  
practice, many claimants w i l l  be unable to adduce the necessary
evidence of negligence. 136
Having established the d i f fe re n t  s itua tions in  w h ich  the 
ca rr ie r  can exem pt h im se lf from  l ia b i l i ty  fo r  loss or damage 
caused by  unseaworth iness under both the Hague Rules and 
Hamburg Rules, we can conclude that the rules contro lling carrie r 
exoneration under the Hamburg Rules are substantia lly  d if fe ren t 
f ro m  those under the Hague Rules. Under the new Ham burg 
Rules, carriers a ttem pting exoneration w i th in  the un if ied  fa u lt  
concept must explain loss or damage to cargo w ith o u t the Hague 
Rules' advantageous order of proofs and w ith o u t the Hague Rules' 
exemptions fo r negligence.
135 gee Chorley & Giles, oo.cit.. at p. 322.
136 see Diamond. “A legal analysis of the Hamburg Rules" (part I), 
Qp.cit.. at p. 12.
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CONCLUSION
We are now in  position to look in  perspective at the d if fe ren t 
changes to w h ich  the carrier's undertaking of seaworthiness has 
been subjected to under the d if fe re n t regimes of Common and 
conventional Laws.
We have seen th roughou t our s tudy tha t the sh ipowner's  
l ia b i l i ty  in  respect of unseaworthiness under the Hague Rules 
d iffers in several aspects from  that at Common Law. The position 
of the shipowner in re lation to seaworthiness at Common Law is 
under an absolute obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. This 
is an im p lied  term  in all contracts fo r the carriage of goods by 
sea, and unless he has expressly and decis ive ly  excluded the 
te rm  in  his contract, the sh ipow ner is liab le  fo r  its  breach 
whether he has been negligent or not.
Faced w i th  such a heavy re sp o n s ib i l i ty ,  ca rr ie rs  by  sea 
entered in to  a frenzy  of ac t iv ity  aimed at developing a clause 
acceptable to the courts which would lessen the ir obligations.
Out of the many a ttem pts  at l im it in g  th e ir  ob liga tions, 
ca rr ie rs ' claims succeeded at the Hague in  1924, w h e re  by  
in te rn a t io n a l agreement the fo rm e r  absolute w a r ra n ty  was 
abandoned in favour of a reduced requ irem en t to exercise due 
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel.
That is, in fact, the purpose of the Hague Rules in a ttem pting a 
fa ir  d is tr ib u t io n  of liab il i t ies  between the parties (ca rr ie r  and 
cargo-owner) and consequently releasing the fo rm e r f ro m  the
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strict obligation im plied at Common Law.
However, i f  legislatures, courts and in te rna tiona l conferences 
have tr ied  to maintain a balance between the paramount du ty  to 
p ro tec t cargo-ow ners  and the desire to re n d e r  jus tice  to 
shipowners, i t  is subm itted  tha t the pendulum  has swung in  
favour of cargo-owners by  the decision of the House of Lords in 
Riverstone Meat Co. Ptv. L td . V. Lancashire Shipping Co. L td .. (The 
Muncaster Castle).!
The reason for that is the severity shown by the Brit ish courts 
in  the in te rp re ta t io n  of the shipowner's du ty  to exercise due 
diligence to make the ship seaworthy in the said case. The resu lt 
is that the exercise of due diligence is a du ty  of a non-delegable 
na ture . Accord ing ly , the ca rr ie r  w ou ld  rem a in  liab le  i f  any 
negligence on the part of those who may be employed by h im  to 
ensure the seaworth iness of the vessel does re s u lt  in  an 
unseaworthy condition causing loss or damage to cargo. This is 
because the courts regard negligence on the part of those parties 
as negligence on the part of the carrier himself, in  other words, 
th e ir  fa i lu re  to exercise due d iligence to make the ship 
seaworthy is his fa ilure.
Since then, the outcome of The Muncaster Castle2 became a 
great concern for the shipping industry , i t  caused quite a stir and 
considerable unrest among the carriers. The com pla int was tha t 
the decision had nu ll i f ied  and defeated the object of A rt ic le  I I I ,  
ru le 1 of the Hague Rules. A ttem pts were made to revise A rtic le  
I I I ,  rule 1 to exclude the result arr ived in the said case.
1 [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57.
2 Ibid.
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A t the Stockholm conference in 1963 a proposal to negate the 
undesired effect of The M uncaster C a s t l e  ^ was tabled. The 
B rit ish  proposal did not receive unanimous approva l and was 
th e re fo re  no t in c lu de d  in  the pro toco l. N o th ing  on th is  
materialised out of this meeting. A du ty  w h ich  comes v e ry  close 
to the absolute w a r ra n ty  of the Common Law s t i l l  reigns in  
Artic le  I I I ,  ru le 1 of the Hague Rules.
I t  has already been mentioned tha t the Hague Rules were the 
resu lt of a compromise between the interests of the carriers and 
the shippers. But the balance created by  tha t compromise is 
s u b s ta n tia l ly  changed in  fa v o u r  of the sh ipper unde r the 
Hamburg Rules.
I t  is w o r th y  of note th a t under the Ham burg Rules the 
undertak ing  of due diligence to prov ide a seaworthy ship has 
been replaced by the term  "reasonable measures" and i t  should 
be exercised at all times.
The Hamburg Rules, 1978, i f  and when ra t if ie d  by the great 
m arit im e  nations, are u n like ly  to im prove  the position of the 
carrier. The carrier, under the new basis of l ia b i l i ty -o f  A rtic le  5 
has to prove tha t "he, his servants and agents took all measures 
tha t could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its 
consequences".
According to a l i te ra l construction of this provision, he could 
be in a worse o ff position under the new regime. He has to take 
the in it ia t ive  to prove tha t he, his servants and agents took all 
measures th a t could reasonab ly  be re q u ire d  to avo id the 
occurrence and its consequences, whereas under the present
3 [ 196 1 ] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57.
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Hague Rules, his l ia b i l i ty  fo r  the acts of his servants and agents 
is premised s im p ly  on the doctrine of v icarious l ia b i l i ty .  I t  is 
h ig h ly  im p ro b a b le  th a t  a cou rt w o u ld  in te rp re t  the said 
p rov is ion  in  any w a y  w h ich  is incons is ten t w i th  the resu lt  
reached in The Muncaster Castle.4
4 Ibid.
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